Gouvernance Nouvelles diverses objectifs de l'entreprise
L’actionnariat familial a-t-il un avenir ?
Ivan Tchotourian 9 décembre 2020 Ivan Tchotourian
C’est à cette question que répond le professeur Pierre-Yves Gomez dans un billet fort intéressant dont je relaie un extrait ci-dessous (ici).
Extrait :
Gouvernance : Actionnariat anonyme vs Actionnariat Familial
C’est à partir de ce moment, au tournant des années 1930, que la société anonyme (et plus tard la SAS) s’est aussi imposée comme la forme juridique dominante : ni l’actionnaire, ni le dirigeant ne sont plus responsables sur leurs biens propres. Sans attaches, ils peuvent entrer et sortir de l’entreprise en utilisant les mécanismes du marché des capitaux ou du travail. Le lien substantiel entre le décideur et l’entreprise se distend. Parallèlement, parce que les actionnaires sont devenus anonymes et que leur responsabilité se limite à leurs apports financiers, la demande de responsabilité s’est déplacée vers les entreprises elles-mêmes. D’où l’exigence contemporaine d’une Responsabilité sociale des entreprises (RSE) associée à une mission ou une raison d’être. Ce que la famille propriétaire portait naguère est désormais attendu de l’entreprise prise comme individu doté d’une personnalité morale.
Pour autant, au delà de cette fiction juridique, l’actionnariat reste massivement familial dans les sociétés anonymes et la famille demeure l’institution sociale de référence comme le montrent régulièrement les sondages d’opinion. Ce paradoxe invite à réfléchir sur l’avenir d’un pouvoir actionnarial fondé encore sur l’héritage. Que peut signifier « hériter d’un capital » au 21ème siècle et comment le destin de l’institution » famille » et celui de l’institution « entreprise » pourraient-ils être encore liés ?
Si l’actionnariat familial ne se réduit plus qu’à un simple transfert générationnel de patrimoine en vue d’accumulation de richesses et de rentes, il achèvera certainement de perdre toute légitimité. Dans les années futures, des réformes de gouvernance s’imposeront comme nécessaires pour limiter l’acquisition de parts sociales d’entreprises par le hasard injuste de l’héritage. Mais si un tel héritage est assumé comme une charge engageant à maintenir un projet social, des savoir-faire ou une communauté de travail, l’actionnariat associé au destin d’une famille pourrait apporter aux parties-prenantes une caution bienvenue de continuité dans la durée. Dans une société fractionnée et rongée d’incertitudes, il associerait le pouvoir souverain du capital à une communauté humaine tenue par des liens non-capitalistes. A la croisée des chemins, cette forme de gouvernance ancienne peut s’inventer une nouvelle pertinence ou sombrer avec l’idée même de famille traditionnelle.
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actualités internationales devoirs des administrateurs Gouvernance normes de droit Nouvelles diverses objectifs de l'entreprise Responsabilité sociale des entreprises
Entreprises et parties prenantes : focus sur les Pays-Bas
Ivan Tchotourian 2 août 2020 Ivan Tchotourian
Le 2 août 2020, Christiaan de Brauw a publié un intéressant billet sur l’Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance sous le titre « The Dutch Stakeholder Experience ».
Extrait :
Lessons learned
The Dutch experience shows that the following lessons are key to make the stakeholder-oriented governance model work in practice.
Embed a clear stakeholder mission in the fiduciary duties of the board
To have a real stakeholder model, the board must have a duty to act in the interests of the business and all the stakeholders, not only the shareholders. In shareholder models there may be some room to consider stakeholder interests. For example, in Delaware and various other US states, the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders may be considered in the context of achieving overall long-term shareholder value creation. In US states with constituency statutes, the board’s discretion is preserved: the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders can be, but do not have to be, taken into account. A meaningful stakeholder model requires the board to act in the interests of the business and all stakeholders. This is a “shall” duty, in the words of Leo Strine and Robert Eccles (see Purpose With Meaning: A Practical Way Forward, Robert G. Eccles, Leo E. Strine and Timothy Youmans, May 16, 2020). Rather than allowing for the possibility that all stakeholders’ interests will be taken into account; it should create a real duty to do so. Since 1971, boards of Dutch companies have had such a “shall” duty to follow a stakeholder mission, similar to that of a benefit corporation in, for example, Delaware.
The stakeholder duty must be clear and realistic for boards in the economic environment in which they operate. To define the contours of such a mission in a clear and practical way is not easy, as the journey of the Dutch stakeholder model shows. Today, the Netherlands has a meaningful and realistically defined fiduciary duty for boards. The primary duty is to promote the sustainable success of the business, focused on long-term value creation, while taking into account the interests of all stakeholders and ESG and similar sustainability perspectives. These principles are broadly similar to the corporate purpose and mission proposed by Martin Lipton and others (see On the Purpose of the Corporation, Martin Lipton, William Savitt and Karessa L. Cain, posted May 27, 2020).
