Nouvelles diverses

Bonjour à toutes et à tous, voici une belle information pour celles et ceux intéressés par les problématiques de gouvernance et de droit des marchés. La province de l’Ontario a mis en place un groupe de travail pour envisager des réformes à l’encadrement réglementaire. 70 propositions ont été faites et la consultation sur celles-ci est ouverte jusqu’en septembre 2020 : « Capital Markets Modernisation Taskforce ».

Voici un résumé des principales pistes explorées… vraiment intéressant !

Extrait :

The CMMT was formed in February 2020 and reports directly to the Minister of Finance. It was tasked to develop “bold, innovative recommendations” to improve how capital markets function in Canada. 

Twelve of the drafted proposals specifically target shareholder voting and company transparency, with the taskforce identifying an “imbalance” among Canada’s proxy and shareholder voting systems. Several stakeholders raised concerns to the CMMT about the influence of proxy advisors, errors in their reports and potential conflicts of interests where voting recommendations and consulting services were provided to the same businesses.  

To remedy this, the CMMT proposes establishing a new regulatory framework that would provide companies with the right to ‘rebut’ reports from proxy advisors. In addition, the taskforce also hopes to restrict conflicts of interest by limiting the services proxy advisors can offer. 

Several of the other proposals are aimed at reforming and improving the proxy plumbing. For instance, currently in Canada, the majority of shareholder votes are cast via proxies using either the company’s or dissident’s proxy ballot. Unfortunately, this means such proxy cards can look different and often confuse investors. 

Therefore, the CMMT proposes the use of universal proxy ballots to improve standardisation and mandate voting disclosure for each side when a dispute arises.  

At the same time, the taskforce has also proposed introducing rules to prevent over-voting and the requirement for companies listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange to have an annual shareholder votes on executive compensation. In further efforts to improve corporate governance standards, the taskforce proposes further legislative guidance be made around the role of independent directors in a bid to avoid conflicts of interest from arising, arguing that current laws do not fully address the role such directors play. 

Elsewhere, the taskforce wants to reduce the ownership threshold for early warning reporting disclosure in Canadian companies from 10% to 5%. This would bring Canada in line with other major markets, with the CMMT also acknowledging that a shareholder can currently requisition a meeting with a holding of as little as 5%.  

In a bid to improve transparency, the CMMT is also proposing the adoption of quarterly filing requirements for institutional investors of Canadian companies and – in a very encouraging step – the introduction of enhanced disclosure of material ESG information. 

With stronger ESG reporting, Canada would be following in the footsteps of other jurisdictions and create a level playing field for its companies. In particular the taskforce identified the metrics used by the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) and Taskforce on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) as potential solutions.  

Other CMMT’s recommendations include giving regulators new and enhanced powers when dealing with listed entities. For instance, the taskforce has proposed empowering the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) to issue no-action letters. This already happens in the US where a company can seek a no-action letter from the Securities and Exchange Commission when it has the basis to exclude a particular shareholder proposal. 

The CMMT has also proposed the introduction of broader remedies for the OSC when dealing with mergers and acquisitions. The taskforce proposes granting the OSC similar powers to those recently granted to the British Columbia Securities Commission, which can now rescind a transaction, require a person to dispose of securities in connection with a deal or even prohibit them from exercising voting rights.

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En cette période estivale, suivre l’actualité est toujours intéressant. Ma lecture d’un article ce matin « Renewed Interest in IPOs of Public Benefit Corporations » (de Cydney Posner) m’apprenait que l’État américain du Delaware est en train de débattre d’une réforme législative en matière d’entreprise à mission !

Pour accéder à cette réforme : ici

Extrait :

These and other similar risks are some of the reasons that, in adopting laws authorizing PBCs, the Delaware legislature made it particularly difficult to convert a traditional corporation to a PBC. For example, currently, the approval of 2/3 of the outstanding stock is required for a traditional corporation to amend its certificate of incorporation to become a PBC or to merge with another entity if the effect of the merger is to convert the shares into shares of a PBC. (Note that, originally, the vote required for conversion was 90%, which made it well nigh impossible for a traditional public company to convert to a PBC.) Appraisal rights are available to stockholders that did not vote in favor of the conversion or merger. And the same vote is required for conversion from a PBC form of entity into a traditional corporation.

The legislation that was just passed by the House in Delaware would, if ultimately signed into law, eliminate the 2/3 voting requirements, making it easier to convert a traditional corporation to a PBC or a PBC to a traditional corporation. Only the standard stockholder vote provisions would be applicable—generally a vote of a majority of the outstanding shares (or any greater or other vote required under the company’s certificate of incorporation) would be required. The amendments would also eliminate the special appraisal rights provisions, with the result that appraisal rights would not be available for conversions resulting from amendments to the certificate, but standard appraisal rights (§262) would be available in the context of mergers.

In addition, as noted above, the current PBC statute mandates that the board of directors manage the business and affairs of the PBC by balancing “the pecuniary interests of the stockholders, the best interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, and the specific public benefit or public benefits identified in its certificate of incorporation.” The statute provides that, with respect to a decision implicating the “balance requirement,” directors of PBCs will be deemed to satisfy their fiduciary duties to stockholders and the corporation if their decision “is both informed and disinterested and not such that no person of ordinary, sound judgment would approve.” A PBC is also permitted to include in its certificate, for purposes of its director exculpatory provisions under §102(b)(7) and its indemnification provisions under §145, that any disinterested failure to satisfy the mandate will not be considered to “constitute an act or omission not in good faith, or a breach of the duty of loyalty.”

