Responsabilité sociale des entreprises

engagement et activisme actionnarial finance sociale et investissement responsable Normes d'encadrement normes de marché

Les critères climatiques et sociaux gagnent encore du terrain dans la finance

C’est sous ce titre que le journal Les affaires relaie un article de l’AFP (ici). Cet article montre que les investisseurs se préoccupent de plus en plus des critères sociaux et environnementaux dans les placements.

 

L’intégration de critères environnementaux, sociaux et de gouvernance (ESG) continue à gagner du terrain parmi les investisseurs et les sociétés levant des capitaux, convaincus par la rentabilité financière de ces placements, selon une étude HSBC publiée jeudi. «61% des investisseurs et 48% des émetteurs (entreprises, ndlr) dans le monde intègrent dans leur stratégie de développement» ces critères, «même si de grandes disparités existent d’une région à l’autre», détaille l’étude, réalisée pour la banque britannique par East & Partners auprès de 1731 sociétés et investisseurs institutionnels.

(…) «La priorité donnée à la rentabilité financière reflète la progression de l’engagement réel des investisseurs et l’action des marchés qui encouragent les changements de comportement. En d’autres termes, la tendance générale est à la prise en compte des critères ESG dans les stratégies de développement des entreprises et d’investissement des investisseurs», estime-t-il.

 

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finance sociale et investissement responsable Gouvernance Normes d'encadrement

Too Many Corporations Act For The Short-Term. That Should Change

Dans un article paru le 30 août 2018 dans Forbes, Arne Alsin livre une belle tribune en faveur du long-termisme des entreprises : « Too Many Corporations Act For The Short-Term. That Should Change ». Il revient par la même occasion sur le rachat d’actions par les entreprises, sur l’activisme actionnariale et sur le rôle que doivent jouer les investisseurs institutionnels.

 

Extrait :

As long-term investors, we want corporations to be thinking about the future. Unfortunately, from our vantage point, short-term thinking has become endemic on Wall Street. While CEOs publicly profess their commitment to the long-term interests of shareholders, too often we see how their actions directly contradict their words.

First, let’s consider a major factor of short-termism: stock buybacks. The immense buyback boom of 2018 is truly staggering. This year, S&P 500 companies are on pace to spend a record-breaking $1 trillion on stock buybacks, according to an analysis by Bloomberg. While executives often pitch these buybacks as a “return of capital” to shareholders, plenty of research suggests the truth is more complicated for long-term investors.

When executives choose to spend shareholder cash on buybacks, it’s a rather simple process: A company executive decides that “extra” cash on the balance sheet is better off being spent repurchasing shares. Without the input of shareholders—and often without any rigorous explanation to shareholders—CEOs then buy up stock, which drives up EPS, which, in turn, helps drive up the stock price. That’s the short-term view.

In the long-term, however, companies that spend billions on buybacks—like GE, Cisco, Oracle, and IBM to name a few—they effectively siphon money away from innovation, research and development, worker training, and reinvestment into new lines of business.

(…) In general, over the next few years, we anticipate seeing a wave of shareholder activism—through proposals and campaigns that align with the interests of long-term shareholders and target short-term mindsets. This isn’t just about buybacks, either. We expect long-term shareholders to fight for corporate issues surrounding fossil fuels, board diversity, worker pay, and so on.

Many of these fights have already begun, and that’s a positive development. Shirley Westcott,  a senior vice President at Alliance Advisors LLC, recently noted that proposals are indeed on the rise. “Calls for various types of climate action have resonated strongly with investors as have social initiatives on gun violence, sexual misconduct and the opioid epidemic,” M. Westcott writes. “Pay programs have faced more frequent rebukes and even auditors, in isolated events, have been challenged over independence and performance.”

Corporate democracy may seem like an oxymoron in today’s top-down corporate structures, but the truth is that in a healthy economic system, corporate directors listen to and respond to feedback from all shareholders. Very often, we’ll see that conversation being dominated by short-term-minded activist hedge funds, whose managers buy up large positions in a stock, and then push management into short-term decisions that drive the stock up—but leave little left for reinvestment that create value over the long-term.

“Armed with their huge war chests,” writes Bill Lazonick, an economist at UMass, “these new-style corporate predators use a corrupt proxy-voting system, “wolf pack” hook-ups with other hedge funds, and once-illegal engagement with management to compel corporations to hand over profits that the hedge funds did nothing to create.”

True, but we believe activist hedge funds will have an increasingly major force to contend with: Major institutional shareholders, long-term investors, and, especially, pension funds.

 

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engagement et activisme actionnarial finance sociale et investissement responsable Gouvernance

Des valeurs de RSE portées par les investisseurs

Bonjour à toutes et à tous, signalons que les investisseurs s’unissent de plus en plus pour défendre la responsabilité sociétale : « Onze investisseurs s’unissent pour changer les choses » (Le Devoir, 7 juin 2018).

 

Alors que s’apprête à débuter le Sommet du G7, 11 investisseurs institutionnels menés entre autres par la Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec unissent leurs forces dans l’espoir de réaliser une série d’avancées dans les domaines des changements climatiques, de l’égalité entre les sexes ainsi que du déficit d’infrastructures. En collaboration avec le Régime de retraite des enseignantes et enseignants de l’Ontario, la Caisse souhaite que le groupe d’investisseurs — dont l’actif sous gestion dépasse 6000 milliards — mette à profit son approche à plus long terme, généralement plus adéquate pour relever des défis d’envergure. Leurs intentions ont été dévoilées à Toronto, mercredi, dans le cadre d’une conférence de presse à laquelle participaient entre autres le ministre fédéral des Finances, Bill Morneau, ainsi que son homologue à l’Environnement et au Changement climatique, Catherine McKenna.

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finance sociale et investissement responsable Nouvelles diverses

Sustainability is good business – and here’s proof

Bonjour à toutes et à tous, je vous signale cet article « Sustainability is good business — and here’s proof » d’Haley Madderom (Eco-Business, 7 octobre 2016). Ce billet rappelle ce que je pense depuis un temps maintenant : la RSE est profitable !

 

For many businesses, sustainability is a nice idea that looks better on paper than in practice. Yet, research shows that sustainability doesn’t just sound good — it’s smart, and it works.

Sustainable Brands has compiled a list of 22 research studies that show sustainable practices lead to long-term benefits. The studies cover multiple benefits, from global reach and stock market value to brand trust and product sustainability.

 

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Ivan Tchotourian

finance sociale et investissement responsable Gouvernance mission et composition du conseil d'administration normes de droit Structures juridiques Valeur actionnariale vs. sociétale

Un projet de loi américain ambitieux : S.3348 – Accountable Capitalism Act

Bonjour à toutes et à tous, la sénatrice Élisabeth Warren vient d’introduire un projet de loi très ambitieux (!) : le S.3348 – Accountable Capitalism Act.

 

Plusieurs points saillants ressortent de ce projet :

  • La création d’un Office of United States Corporations.
  • La possibilité de s’enregistrer auprès de cet organisme fédéral (alors que jusqu’à maintenant, rappelons-le, l’enregistrement se faisait auprès des États et notamment celui du Delaware).
  • Les salariés représenteraient 40 % du CA.
  • L’entreprise devrait poursuivre une mission sociétale.
  • La redéfintion des devoirs des administrateurs et hauts-dirigeants.

 


Extrait du projet de loi

 

SEC. 5. Responsibilities of United States corporations.

(a) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) GENERAL PUBLIC BENEFIT.—The term “general public benefit” means a material positive impact on society resulting from the business and operations of a United States corporation, when taken as a whole. (…)

(1) IN GENERAL.—The charter of a large entity that is filed with the Office shall state that the entity is a United States corporation.

 

(2) CORPORATE PURPOSES.—A United States corporation shall have the purpose of creating a general public benefit, which shall be—

(A) identified in the charter of the United States corporation; and

(B) in addition to the purpose of the United States corporation under the articles of incorporation in the State in which the United States corporation is incorporated, if applicable.

(c) Standard of conduct for directors and officers.—

 

(c) Standard of conduct for directors and officers.—

(1) CONSIDERATION OF INTERESTS.—In discharging the duties of their respective positions, and in considering the best interests of a United States corporation, the board of directors, committees of the board of directors, and individual directors of a United States corporation—

 

(A) shall manage or direct the business and affairs of the United States corporation in a manner that—

(i) seeks to create a general public benefit; and

(ii) balances the pecuniary interests of the shareholders of the United States corporation with the best interests of persons that are materially affected by the conduct of the United States corporation; and

 

(B) in carrying out subparagraph (A)—

(i) shall consider the effects of any action or inaction on—

(I) the shareholders of the United States corporation;

(II) the employees and workforce of—

(aa) the United States corporation;

