Gouvernance | Page 121

« Big funds push back against activist investor settlements » (Reuters, 18 juillet 2016)… Cet article est à lire, tant il témoigne d’une évolution lente et progressive vers un modèle de gouvernance moins axé vers le court-termisme. Le temps de faire siéger les investisseurs court-termistes (tels les fonds de couverture) dans les CA serait-il révolu ?

After years of support for companies that hand board seats to activists to avoid a bruising public fight, some of the world’s largest institutional investors are pushing back.

BlackRock Inc (BLK.N), the world’s largest asset manager, and Norges Bank Investment Management, Norway’s $872 billion sovereign wealth fund are among the major funds resisting, encouraging companies to consult them before responding to an activist.

These investors argue that in certain cases, giving board seats to frustrated shareholders with a shorter-term investment horizon could jeopardize the company’s long-term performance.

Activist investors, which Thomson Reuters data show launched a record 511 campaigns last year, are usually hedge funds that buy up a minority stake in a company they believe is undervalued, and push publicly for changes to boost the stock.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Bonjour à tous, MSCI vient de publier un tout nouveau rapport sur la rémunération des dirigeants. Les chercheurs sont arrivés à cette conclusion : les PDG les mieux payés se retrouvent le plus souvent à la tête des entreprises les moins performantes ! Un article sur ledit rapport est paru ce matin dans Business Day :

The analysis, from corporate-governance research firm MSCI, examined the pay of about 800 CEOs at 429 large and midsize US companies during the decade ending in 2014, and also looked at the total shareholder return of the companies during the same period.

MSCI found that $100 invested in the 20% of companies with the highest-paid CEOs would have grown to $265 over 10 years. The same amount invested in the companies with the lowest-paid CEOs would have grown to $367.

L’article complet de Theo Francis sur le rapport de MSCI est disponible ici.

Le rapport complet est disponible ici.

Bonne lecture

Julie Bernard, MAP, Adm.A

Étudiante au doctorat (PhD) en sciences de l’administration (Management)

Faculté des sciences de l’administration

Université Laval

Pour Paul Hodgson, il est temps de changer la done dans le domaine de la gouvernance d’entreprise : « Change to U.K. CEO pay or regulation seen as inevitable » (Compliance Week, 20 juillet 2016).

Voici un extrait :

wC’s latest report, called Time to Listen, is subtitled, “We need to find a way to respond to public concern about executive pay, or matters will be taken out of our hands.”

The report draws its conclusions on the need to address income inequality from both its own research and the British Social Attitudes 32 survey, published in 2015, which showed strong agreement, even among those voting conservative, to some stark statements:

• There is one law for the rich and another for the poor
• Ordinary people do not get their fair share of the nation’s wealth
• Management will always try to get the better of employees if it gets the chance
• Big business benefits owners at the expense of workers

(…) The paper concludes that CEO pay in listed companies is probably the result of market forces operating in imperfectly. It says that the current system of shareholder votes is working but has not been given time to “bed down” and that further regulation may do more harm than good. Finally, it says: “We should in any case be more concerned about pay structures than pay levels.” But the report says that action is not simply required at the top but also at the bottom; addressing stagnating pay and employment uncertainty for ordinary workers. Especially in a period of uncertainty caused by Brexit, “companies will be judged by how they treat the most vulnerable in their workforce.”

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Voilà une belle capsule-vidéo portant sur cette question bien connue des juristes québécois et canadiens : « Les pouvoirs du CA peuvent-ils être restreints ou retirés ? ». Me André Vautour y répond…

Rappelons simplement qu’en vertu de l’article 213 LSAQ, les actionnaires peuvent restreindre ou retirer les pouvoirs du CA. Ils alors conclure une convention unanime par écrit qu’ils aient un droit de vote ou non. Cette convention va prévoir par exemple :

• Définition de modalités spécifiques pour l’exercice des pouvoirs du conseil : majorité spéciale…
• Rapatriement d’une partie ou de tous les pouvoirs du conseil
• Imposition de l’approbation des actionnaires ou d’un tiers avant des décisions
• Prévision d’un droit de veto ou d’une autorisation pour donner effet à certaines décisions
• Contraindre les administrateurs à poser des gestes

La décision Allard c. Myhill de 2012 (EYB 2012-213993) a utilement rappelé que :

La convention unanime peut donc restreindre en totalité les pouvoirs des administrateurs de gérer les affaires de la société.

Mais attention aux conséquences ! Les actionnaires devront assumer les mêmes responsabilités (sur ce point, je vous souhaite une bonne lecture de l’article 214 LSAQ).

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Alors que Theresa May a fait part de son intérêt d’importer en Grande-Bretagne le système allemand, MM. Horst Eidenmüller,  Mathias Habersack, Caspar Behme et Lars Klöhn  reviennent sur la pertinence de cette proposition en jetant un regard prudent (de chercheurs !) sur ce système : « Corporate Co-Determination German-Style as a Model for the UK? » (18 juillet 2016).

On 13 July 2016, Theresa May took up office as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. Only shortly before, she had made headlines when she proposed to adopt European-style worker representation on the boards of leading companies.

Corporate co-determination hence seems to gain a certain degree of popularity with the British government – which is highly astonishing, considering that it was the UK which most fiercely fought against co-determination on a European level. It was mainly the diverging views of the UK and Germany on co-determination which have thwarted projects like the Draft Fifth Company Law Directive or the establishment of a European Private Company (Societas Privata Europaea, SPE). It is downright ironic that while the UK now shows an interest in co-determination, the concept is being questioned in Germany after decades of lying dormant. The reason for the new German discussion of co-determination are doubts regarding the compatibility of its specific form of co-determination with higher-ranking Union law. This post provides a brief overview of the most recent developments in German co-determination law that were the focus of a joint Oxford/Munich conference at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität (LMU) in Munich in March 2016.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian