Gouvernance | Page 9

Bel article du Journal de Montréal : « Le rendement à court-terme, une menace pour nos entreprises » (22 novembre 2016). Une occasion de discuter gouvernance d’entreprise en se concentrant sur la situation actuelle caractérisée par une omniprésence des investisseurs institutionnels !

Auparavant, les petits investisseurs québécois conservaient leurs actions en bourse en moyenne 10 ans. Aujourd’hui, à peine quatre mois. Quelque chose a changé dans notre rapport aux entreprises. Et pas pour le mieux, dit Gaétan Morin, président et chef de la direction du Fonds de solidarité FTQ.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Article inquiétant d’Olivier Pinaud ans L’Agefi.fr intitulé « Les dividendes prennent le dessus sur les investissements ». Il semblerait que face au ralentissement économique mondial, les entreprises aient décidé de conserver un versement de dividendes toujours aussi importants… et cela au détriment de l’investissement, nécessaire pourtant à la croissance économique et à la survie des entreprises elles-mêmes !

Malgré des perspectives de résultats en baisse, les groupes cotés versent des dividendes dans des proportions toujours plus grandes.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

L’Afrique du Sud l’affirme et l’assume : la primauté actionnariale doit être remise en cause et la gouvernance d’entreprise doit s’ouvrir aux parties prenantes. Dans son dernier rapport de novembre 2016 (King IV Report on Corporate Governance), l’institut des administrateurs de sociétés sud-africaines ne dit pas autre chose !

Vous pourrez lire l’intéressante synthèse suivante : « King: Shareholders not owners of companies » (10 novembre 2016, Fin24 city press).

Shareholders are not the owners of a company – they are just one of the stakeholders, Prof Mervyn King said on Thursday at the 15th BEN-Africa Conference, which took place in Stellenbosch.

« I realised long ago that the primacy of shareholders could not be the basis in the rainbow nation, » said King. The corporate governance theory of shareholder primacy holds that shareholder interests should have first priority relative to all other corporate stakeholders.

He said when he started with his report on corporate governance the issue was that the majority of SA’s citizens were not in the mainstream of the economy. His guidelines on corporate governance, therefore, had to be for people who had never been in that mainstream of society.

The King Reports on Corporate Governance are regarded as ground-breaking guidelines for the governance structures and operation of companies in SA. The first was issued in 1994, the second in 2002, the third in 2009 and the fourth revision was released last week.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Intéressant article dans The Sydney Morning Herald sous la plume de Mme Vanessa Desloires intitué : « BlackRock, Vanguard, State Street are not passive on corporate governance ». Cet article illustre l’activisme croissant (et la lente disparition de la prétendue passivité des actionnaires) des actionnaires d’aujourd’hui. Il faut dire que ces derniers (devenus des investisseurs institutionnels) sont de plus en plus puissants autant financièrement qu’économiquement !

Investment behemoths BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street now hold the « balance of power » in corporate governance disputes. And they’re no longer content to be the silent giants in the background, forcing company boards to balance the long-term view of passive fund managers with the short-termism of active managers.

The underperformance of the majority of Australian active managers over the past few years, coupled with the low cost of passive funds, has driven investors into products such as exchange-traded funds en masse, with total funds under management topping $23 billion this year.

As such, the three biggest providers of passive funds, BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street, have a growing presence on company registers.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Intéressant ce que relaie le Time. Il y a un des candidats à l’élection présidentielle américaine a invoqué le devoir fiduciaire pour justifier les politiques d’évitement fiscales qu’il a mises en œuvre pendant de nombreuses années : « Donald Trump’s ‘Fiduciary Duty’ Excuse on Taxes Is Just Plain Wrong ». Qu’en penser ? Pour la journaliste Rana Foroohar, la réponse est claire : « The Donald and his surrogates say he has a legal responsibility to minimize tax payments for his shareholders. It’s not a good excuse ».

It’s hard to know what to say to the New York Times’ revelation that Donald Trump lost so much money running various casino and hotel businesses into the ground in the mid-1990s ($916 million to be exact) that he could have avoided paying taxes for a full 18 years as a result (which may account for why he hasn’t voluntarily released his returns—they would make him look like a failure).

But predictably, Trump did have a response – fiduciary duty made me do it. So, how does the excuse stack up? Does Donald Trump, or any taxpayer, have a “fiduciary duty,” or legal responsibility, to maximize his income or minimize his payments on his personal taxes? In a word, no. “His argument is legal nonsense,” says Cornell University corporate and business law professor Lynn Stout,

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Marc T. Moore offre un beau papier sur la place de la valeur actionnariale en Grande-Bretagne dans une perspective historique : « Shareholder Primacy, Labour and the Historic Ambivalence of UK Company Law » (Oxford University, 20 septembre 2016).

Most directors and senior managers of British companies would likely regard it as trite law that, in undertaking their functions, they are accountable first and foremost to their employer firm’s general body of shareholders. It follows that the interests of other corporate constituencies – and, in particular, those of employees – must ultimately cede to those of shareholders in the event of conflict. Although frequently taken for granted today, the lexical priority that the British company law framework affords to the interests of shareholders is remarkable, not least when viewed alongside the correspondingly disempowered corporate governance status of labour in the UK.

On first reflection, it is somewhat curious that the interests of employees have not figured more prominently within British company law, especially when one considers the general political disposition of the country in modern times. Throughout the course of the last century, the UK has witnessed 37 years of Labour government (or 42 years if one includes Labour’s participation in the wartime coalition government). And although the UK is acknowledged on the whole as having a more neo-liberal (ie right-wing) political orientation than many of its northern European counterparts, it nonetheless has a comparatively strong social-democratic (ie left-wing) political tradition in relation to other English-speaking and former-Commonwealth countries, at least since the Second World War. It is thus not unreasonable to expect that, at some point during the post-war era, democratic public policy measures might have been taken to effect the direct integration of worker interests into the heart of the British corporate legal structure.

Une de ses conclusion est intéressante :

However, whilst the centrality of shareholders’ interests to the doctrinal and normative fabric of contemporary UK company law is both manifest and incontrovertible, this has curiously not always been the case. With respect to the fundamental question of the proper corporate objective (that is, as to whose interest British company directors are expected to serve while carrying out their functions), UK company law up until 2006 adopted a highly ambiguous position. Moreover, British company law has in the fairly recent past come precariously close to adopting a radically different board representation model, in which worker interests would formally have shared centre-stage with those of shareholders in a similar vein to the traditional German corporate governance model.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian