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engagement et activisme actionnarial Gouvernance Nouvelles diverses

Can America’s Companies Survive America’s Most Aggressive Investors?

Quel bel article d’Alana Semuels dans The Atlantic (ici) ! Cette étude revient sur la politique des fonds de couverture (hedge funds) et l’implication de leur activisme sur les politiques et les stratégies mises en place par les entreprises américaines.

Extrait :

 

DuPont is one of dozens of American companies that have abandoned a long-term approach to doing business after being the target of so-called activist investors. These investors buy up shares of a company and attempt to maximize the returns to their shares, usually by replacing members of the board of directors with hand-picked candidates who will push the company to cut costs. Activity by such investors has skyrocketed of late. In a 20-month stretch in 2005 and 2006, there were only 52 activist campaigns, according to John C. Coffee, a professor at Columbia University Law School. Between 2010 and early 2014, by contrast, there were 1,115 activist campaigns. “Hedge-fund activism has recently spiked, almost hyperbolically,” Coffee writes in a 2016 paper, “The Wolf at The Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance.”

These campaigns are damaging to the long-term outlook of individual companies like DuPont and also to America’s economy more generally. They often result in big cuts to research and development, substantial reductions in the workforce, and a focus on outcomes—in particular short-term profit—that hurt a company’s ability to survive in the long-term. The threat of activism affects companies across the economy: Even public companies not targeted by activists often change their behavior and cut costs to avoid becoming a target. This may be one of the reasons why America is slipping in funding research and development projects when compared with other countries.

 

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

engagement et activisme actionnarial Gouvernance Normes d'encadrement Nouvelles diverses

Activisme des investisseurs : les entreprises canadiennes résistent bien

Un article du Timely Disclosure de Me Lindzon Russell aborde la situation des entreprises canadiennes face à l’activismes des investisseurs : « Canadian Issuers Continue To Have Success Against Activist Investors ». Résultat : elles résistent bien !

 

As noted in the Globe and Mail’s recent article, “In Canada’s boardrooms, activist investors are striking out” (subscription to the Globe and Mail required), Canadian listed public companies have continued to have success against activist investors. In fact, since January 1, 2015, Canadian listed issuers have a perfect record against “professional” activists in formal proxy contests, having won all six such contests to make changes to the board which were initiated by hedge funds or institutional investors. This success may be driven, at least in part, by issuers’ increased emphasis on advance preparation, including shareholder engagement. If issuers are more attuned to the views of their shareholders, it stands to reason that they will be in a better position to assess the likelihood of successfully defending against an activist in a formal proxy contest and pre-emptively settle those situations that they do not believe they can win. This explanation, while compelling, may be incomplete. With that in mind, I offer the following five observations based on a review of the public record of unsuccessful contests recently initiated by “professional” activists.

 

Je vous laisse découvrir les 5 observations de l’auteur…

 

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

engagement et activisme actionnarial Gouvernance Nouvelles diverses

Agences de conseil en vote : résultat d’une étude

Bonjour à toutes et à tous, ce matin, je vous propose de retourner sur l’intéressant sujet des agences de conseil en vote (proxy advisors) au travers ce billet du Harvard Law School Forum : « The Role of Proxy Advisory Firms: Evidence from a Regression-Discontinuity Design » (par Nadya Malenko et Yao Shen).

 

À quelle conclusion arrivent ces auteurs ?

 

Overall, our article suggests that at least based on the sample of 2010-2011 say-on-pay votes, the influence of ISS does not seem overstated. Our findings contribute to the ongoing debate on the role and economic impact of proxy advisory firms.

 

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

engagement et activisme actionnarial Gouvernance mission et composition du conseil d'administration Nouvelles diverses

Engagement et gouvernance d’entreprise

Intéressant éclairage apporté par Paula Loop sur LinkedIn à propos de la notion d’engagement qui est devenu une notion incontournable de droit de la gouvernance d’entreprise : « Shareholder engagement: What does success look like? ».

 

Petit extrait :

 

Shareholder engagement is a hot topic these days and one that is frequently debated in the C-suite and boardroom. Traditionally, executives put a lot of emphasis on the role of Investor Relations in the engagement process, only rolling up their sleeves and getting involved if there was an issue or an event that called for additional effort.

Calls for more frequent director communication

But now we’re hearing investors say that they would like to hear from key executives—and even directors—on a more regular basis. Depending on the facts and circumstances, investors might like to hear from the company annually, or in some cases, more often. For some executives and directors, this is a new paradigm

 

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

engagement et activisme actionnarial Gouvernance normes de droit Nouvelles diverses

Loi Sapin 2 : Proxinvest s’exprime sur le say on pay et les abstentions

Bonjour à toute et à tous, je relaie aujourd’hui la position de l’agence en conseil de vote Proxinvest qui réagit au fait que les députés et sénateurs sont réunis depuis le 14 septembre en Commission mixte paritaire au sujet des discussions sur le projet de loi relatif à la transparence, à la lutte contre la corruption et à la modernisation de la vie économique, dite Loi Sapin 2.

 

Que ce soit dans la version adoptée par l’Assemblée Nationale le 10 juin 2016 ou dans la version du Sénat adoptée le 8 juillet 2016, il apparaît que le projet de Loi s’intéresse désormais à la question des droits et responsabilités des actionnaires en assemblée générale. Le Forum de l’Investissement responsable (FIR), dont Proxinvest est membre, a d’ores et déjà pris une position publique en faveur du vote annuel contraignant des actionnaires en assemblée générale sur les rémunérations des dirigeants tel qu’adopté en première lecture par l’Assemblée Nationale. Proxinvest se mobilise également en écrivant aux membres de la Commission pour les inviter à adopter ce vote annuel contraignant sur la rémunération des dirigeants et à abandonner le projet de réforme de la comptabilisation des abstentions en assemblée générale.

 

Voir la position de Proxinvest : « Loi Sapin 2 : Proxinvest exprime ses positions aux membres de la Commission mixte paritaire ».

 

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

autres publications engagement et activisme actionnarial Nouvelles diverses

Exit, Voice and Loyalty from the Perspective of Hedge Funds Activism in Corporate Governance

Bonjour à toutes et à tous, en voilà un bel article ! « Exit, Voice and Loyalty from the Perspective of Hedge Funds Activism in Corporate Governance » d’Alessio Pacces (Law Working Paper No. 320/2016) revient sur les thématiques de l’activisme des hedge funds, du court-termisme et des multiples classes d’actions.

 

This article discusses the policy response to hedge funds activism in corporate governance based on Hirschman’s classic: Exit, Voice and Loyalty. From that perspective, the article argues that hedge funds do not create the loyalty concerns underlying the usual short-termism critique of hedge funds activism, because the arbiters of such activism are typically indexed funds, which cannot choose short-term exit. Nevertheless, the voice activated by hedge funds can be excessive for a particular company.

Furthermore, this article claims that the short-termism debate cannot shed light on the desirability of hedge funds activism. Neither theory nor empirical evidence can tell whether hedge funds activism systematically leads to short-termism or whether its absence lead management to the opposite bias, namely long-termism. The real issue with activism is a conflict of entrepreneurship, namely a conflict between the opposing views of the activists and the incumbent management regarding in how long an individual company should be profitable. Leaving the choice between these views to institutional investors is not efficient for every company at every point in time.

Consequently, this article argues that regulation should enable individual companies to choose whether to encourage or to curb hedge funds activism depending on the efficient time-horizon given the firm’s lifecycle. The recent European experience reveals that loyalty shares enable such choice, even in the midstream, operating as dual-class shares in disguise. However, loyalty shares can often be introduced without institutional investors’ consent. This outcome could be improved by allowing dual-class recapitalizations, instead of loyalty shares, but only with a majority of minority vote. This solution would screen for the companies for which temporarily curbing activism is efficient, and induce these companies to negotiate sunset clauses with institutional investors.

 

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian