Normes d’encadrement

Gouvernance Normes d'encadrement normes de droit normes de marché

Canada : Integrating sustainability goals across the investment industry

Très beau rapport concernant le Canada pour améliorer le cadre juridique dans l’industrie de l’investissement en vue de favoriser la durabilité : « A Legal Framework for Impact – Integrating Sustainibility Goal accross the Investment Industry ». RSE et finance sont de plus en plus intrinsèquement liés…

  • Pour télécharger le rapport, cliquez ici

Résumé :

Ce rapport soutient que des changements politiques sont nécessaires pour que les investisseurs puissent contribuer pleinement à la durabilité environnementale et sociale à long terme du Canada. Les auteurs examinent les aspects pertinents du cadre juridique et réglementaire canadien et identifient les domaines dans lesquels davantage de clarté et d’orientations sont nécessaires. Ils recommandent ensuite des réformes qui permettraient aux investisseurs de prendre en compte les risques liés à la durabilité et de poursuivre des objectifs d’impact sur la durabilité, en particulier lorsque ceux-ci sont pertinents pour les rendements financiers. Leurs propositions comprennent des modifications des obligations légales – en raison de la complexité du cadre juridique canadien, ils ne formulent des recommandations que pour les fonds de pension. D’autres recommandations de ce document s’appliquent à tous les investisseurs institutionnels.

Merci à L’initiative canadienne de droit climatique de cette nouvelle !

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Gouvernance Normes d'encadrement normes de droit Responsabilité sociale des entreprises

Entreprises, solidarité et durabilité : le temps du droit

Durabilité et solidarité devraient être traduits dans le droit des entreprises et des affaires, tel est le message de la professeure Sjåfjell sur SSRN : Sjåfjell, Beate, Solidarity, Sustainability and the Role of Business, 29 juillet 2023, University of Oslo Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 2023-04, Forthcoming in Research Handbook on International Solidarity Law (Edward Elgar 2024).

Résumé :

This chapter positions the debate on a UN declaration on the right to international solidarity within a research-based concept of sustainability and in light of the urgent need to regulate business for sustainability.

Solidarity is an inextricable element of sustainability as a goal and of a sustainable development – a development that brings us towards sustainability. With the current focus on financial and corporate risks of climate change and, more recently, of biodiversity loss, discussing the role of business through a solidarity lens brings the social aspects of sustainability more to the forefront.

I suggest that the principle of solidarity in international law, as reflected in the Revised draft declaration on human rights and international solidarity, should be broadened to fully encompass intersectionality and to include interspecies solidarity. I also propose that core elements of sustainability should be taken as legal concepts in the regulation of business, to realise the crucial potential of business to sustainability, including solidarity.

Drawing on a decade of collaborative research through international research projects, I indicate how reforms of law could facilitate sustainable business, and the importance of solidarity and its proper relevance for business – and the significance of business for international solidarity. I conclude the chapter with reflections on the potential and hope for change.

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Gouvernance normes de droit

Public Benefit Corporation : modification législative au Delaware

Voici un article qui intéressera celles et ceux qui suivent l’actualité entourant les Public Benefit Corporation : « Delaware Public Benefit Corporations—Recent Developments » (Michael R. Littenberg, Emily J. Oldshue, and Brittany N. Pifer, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, 31 août 2020).

Extrait :

The 2020 Amendments

Delaware has amended the PBC statute twice since inception to address concerns that limited its utility.

Most recently, in July, Delaware amended the PBC statute to, among other things, (1) reduce the stockholder approval threshold necessary for becoming a PBC, and for exiting the PBC regime; (2) eliminate statutory appraisal rights in connection with the conversion of a conventional corporation to a PBC; and (3) strengthen the protections for directors. Each of these amendments is discussed in more detail below.

Voting Thresholds for Opting In and Opting Out Lowered. Section 363(a) of the DGCL originally provided that an existing conventional corporation could not become a PBC without the approval of 90% of the outstanding stock on the amendment of its certificate of incorporation or the merger or consolidation with or into a PBC. Conversely, under Section 363(c), a PBC had to satisfy the 90% voting threshold to become a conventional corporation. In 2015, this threshold was amended down to a two-thirds majority. The 2020 PBC amendments eliminated Section 363(a) and (c). The result is that the voting thresholds for conversions, mergers and consolidations involving PBCs are now governed by Sections 242(b) and 251 of the DGCL, which provide for majority voting unless the certificate of incorporation provides otherwise.

Elimination of Statutory Appraisal Rights in Connection with PBC Conversions. Section 363(b) of the DGCL previously provided appraisal rights for stockholders of a conventional corporation that amended its certificate of incorporation to become a PBC or engaged in a merger or consolidation that resulted in the surviving corporation being a PBC, to the extent the stockholder did not vote for the amendment, merger or consolidation. In 2015, this section of the DGCL was amended to add a “market out” exception, which provided that appraisal rights generally would not be available to holders of shares listed on a national securities exchange or held of record by more than 2,000 holders. The market out exception of course did not apply in the private company context.

The 2020 PBC amendments eliminated Section 363(b). As a result, there no longer is a specific statutory appraisal right if a conventional corporation converts to a PBC. Appraisal rights in connection with PBC mergers and consolidations are now governed by Section 262 of the DGCL, which addresses appraisal rights in connection with mergers and consolidations more generally.

Director Protections Strengthened. As discussed above, under Section 365(a) of the DGCL, directors of a PBC must balance the pecuniary interest of stockholders, the interests of other stakeholders and the specific public benefit identified in the certificate of incorporation. Section 365(c) has been amended to clarify that a director’s ownership of stock or other interests in the PBC does not inherently create a conflict of interest, unless the ownership of the interests would create a conflict of interest in a conventional corporation.

In addition, the 2020 PBC amendments revised Section 365(c) to provide that any failure on a director’s part to satisfy Section 365(a)’s balancing requirement does not constitute an act or omission not in good faith or a breach of the duty of loyalty for purposes of Section 102(b)(7) (exculpation of directors) or Section 145 (indemnification) of the DGCL, unless the certificate of incorporation provides otherwise. Previously, this was framed as an opt-in in Section 365(c), rather than as an opt-out.

Ability to Bring Derivative Suit Brought into Alignment with Conventional Corporations. Section 367 of the DGCL sets forth the ownership requirements for PBC stockholders to be able to bring a derivative suit to enforce the statutory requirement to balance the stockholders’ pecuniary interests, the best interests of those materially affected by the PBC’s conduct and the public benefit identified in the certificate of incorporation. The 2020 PBC amendments provide that a derivative action to enforce the balancing requirement can only be brought by one or more plaintiffs owning individually or collectively (1) at least 2% of the corporation’s outstanding shares or (2) in the case of a corporation listed on a national securities exchange, the lesser of 2% of the corporation’s shares and shares with a value of at least $2,000,000.

The amendments to Section 367 align the thresholds for PBC derivative actions with those applicable to conventional corporations.

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Gouvernance Normes d'encadrement normes de droit

Agences de conseil en vote : la SEC modifie les règles

La Securities and Exchange Commission des États-Unis (la SEC) a récemment publié les modifications définitives à ses règles sur les procurations visant à réglementer certaines activités des agences de conseils en matière de vote par procuration. Les règles définitives sont conformes aux modifications proposées, émises par la SEC en décembre 2019. Dans l’ensemble, les règles définitives sont moins contraignantes que celles proposées en décembre 2019 et reposent davantage sur des principes. Le cabinet Osler en offre une belle synthèse !

  • Pour en savoir plus, cliquez ici.

Résumé :

Parmi les points saillants des modifications définitives, on compte notamment les suivants :

  • Les nouvelles dispositions précisent que les recommandations de vote par procuration formulées par les agences de conseils en matière de vote par procuration constituent des « sollicitations » soumises aux règles sur les procurations de la SEC (notamment l’interdiction d’énoncés qui sont faits d’une manière fausse ou trompeuse).
  • Ces dispositions précisent que la dispense de l’obligation de divulgation de renseignements concernant les procurations et des exigences de dépôt auprès de la SEC est autorisée uniquement si les agences de conseils en matière de vote par procuration
    • divulguent, dans le cadre de leurs prestations de conseils sur le vote aux clients, de l’information précise sur les conflits d’intérêts;
    • adoptent des politiques rendues publiques destinées
      • à assurer que les émetteurs visés par des conseils sur le vote par procuration ont eu droit à ces conseils au plus tard au moment où ils ont été communiqués aux clients de l’agence de conseils en matière de vote par procuration;
      • à fournir aux clients un mécanisme leur permettant de prendre connaissance, en temps opportun avant l’assemblée des actionnaires, de toute déclaration écrite par les émetteurs visés par les conseils sur le vote par procuration.
  • Il n’est pas nécessaire de fournir aux émetteurs une ébauche préliminaire des conseils sur le vote par procuration proposés aux fins d’examen et de commentaires.
  • L’obligation de fournir un avis à un émetteur concernant les conseils sur le vote par procuration et d’offrir un mécanisme aux clients concernant les déclarations écrites d’un émetteur ne s’applique pas aux dossiers contestés, à la majorité des fusions et à certaines opérations sur actifs.
  • Les agences de conseil en vote doivent se conformer aux nouvelles règles concernant les conflits et les avis d’ici le 1er décembre 2021.
  • Les règles ne s’appliquent pas aux émetteurs canadiens qui sont des émetteurs privés étrangers aux termes des lois sur les valeurs mobilières des États-Unis. Par contre, le rapport de consultation du Groupe de travail sur la modernisation relative aux marchés financiers de l’Ontario publié en juillet 2020 envisage l’adoption d’un cadre réglementaire conforme aux règles proposées en 2019.

La SEC a souligné, dans son communiqué, l’importance et l’éminence du rôle des agences de conseils en matière de vote par procuration en tant qu’intermédiaires dans les procédures de vote par procuration au nom des investisseurs institutionnels, lesquels détiennent la majorité des actions en circulation sur les marchés actuels et font appel à ces agences en vue de les aider dans le cadre de leurs décisions de vote et des votes à l’égard de leurs actions. La SEC constate que les émetteurs, les investisseurs et autres entités concernées expriment depuis quelques années des réserves quant au rôle des agences de conseils en matière de vote par procuration. Ces réserves portent notamment sur l’exactitude des renseignements et la transparence des méthodologies appliquées dans le cadre de la formulation de recommandations par les agences de conseils en matière de vote par procuration. De plus, des questions ont été soulevées quant à la possibilité par un émetteur de prendre connaissance des conseils et d’y répondre dans un délai convenable avant l’expression des votes de l’actionnaire, sur les conseils de l’agence de conseils en matière de vote par procuration, et quant à la possibilité par un actionnaire de prendre connaissance des conseils sur le vote par procuration, notamment de toute réponse d’un émetteur ou autres entités, avant l’expression de ses votes.

La SEC a déterminé que les agences de conseils en matière de vote par procuration n’avaient pas à se conformer à cette obligation d’information et de dépôt des règles fédérales sur les procurations applicables à la sollicitation de procurations tant qu’elles respectent certaines règles propres à leur rôle dans le cadre du processus de vote par procuration. Ces règles permettent de s’assurer que les clients de ces agences ont un accès raisonnable et en temps opportun à des renseignements transparents, exacts et exhaustifs pertinents pour les investisseurs sur les questions soumises aux fins de vote.

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actualités canadiennes Gouvernance normes de droit

Vers une réforme du droit financier en Ontario ? Capital Markets Modernisation Taskforce (CMMT)

Bonjour à toutes et à tous, voici une belle information pour celles et ceux intéressés par les problématiques de gouvernance et de droit des marchés. La province de l’Ontario a mis en place un groupe de travail pour envisager des réformes à l’encadrement réglementaire. 70 propositions ont été faites et la consultation sur celles-ci est ouverte jusqu’en septembre 2020 : « Capital Markets Modernisation Taskforce ».

Voici un résumé des principales pistes explorées… vraiment intéressant !

Extrait :

The CMMT was formed in February 2020 and reports directly to the Minister of Finance. It was tasked to develop “bold, innovative recommendations” to improve how capital markets function in Canada. 

Twelve of the drafted proposals specifically target shareholder voting and company transparency, with the taskforce identifying an “imbalance” among Canada’s proxy and shareholder voting systems. Several stakeholders raised concerns to the CMMT about the influence of proxy advisors, errors in their reports and potential conflicts of interests where voting recommendations and consulting services were provided to the same businesses.  

To remedy this, the CMMT proposes establishing a new regulatory framework that would provide companies with the right to ‘rebut’ reports from proxy advisors. In addition, the taskforce also hopes to restrict conflicts of interest by limiting the services proxy advisors can offer. 

Several of the other proposals are aimed at reforming and improving the proxy plumbing. For instance, currently in Canada, the majority of shareholder votes are cast via proxies using either the company’s or dissident’s proxy ballot. Unfortunately, this means such proxy cards can look different and often confuse investors. 

Therefore, the CMMT proposes the use of universal proxy ballots to improve standardisation and mandate voting disclosure for each side when a dispute arises.  

At the same time, the taskforce has also proposed introducing rules to prevent over-voting and the requirement for companies listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange to have an annual shareholder votes on executive compensation. In further efforts to improve corporate governance standards, the taskforce proposes further legislative guidance be made around the role of independent directors in a bid to avoid conflicts of interest from arising, arguing that current laws do not fully address the role such directors play. 

Elsewhere, the taskforce wants to reduce the ownership threshold for early warning reporting disclosure in Canadian companies from 10% to 5%. This would bring Canada in line with other major markets, with the CMMT also acknowledging that a shareholder can currently requisition a meeting with a holding of as little as 5%.  

In a bid to improve transparency, the CMMT is also proposing the adoption of quarterly filing requirements for institutional investors of Canadian companies and – in a very encouraging step – the introduction of enhanced disclosure of material ESG information. 

With stronger ESG reporting, Canada would be following in the footsteps of other jurisdictions and create a level playing field for its companies. In particular the taskforce identified the metrics used by the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) and Taskforce on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) as potential solutions.  

Other CMMT’s recommendations include giving regulators new and enhanced powers when dealing with listed entities. For instance, the taskforce has proposed empowering the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) to issue no-action letters. This already happens in the US where a company can seek a no-action letter from the Securities and Exchange Commission when it has the basis to exclude a particular shareholder proposal. 

The CMMT has also proposed the introduction of broader remedies for the OSC when dealing with mergers and acquisitions. The taskforce proposes granting the OSC similar powers to those recently granted to the British Columbia Securities Commission, which can now rescind a transaction, require a person to dispose of securities in connection with a deal or even prohibit them from exercising voting rights.

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actualités internationales Gouvernance normes de droit Responsabilité sociale des entreprises Structures juridiques

Public Benefit Corporation : réforme en vue

En cette période estivale, suivre l’actualité est toujours intéressant. Ma lecture d’un article ce matin « Renewed Interest in IPOs of Public Benefit Corporations » (de Cydney Posner) m’apprenait que l’État américain du Delaware est en train de débattre d’une réforme législative en matière d’entreprise à mission !

