The quota requirement has been included as an amendment to the bill transposing the EU Shareholder Rights Directive II (SRD II) into Greek law, and is the result of a consultation led by a group of academics specialising in corporate governance.
(…)
Overall, the directive is designed to encourage companies away from short-termism, focusing on areas such as director remuneration. However, the Greek amendment marks the first time it has been used to tackle the EU’s poor record on gender diversity at a board level.
Within this, France was the only EU member state with at least 40% female representation at board-level, while women account for less than a third of board-level positions in Italy, Sweden, Finland and Germany.
According to the same data, women made up less than 10% of board members in Greece.
Voilà une belle question abordée dans ce billet du Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance« What Board Members Need to Know about the “E” in ESG » (par Sheila M. Harvey, Reza S. Zarghamee et Jonathan M. Ocker, 9 juillet 2020) !
Extrait concernant les CA :
Board Responsibilities
Traditionally, a company’s board will manage corporate governance risks and executive compensation. The practical need to expand these responsibilities to account for environmental stewardship and risk management is a relatively new phenomenon, and many boards are not yet up to speed.
The first step toward properly addressing environmental matters is for the board to collaborate with management to identify the different ways in which the company’s businesses and operations interface with environmental issues. The aim here is to think expansively. For purposes of ESG, environmental matters extend beyond regulatory compliance and impacts on natural resources to include concepts such as environmental justice, carbon footprints, supply chains and product stewardship.
Consistent with this approach, an equally broad realm of potential environmental risks also should be considered. These may include the potential to cause environmental contamination and natural resource damages, which may trigger not just cleanup liabilities but also disclosure requirements in financial statements. Also relevant is the potential for business operations to be disrupted by environmental factors such as climate change.
Once potential environmental risks are identified, assessments should be made regarding their materiality and the existence of standing corporate policies and procedures to address them. Where such policies are lacking, they should be developed and implemented. Moreover, determinations should be made about how the company will present itself to investors, regulators and society to adequately inform them of potential environmental risks, avoid reputational harm and increase long-term value.
There is no one-size-fits-all solution, and companies have different environmental profiles. Each will have to find its own way, but the board should make sure that management devotes the appropriate resources to addressing environmental matters, understands environmental disclosure requirements and standards and ranking systems, and takes a proactive approach to protecting the company’s reputation from an environmental standpoint.
This is a multifaceted paradigm that requires open lines of communication between management and the board at all times. Moreover, because not every board member can be an ESG expert, we recommend that the appropriate committee be tasked in its charter with spearheading the environmental risk area for the board.
Points à retenir :
Corporate boards should partner with management to ensure appropriate and regular oversight of environmental issues critical to the long-term economic success and reputation of the company.
Either the board or an authorized committee should receive briefings on environmental matters/risks that may jeopardize a company’s reputation and corrective action undertaken to address those risks.
Management should monitor environmental disclosures and rankings of peer firms and consult with the board on how to improve their company’s standing relative to competing firms and in terms of stakeholder expectations.
La crise de la COVID-19 met en relief l’importance de l’investissement responsable. Deux consultantes expertes dans le domaine invitent les comités de retraite à préparer les bonnes questions à poser à leurs gestionnaires de portefeuille.
Random and arbitrary compliance with various initiatives makes companies’ sustainable practices ‘less’ rather than ‘more’ transparent. Our paper offers a comprehensive view on different reporting frameworks. It shows that there is a need to provide some clarity in this complex landscape. Fundamentally, the current reporting landscape is unlikely to impact positively on efforts towards sustainability. We suggest in our paper hat the scope of the NFRD, as the most promising of the existing initiatives, should be revisited so as to enhance its contribution to furthering corporations’ sustainable practices. Our paper supports reform of the NFRD which has constituted a positive step in the right direction. What is required now is stronger guidance on what to report and how to report it. Steps are being taken in the right direction towards clarifying metrics around sustainability (World Economic Forum 2020). A standardized and streamlined framework is necessary in order to pin companies down to something more concrete, rather than giving them too much choice on which guidelines, frameworks or recommendations they may opt to follow. Stronger, clearer and more concrete definitions of key concepts are required, as well as clarification of the rights of stakeholders in this area of activity. Proposals for reform that have arisen, with a consultation exercise by the European Commission, (European Commission Consultation 2020) are therefore to be welcomed. We suggest an expansion of the NFRD’s scope and that it represent sustainability as a positive instead of reducing the focus only to negative risks. EU member states and companies should have opportunities for effective compliance with the reporting requirements, with the NFRD better defining the concepts it refers to.
In this short essay (…), I take issue with the relevance and effectiveness of ’corporate purpose’ as a form of private ordering (eg, as a bylaws provision), or in other sources of soft-law (self-regulation in corporate governance codes, declarations of business associations, etc). I challenge whether these are, in fact, effective tools to induce greater commitment toward stakeholders.
(…) My possible disagreement with Mayer and other similar approaches and initiatives—or, more precisely, with a possible reading of these approaches and initiatives—lays in the excessive trust and emphasis that has been reserved to formulas concerning the purpose of the corporation and their possible consequences. Mayer argues that the corporate contract should include a reference to stakeholders and general social interests beyond value for shareholders, suggesting that this simple trick would have a meaningful impact on business conduct.
(…) The reasons are obvious.
First, these formulas are so broad, vague and ephemeral that they cannot possibly represent a compass for corporate action; they cannot provide meaningful guidance for virtually any specific corporate decision that implies a (legitimate) tradeoff between the interests of different stakeholders. Also, as precedents show, these formulas can be used even less to invoke the violation of directors’ duties and their liability. This conclusion is inevitable because the very essence of the agency relationship, the crucial function of a director or executive, is exactly mediating and balancing the different and often conflicting interests that converge on the corporation in an uncertain and evolving scenario. The idea of constraining the necessary discretion of directors within the boundaries of a simple purpose declaration is no better than the idea of writing in the contract with a painter that her work must be a masterpiece. Such an attempted shortcut to real value is self-evidently flawed.
Second, multiplying the goals and interests that directors must or can pursue, if it can have any effect at all, by definition increases their flexibility and discretion and makes it easier to justify, ex ante and ex post, very different choices. Without being cynical, from this perspective it is not surprising that these formulas are often welcomed, if not sponsored, by business associations and interest groups linked to managers, executives and entrenched shareholders.
Third, self-regulation and private ordering are often a way to avoid or delay the adoption of more stringent statutory or regulatory provisions. The former might be more or less effective, but they might also create an illusion of responsibility. The risk of putting too much trust into the beneficial consequences of these formulas is a disregard for more biting mandatory provisions, which may be necessary to avoid externalities and other market failures.
In particular, securities regulators should make pay ratio disclosures mandatory to improve transparency of executive pay packages at public companies. Pay ratio disclosures reveal the difference in the total remuneration between a company’s top executives and its rank and file workers….