The new legislation would also amp up the protections for directors of a PBC. The amendments would clarify that a director would not be considered “interested” in connection with a balancing decision solely because of the director’s interest in stock of the corporation, except to the extent that the same ownership would create a conflict of interest if the corporation were not a PBC. The amendments would also provide that, in the absence of a conflict, no failure to satisfy the balancing requirement would, for purposes of §102(b)(7) or §145, be considered “an act or omission not in good faith, or a breach of the duty of loyalty, unless the certificate of incorporation so provides.” That is, the certificate would no longer need to expressly provide for the protection for it to apply. In addition, the amendments would provide that, to bring any lawsuit to enforce the PBC balancing requirement, the plaintiffs must own at least 2% of the corporation’s outstanding shares or, for PBCs listed on a national securities exchange, shares with a market value of at least $2 million, if lower.

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Minerva Analytics apporte une belle mise à jour à la problématique de la diversité en m’apprenant que la Grèce vient de renforcer son dispositif juridique en matière de féminisation : « Greek companies will soon be mandated to meet a 25% female quota on their boards following a landmark decision for gender diversity ».

Extrait :

The quota requirement has been included as an amendment to the bill transposing the EU Shareholder Rights Directive II (SRD II) into Greek law, and is the result of a consultation led by a group of academics specialising in corporate governance.

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Overall, the directive is designed to encourage companies away from short-termism, focusing on areas such as director remuneration. However, the Greek amendment marks the first time it has been used to tackle the EU’s poor record on gender diversity at a board level.

According to the European Commission’s 2019 report on equality between men and women, since 2015, progress on corporate gender inclusivity has stalled. As of October 2018, the proportion of women on the boards of the EU’s biggest companies was only 26.7%.

Within this, France was the only EU member state with at least 40% female representation at board-level, while women account for less than a third of board-level positions in Italy, Sweden, Finland and Germany.

According to the same data, women made up less than 10% of board members in Greece.

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Le journal The Guardian publie un article revenant sur la contribution faite au Parlement britannique par le business, energy and industrial strategy (BEIS) committee sur la future réforme de la gouvernance d’entreprise : « MPs’ corporate governance inquiry: what are the key issues? ».

Parliament launches a series of hearings on reforming British boardrooms on Tuesday, as MPs pledge to ensure Theresa May fulfils her promise to clean up big business.

The business, energy and industrial strategy (BEIS) committee is collecting evidence for its own investigation into corporate governance, while the government’s own consultation is expected to start before Christmas.

In her brief campaign to become Conservative party leader, May hit out against the gap between directors’ pay and the wider workforce, while raising the idea of putting workers on boards. Iain Wright, chair of the BEIS committee, said: “I hope she’s not rolling back.”

The submissions to the committee’s corporate governance probe offer ideas to tackle executive pay – the average boss earned £5.5m in 2015, up from just under £5m the year before – and provide clues to the other topics that will be debated in the months ahead.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Les Autorités canadiennes en valeurs mobilières (ACVM) ont publié des modifications fondamentales au régime d’offres publiques d’achat qui devraient entrer en vigueur le 9 mai 2016 (ici). Les modifications accorderont plus de temps aux émetteurs visés pour réagir à une offre hostile, qui se traduira concrètement par un régime « offre permise » de 105 jours et un régime d’offres publiques d’achat harmonisé à l’échelle du Canada lorsque le Règlement 62-104 sur les offres publiques d’achat et de rachat (le Règlement 62-104) sera adopté en Ontario. Les modifications entraînent des incidences importantes sur l’utilisation de régimes de droits à la fois tactiques et stratégiques, et peuvent également influencer la façon dont les opérations seront structurées à l’avenir.

Une des modifications fondamentales prévoit que toute OPA non dispensée devra respecter une obligation de dépôt minimal de plus de 50 % des titres en circulation visés par l’offre (à l’exclusion des titres détenus par l’initiateur ou ses alliés).

Les modifications prévoient également un délai minimal de dépôt de 105 jours, sauf dans certaines situations où le délai peut être abrégé à la discrétion du conseil de l’émetteur visé ou si l’émetteur réalise l’une des opérations de remplacement prévues. Qui plus est, le délai minimal de dépôt fait l’objet d’une prolongation obligatoire d’au moins 10 jours une fois que l’obligation de dépôt minimal et toutes les autres conditions ont été remplies.

Selon le régime actuel, les OPA non dispensées doivent être maintenues pendant 35 jours et ne sont soumises à aucune obligation de dépôt minimal ni prolongation obligatoire une fois que l’initiateur a pris livraison des titres déposés.

Vous pourrez trouver un commentaire du cabinet Osler : ici.

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Ivan Tchotourian

En application de l’article 23 de la loi n° 2014-1545 du 20 décembre 2014 relative à la simplification de la vie des entreprises, le Gouvernement français a publié l’ordonnance n° 2015-1127 du 10 septembre 2015 qui réduit à deux au minimum le nombre des actionnaires dans la société anonyme.

Toutefois est maintenu à 7 le nombre minimal des actionnaires dans la société anonyme dont les titres sont admis aux négociations sur un marché réglementé.

Attention chers lecteurs et chères lectrices :

1. Il n’existe pas encore de société anonyme unipersonnelle
2. Les règles d’administration, de fonctionnement et de contrôle de la société anonyme n’ont pas été modifiées

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Ivan Tchotourian