Pour accéder à cette réforme : ici

Extrait :

These and other similar risks are some of the reasons that, in adopting laws authorizing PBCs, the Delaware legislature made it particularly difficult to convert a traditional corporation to a PBC. For example, currently, the approval of 2/3 of the outstanding stock is required for a traditional corporation to amend its certificate of incorporation to become a PBC or to merge with another entity if the effect of the merger is to convert the shares into shares of a PBC. (Note that, originally, the vote required for conversion was 90%, which made it well nigh impossible for a traditional public company to convert to a PBC.) Appraisal rights are available to stockholders that did not vote in favor of the conversion or merger. And the same vote is required for conversion from a PBC form of entity into a traditional corporation.

The legislation that was just passed by the House in Delaware would, if ultimately signed into law, eliminate the 2/3 voting requirements, making it easier to convert a traditional corporation to a PBC or a PBC to a traditional corporation. Only the standard stockholder vote provisions would be applicable—generally a vote of a majority of the outstanding shares (or any greater or other vote required under the company’s certificate of incorporation) would be required. The amendments would also eliminate the special appraisal rights provisions, with the result that appraisal rights would not be available for conversions resulting from amendments to the certificate, but standard appraisal rights (§262) would be available in the context of mergers.

In addition, as noted above, the current PBC statute mandates that the board of directors manage the business and affairs of the PBC by balancing “the pecuniary interests of the stockholders, the best interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, and the specific public benefit or public benefits identified in its certificate of incorporation.” The statute provides that, with respect to a decision implicating the “balance requirement,” directors of PBCs will be deemed to satisfy their fiduciary duties to stockholders and the corporation if their decision “is both informed and disinterested and not such that no person of ordinary, sound judgment would approve.” A PBC is also permitted to include in its certificate, for purposes of its director exculpatory provisions under §102(b)(7) and its indemnification provisions under §145, that any disinterested failure to satisfy the mandate will not be considered to “constitute an act or omission not in good faith, or a breach of the duty of loyalty.”

The new legislation would also amp up the protections for directors of a PBC. The amendments would clarify that a director would not be considered “interested” in connection with a balancing decision solely because of the director’s interest in stock of the corporation, except to the extent that the same ownership would create a conflict of interest if the corporation were not a PBC. The amendments would also provide that, in the absence of a conflict, no failure to satisfy the balancing requirement would, for purposes of §102(b)(7) or §145, be considered “an act or omission not in good faith, or a breach of the duty of loyalty, unless the certificate of incorporation so provides.” That is, the certificate would no longer need to expressly provide for the protection for it to apply. In addition, the amendments would provide that, to bring any lawsuit to enforce the PBC balancing requirement, the plaintiffs must own at least 2% of the corporation’s outstanding shares or, for PBCs listed on a national securities exchange, shares with a market value of at least $2 million, if lower.

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actualités internationales Gouvernance mission et composition du conseil d'administration normes de droit Responsabilité sociale des entreprises

Grèce : 25 % de femmes au CA imposé par la loi

Minerva Analytics apporte une belle mise à jour à la problématique de la diversité en m’apprenant que la Grèce vient de renforcer son dispositif juridique en matière de féminisation : « Greek companies will soon be mandated to meet a 25% female quota on their boards following a landmark decision for gender diversity ».

Extrait :

The quota requirement has been included as an amendment to the bill transposing the EU Shareholder Rights Directive II (SRD II) into Greek law, and is the result of a consultation led by a group of academics specialising in corporate governance.

(…)

Overall, the directive is designed to encourage companies away from short-termism, focusing on areas such as director remuneration. However, the Greek amendment marks the first time it has been used to tackle the EU’s poor record on gender diversity at a board level.

According to the European Commission’s 2019 report on equality between men and women, since 2015, progress on corporate gender inclusivity has stalled. As of October 2018, the proportion of women on the boards of the EU’s biggest companies was only 26.7%.

Within this, France was the only EU member state with at least 40% female representation at board-level, while women account for less than a third of board-level positions in Italy, Sweden, Finland and Germany.

According to the same data, women made up less than 10% of board members in Greece.

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