(bb) the subsidiaries of the United States corporation; and

(cc) the suppliers of the United States corporation;

(III) the interests of customers and subsidiaries of the United States corporation as beneficiaries of the general public benefit purpose of the United States corporation;

(IV) community and societal factors, including those of each community in which offices or facilities of the United States corporation, subsidiaries of the United States corporation, or suppliers of the United States corporation are located;

(V) the local and global environment;

(VI) the short-term and long-term interests of the United States corporation, including—

(aa) benefits that may accrue to the United States corporation from the long-term plans of the United States corporation; and

(bb) the possibility that those interests may be best served by the continued independence of the United States corporation; and

(VII) the ability of the United States corporation to accomplish the general public benefit purpose of the United States corporation;

(ii) may consider—

(I) other pertinent factors; or

(II) the interests of any other group that are identified in the articles of incorporation in the State in which the United States corporation is incorporated, if applicable; and

(iii) shall not be required to give priority to a particular interest or factor described in clause (i) or (ii) over any other interest or factor.

(2) STANDARD OF CONDUCT FOR OFFICERS.—Each officer of a United States corporation shall balance and consider the interests and factors described in paragraph (1)(B)(i) in the manner described in paragraph (1)(B)(iii) if—

(A) the officer has discretion to act with respect to a matter; and

(B) it reasonably appears to the officer that the matter may have a material effect on the creation by the United States corporation of a general public benefit identified in the charter of the United States corporation.

 

(3) EXONERATION FROM PERSONAL LIABILITY.—Except as provided in the charter of a United States corporation, neither a director nor an officer of a United States corporation may be held personally liable for monetary damages for—

(A) any action or inaction in the course of performing the duties of a director under paragraph (1) or an officer under paragraph (2), as applicable, if the director or officer was not interested with respect to the action or inaction; or

(B) the failure of the United States corporation to pursue or create a general public benefit. (…)

 

(d) Right of action.—

(1) LIMITATION ON LIABILITY OF CORPORATION.—A United States corporation shall not be liable for monetary damages under this section for any failure of the United States corporation to pursue or create a general public benefit.


 

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Ivan Tchotourian

finance sociale et investissement responsable normes de droit Structures juridiques

La Benefit Corporation introduite au Canada ?

En voilà une nouvelle ! Selon Me Sarah Fitzpatrick de Miller Thomson LLP, la Colombie-Britannique a déposé un projet de loi visant à introduire une Benefit corporation dans la province de la Colombie-Britannique : « B.C. Considers Benefit Corporations » (27 juin 2018).

 

British Columbia may become the first province in Canada to pass legislation that provides for the creation of « benefit corporations. » Benefit corporations are different from the typical for-profit business corporation in that they must be mandated to conduct business for the purpose of creating a general public benefit. They must also adhere to a certain level of accountability and transparency.  Benefit corporations started as a « B Corp » certification issued by B Lab, a non-profit headquartered in Pennsylvania. B Lab then prepared model legislation for U.S. States to adopt, officially authorizing corporations to conduct business for a public benefit purpose and allowing directors to act in the best interest of the public.  Currently, 33 U.S. States and the District of Columbia have passed legislation that officially authorizes benefit corporations.

Bill M 216 proposes to amend the B.C. Business Corporations Act (the « Act ») to create benefit companies. The bill is a private members’ bill, which passed second reading on May 17, 2018. As it has passed both first and second reading (which is rare), it is expected that Bill M 216 will receive enough support to pass third reading and be enacted into law.

 

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Ivan Tchotourian

divulgation extra-financière finance sociale et investissement responsable Normes d'encadrement normes de droit normes de marché

Commission legislative proposals on sustainable finance

La Commission européenne a fait plusieurs propositions législatives sur la finance durable en mai 2018 : « Commission legislative proposals on sustainable finance ».

 

In May 2018 the Commission presented a package of measures as a follow-up to its action plan on financing sustainable growth. The package includes 3 proposals aimed at:

  • establishing a unified EU classification system of sustainable economic activities (‘taxonomy’)
  • improving disclosure requirements on how institutional investors integrate environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors in their risk processes
  • creating a new category of benchmarks which will help investors compare the carbon footprint of their investments.

In addition, the Commission is, from 24 May to 21 June 2018, seeking feedback on amendments to delegated acts under the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II) and the Insurance Distribution Directive to include ESG considerations into the advice that investment firms and insurance distributors offer to individual clients.

 

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Ivan Tchotourian