Normes d’encadrement | Page 27

Alors que le colloque du SASE va bientôt avoir lieu à Berkeley aux Etats-Unis, je reviens aujourd’hui sur ce que j’avais présenté au colloque qui s’était tenu en 2014 à Chicago : “Enterprise” and Lawyer’s view: By by Irresponsibility and Welcome in a New Area ».

Accédez au diaporama : PPT SASE 2014 version anglaise

Voici le résumé de cette intervention :

As institutions corporations and enterprises are the basis of capitalism and the subject of great interest for legal studies. Beyond regulation, the inherent nature of corporations raises sensitive legal questions, indeed, since its first appearance in the 18^th century. Inspired by economic and financial sciences, legal theories incorporate corporations to contracts (referred to as “aggregate theory”), a private government (referred to as “artificial theory”) and an autonomous entity (“entity theory” or “doctrine de l’entreprise” in Continental Europe). It is indeed argued that incorporating corporations to a simple nexus of contracts has been the subject of great attention since the 1970s, provided that none of the above theories have definitely won unanimity in law, as seen by a comparative reading of the Canadian, American and European jurisprudence. Corporate governance rules clearly demonstrate such incorporation. In its essence, however, the contractual analysis regards the corporation as a means to serving private interests whereby the liability schemes are limited to protecting the supplier of capital. The contractual analysis’s vision is indeed restricted, and it summarizes its goals, to the sought-after maximization of the corporation’s shareholders value. At the heart of the corporation’s issues lies the financial aspect. Within this framework, non-financial concerns appear far away and are dealt with as simple externality that poses management problems. Nonetheless, the corporation’s activities are bearing an economic power that is today seen as ever increasingly significant and its financial and non-financial consequences should be the basis of further thinking. Yet, Canadian law has engaged into this pathway. On the one hand, Canadian corporate law has experienced a profound re-assessment through the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions in Peoples (2004) and BCE (2008). Far from being a strict contractual reading of the corporation, these decisions have shed light on the importance of different paradigms such as corporate social responsibility and the stakeholders’ theory. Indeed, new incorporated corporate concepts have reshaped the way the corporation is perceived and its relationship with the environment. On the other hand, Canadian competition law attempts at integrating social concerns into its political sphere. In 2013, the Supreme Court of Canada has allowed the commencement of proceedings by indirect purchasers by way of a class action (see cases of Pros-sys, Sun-Rype and Infineon). Case law contemplates limiting the negative impact of anti-competition practices implemented by multinational corporations. The objective is to reinstate an economic balance as between corporations and its clients. The consumer is indeed called upon to play a protective role in the market in addition to the Canadian Competition authority’s competence. As affirmed by the Canadian Competition Tribunal in the decision of Visa/Master Card certain competition disputes between merchants are of common interest. Thus, the public should be made aware of the difficulties met by the businesses in the market. In light of the recent Canadian case law standpoint, it most certainly raises questions about the role that competition policies play within the corporation’s economic activities framework. This paper suggests showing the current legal positions of Canadian corporations and its competition law framework, in addition to putting them into perspective with  their US and European counterparts. In addition to demonstrating their convergence in favor of a more social concern, we stand for the proposition that corporations, as has been defined by the jurist, does not only form a contract. Indeed, it is an institution that carries responsibilities as against its own environment.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Jacques Grisé relaie sur son blogue (ici) un intéressant article sur la pratique de la rémunération par les fonds activistes de candidats à des postes d’administrateurs : « Rémunération, par les fonds activistes, de candidats à des postes d’administrateurs | Est-ce acceptable ? ».

Un actionnaire activiste (Hedge Funds) qui veut faire élire un de ses partisans à un conseil d’administration ciblé peut-il le rémunérer afin qu’il puisse faire campagne pour son élection à un poste d’administrateur ?

Quelle est la loi à cet égard ? Quelles sont les recommandations de la firme ISS dans ces cas ?

La laisse dorée (« golden leash »), comme on appelle ce lien avec le promoteur de la campagne électorale, est-elle congruente avec le droit des actionnaires ? Ou, cette pratique est-elle sujette à d’éventuels conflits d’intérêts au détriment des actionnaires ?

Il semble bien que cette pratique soit de plus en plus répandue et qu’elle soit « légale », bien que la SEC n’ait pas dit son dernier mot à ce stade-ci. La pratique est appuyée par les grandes firmes de conseil en votation (ISS et Glass Lewis).

L’article publié par Andrew A. Schwartz, professeur à l’École de droit de l’Université du Colorado, est paru aujourd’hui sur le forum de la HBL School on Corporate Governance. On y présente différentes  problématiques, telles que la volonté des CA de bloquer l’élection d’administrateurs externes et la volonté des fonds activistes de remplacer certains administrateurs par des candidats favorables aux changements stratégiques souhaités.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Le message a le mérite d’être clair ! Le blog of Manifest, the proxy voting agency se montre pour le moins critique (!) d’une réforme américaine qui vient d’être proposé et qui vise notamment à mettre en place un encadrement des agences de conseil en vote : « Global investors condemn US attempt to undermine their voting decisions »

The US House of Representatives’ Finance Services Committee last week passed a series of  Bills which seek to repeal large chunks of the Dodd-Frank Act which was passed in response to the 2008 financial crash.

The bills would amend the mandate on public companies to provide shareholders with a vote on executive compensation to occur only when the company has made a material change to the executive compensation; repeal the Security and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) authority to issue rules on proxy access and repeal the mandate that publicly-traded companies disclose the ratio of median versus chief executive officer pay.

Part of the package of legislative proposals is the Corporate Governance Reform & Transparency Act of 2016 would, if passed by Congress and signed by President Obama, require mandatory SEC registration for proxy advisory firms such as Manifest wishing to operate in the US.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Le Revenu propose deux capsules-vidéos consacrées à l’ISR autour de la question suivante : peut-il être plus efficace ? C’est M. Thierry Philipponnat (président du Forum pour l’investissement responsable, le FIR) qui s’exprime.

• Capsule-vidéo 1 : ici
• Capsule-vidéo 2 : ici

Après l’affaire de la rémunération de Carlos Ghosn, président de Renault et Nissan, faut-il aller jusqu’à désinvestir des sociétés qui prévoient des rémunérations excessives à leurs dirigeants, comme le fonds souverain norvégien (NBIM), veut désormais en donner l’exemple ? Ce fonds, qui gère près de 800 milliards d’euros d’encours, peut avoir de l’impact en désinvestissant, pas une petite société de gestion, argumente Thierry Philipponnat.

«Une société de gestion qui pèse 1% du fonds norvégien, doit être investie. Pour que les gérants fassent entendre leur voix, il faut qu’ils aillent voter aux assemblées», affirme Thierry Philipponnat. Le dialogue avec les entreprises et le vote des gérants aux assemblées reste, pour lui, la clé d’un investissement avec impact, même si d’autres préconisent le désinvestissement ou une intervention de l’État plus importante.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Comme l’indique un récent article de TheTyee.ca de David Ball, les choses ont peu bougé en matière de RSE au Bangladesh malgré l’affaire du Raza Plana : « Bangladesh Factory Safety Fixes ‘Far Behind Schedule’: Investors ». « Garment factory collapse killed 1,134 workers. But some warn progress is too slow » mentionne le journaliste. Face à cette situation, les investisseurs d’alarment.

Morceau choisi :

On Thursday, a letter signed by 140 organizations hoping to leverage their investment portfolios to improve conditions warned that despite some progress made since the disaster in setting safety standards, inspecting facilities, and signing accords, efforts to actually fix unsafe Bangladeshi factories have been too slow.

« While expert inspections have identified thousands of issues, the vast majority of corrective action plans are far behind schedule, » the letter states. « The lack of significant progress in addressing persistent systemic issues [will] continue to not only put workers at risk, but also pose material, financial and reputational risk for companies and their investors. »

One of the letter’s signatories was the Shareholder Association for Research & Education (SHARE), an organization that represents large institutional investors such as unions, pension plans and churches.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian