autres publications | Page 15

L’Autorité prudentielle de la Banque d’Angleterre vient de publier un Supervisory Statement intitulé « Corporate governance: Board responsibilities » (SS5/16, mars 2016).

The Prudential Regulation Authority has published a policy statement and accompanying supervisory statement concerning the responsibilities of boards.

The purpose of this supervisory statement is to identify, for the boards1 of firms regulated by the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), those aspects of governance to which the PRA attaches particular importance and to which the PRA may devote particular attention in the course of its supervision. It is not intended to provide a comprehensive guide for boards of what constitutes good or effective governance. There are more general guidelines for that purpose, for example the UK Corporate Governance Code, published by the Financial Reporting Council.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

La Commission européenne vient de publier un document sur le financement participatif qui fait l’état des lieux des initiatives nationales : « COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
– Crowdfunding in the EU Capital Markets Union » (SWD(2016) 154 final).

Voici la conclusion de ce document :

This report demonstrates that crowdfunding remains relatively small in the EU but is developing rapidly. It has the potential to be a key source of financing for SMEs over the long term.

Crowdfunding is one of many technological innovations that have the potential to transform the financial system. Therefore, crowdfunding warrants consideration as part of our broader approach to FinTech and the digitalisation of financial services, which is being looked at further in the Green Paper on Retail Financial Services.

As demonstrated in this report, to promote the growth of crowdfunding and appropriately protect investors, EU Member States have put in place a range of measures to regulate crowdfunding – either using the EU legislative framework where appropriate or via national regimes. These national frameworks are broadly consistent in terms of the objectives and outcomes they seek to achieve, but are tailored to local markets and domestic regulatory approaches.

Given the predominantly local nature of crowdfunding, there is no strong case for EU level policy intervention at this juncture. Crowdfunding is still relatively small and needs space to innovate and develop. Given the dynamism of crowdfunding and the potential for future cross border expansion, it will be important to monitor the development of the sector and the effectiveness, and degree of convergence of, national regulatory frameworks.

The Commission Services will therefore maintain regular dialogue, through twice yearly meetings, with the European Supervisory Authorities, Member States, and the crowdfunding sector to promote convergence, sharing of best practice and keep developments under review. We will assess the development of cross-border business and consider in particular the investor protection aspects. This will ensure the Commission is able to respond in a timely manner if further steps to support convergence of regulatory approaches are needed, both to promote the development of the sector and to ensure appropriate investor protection.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Le professeur John Armour offre une analyse synthétique des liens entre l’affaire Volkswagen et la gouvernance d’entreprise dans un billet de blog paru sur le site de l’Université d’Oxford : « Volkswagen’s Emissions Scandal: Lessons for Corporate Governance? (Part 1) ».

At this point, it remains unclear precisely how and why VW came to do this. US law firm Jones Day have been retained by VW to conduct an internal investigation, the results of which are due in the fourth quarter of 2016. VW’s official line is that this was the result of the actions of a few engineers and programmers. Let’s call this the ‘rogue technicians’ theory. However, with such a large number of vehicles, over a period of about seven years, it seems—as was argued in a recent post by J.S. Nelson—more plausible that senior management might have been aware of the scheme (or warning signs of it) at some point prior to its revelation. Let’s call this the ‘management inaction’ theory.

J’ai hâte de lire la partie 2 !

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Le Harvard Business Review propose un article intitulé : « How incentives for long-term management backfire” qui prend le contrepied de la croyance voulant que les plans incitatifs basés sur la performance à long terme seraient une cause du court-termisme de la direction des entreprises.

In the five years since the advent of Dodd-Frank regulation, corporate governance groups, with their policies requiring at least half of long-term incentives to be “performance-based,” have pushed companies to replace options with multi-year, performance plans. How could anyone object to such an effort? Hardly anyone, except here is the rub: Performance plans require performance targets, and in most companies, planning works in three-year cycles. The logical performance period for long-term incentives is one that matches those cycles. Three years has thus become the standard performance window for measuring achievement.

So a three-year horizon — not even a presidential term — has inexorably become the norm for investing hundreds of billions of dollars of money aimed at creating “long term” value. With the best of intentions, many proxy advisors and long-term investors have widely blessed three years as appropriate, adopting three-year pay for performance as their standard comparison. Today, four out of five S&P 500 companies use a three-year performance period in their long-term incentives. But executives today, who are paid on this new “long term,” typically with equity based partly on earnings-per-share performance, naturally think twice about retaining earnings for projects beyond three years. Their measurements conflict with their managerial inclinations, encouraging them to use earnings booked today to immediately return cash to shareholders.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Excellent dossier de La presse consacré à la gouvernance d’entreprise publié ce 3 mai ! Plusieurs articles sont ainsi consacré à la gouvernance d’entreprise et notamment un que je retiens dans le cadre du blogue : « Six enjeux de la gouvernance d’entreprise ».

L’activisme des actionnaires d’entreprises cotées en Bourse fait maintenant partie du paysage. Dénote-t-il des besoins de réformes majeures ? Va-t-il amener des changements de comportement chez l’élite des sociétés ? Survol des principaux enjeux en gouvernance d’entreprise.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Le quotidien Le Monde vient de publier un article de Mme Stéphanie Goujon (« Il faut « favoriser la diffusion du retour social sur investissement auprès des entreprises comme des associations » ») qui revient sur l’importance d’évaluer la création de valeur sociétale et l’utilité de développer un nouvel indicateur pertinent, moderne et juste : le retour social sur investissement (Social Return on Investment, SROI). L’auteure y aborde le dernier rapport de France Stratégie sur le lien entre RSE et performance d’entreprise.

• Pour accéder au rapport de France Stratégie : « Responsabilité sociale des entreprises et compétitivité : Évaluation et approche stratégique » (janvier 2016).

Les entreprises peinent véritablement à calculer le retour sur investissement des actions RSE – le fameux ROI (« return on investment »), Graal de toute entreprise. L’absence de liaison directe entre RSE et ROI de la responsabilité sociale, sociétale et environnementale conduit même certaines entreprises à penser que leur démarche RSE n’a aucun impact sur leurs performances économiques et financières… Pourtant une récente étude de France Stratégie montre qu’il existe un écart de performance économique de 13 % au bénéfice des entreprises ayant adopté une démarche RSE.