Critics of the stakeholder model sometimes point to the ambiguity and lack of clarity of such a pluralistic model. The developments of the Dutch stakeholder model since its inception show that a pluralistic model can work in practice. By now, Dutch boards’ overriding task is adequately clear and aligned with what is typically expected of a company’s executives: pursuing the strategic direction that will most likely result in long-term and sustainable business success. The Dutch stakeholder model also has a workable roadmap to deal with stakeholders’ interests, particularly if they diverge or cannot all be protected fully at the same time, which necessarily results in trade-offs between stakeholders. A realistic approach to governance acknowledges that a stakeholder model does not mean that boards can or should seek to maximize value for all the stakeholders equally and at the same time. It is simply unrealistic to simultaneously pay (and progressively increase) dividends, increase wages and improve contract terms, while also promoting the success of the business. The Dutch interpretation of the stakeholder model, as developed through practice over decades, boils down to the focus on the sustainable success of the business and long-term value creation. As said above, stakeholders are protected by the board’s duty to prevent disproportionate or unnecessary harm to any class of stakeholders. Boards should avoid or mitigate such harm, for example, by agreeing “non-financial covenants” in a takeover. This makes sense as a way to protect stakeholder interests in a realistic manner, much more so than merely requiring boards—without any further guidance—to create value for all the stakeholders.
A stakeholder-oriented model should also be modern and flexible enough to address and incorporate important developments. The Dutch model is especially well positioned to embrace ESG and similar sustainability perspectives. For example, the Dutch company DSM has successfully illustrated this, while being profitable and attractive for investors. There is growing appreciation that being a frontrunner in ESG is required for sustainable business success. In addition to the fact that ESG is required for continuity of the business model and can often give a company a competitive edge, stakeholders increasingly require it. Simply “doing the right thing”, as an independent corporate goal, is more and more seen as important by (new millennial) employees, customers, institutional investors and other stakeholders.
There is no standard test to determine whether a business has achieved sustainable success. There will be different ways to achieve and measure success for different companies, depending on the respective circumstances. Therefore, the test will always have to be bespoke, implemented by the board and explained to stakeholders.
The Dutch stakeholder model has proven to work quite well in times of crisis, such as today’s Covid-19 crisis, as it bolsters the board’s focus on the survival and continuity of the business. The board must first assess whether there is a realistic chance of survival and continuity of the business. If not, and if insolvency becomes imminent, the board’s duties transform to focus on creditors’ interests, such as preventing wrongful trading and the winding down or restarting of the business in line with applicable insolvency/restructuring proceedings. Driven by the economic reality and the need to survive, in times of crisis, boards typically have more freedom to do what it takes to survive: from pursuing liquidity enhancing measures, implementing reorganizations, suspending dividends to shareholders and payments to creditors and so on. The success of the business remains the overriding aim, and in some cases harm to one or more classes of stakeholders may need to be accepted. In addition, in a true stakeholder model, in times of crisis there may not be sympathy for corporate raiders or activists (so-called “corona profiteers” in the current case) who want to buy listed companies on the cheap. A just say not now defense in addition to the just say no defense will readily be available for boards who are occupied with dealing with the crisis and revaluating the best strategic direction. This idea that during the Covid-crisis protection against activists and hostile bidders may be needed seems to be understood as well by, for example, ISS and Glass Lewis, evidenced by their willingness to accept new poison pills for a one year duration (see, for example, ISS and Glass Lewis Guidances on Poison Pills during COVID-19 Pandemic, Paul J. Shim, James E. Langston, and Charles W. Allen, posted on April 26, 2020).
Teeth to protect the stakeholder mission and appropriate checks and balances
The Netherlands has adopted a model in which matters of strategy are the prerogative of the executive directors under supervision of the non-executive directors or, in the still widely used two-tier system, of the management board under supervision of the supervisory board. Similar to the discretion afforded to directors under Delaware’s business judgment rule, a Dutch board has a lot of freedom to choose the strategic direction of the company. In a dispute, the amount of care taken by the board in the decision-making process will be scrutinized by courts, but normally objectively reasonable decisions will be respected. In the Dutch model the board is the captain of the ship; it is best equipped to determine the course for the business and take difficult decisions on how to serve the interests of stakeholders. Generally, the board has no obligation to consult with, or get the approval of, the shareholders in advance of a decision.
At the same time, in recognition of the significant power that boards have in the Dutch stakeholder model, there should be checks and balances to ensure the board’s powers are exercised in a careful manner, without conflicts of interest and without entrenchment. Non-executive/supervisory directors will need to exercise critical and hands-on oversight, particularly when there are potential conflicts of interest. Further, shareholders and other stakeholders are entitled to hold boards to account: boards need to be able to explain their strategic decisions. Shareholders can use their shareholder rights to express their opinions and preferences. Shareholders can also pursue the dismissal of failing and entrenched boards. Boards need regular renewed shareholder mandates through reappointments. The courts are the ultimate guardian of the stakeholder model. The Dutch Enterprise Chamber at the Amsterdam Court of Appeals, which operates in a comparable manner to the Delaware Chancery Court, is an efficient and expert referee of last resort.
The stakeholder model should not convert to a shareholder model in takeover scenarios. The board should focus on whether a takeover is the best strategic option and take into account the consequences for all the stakeholders. In most cases, the best strategic direction for the business will create the highest valuation of the business. But, and this is a real difference with shareholder models, it should be acknowledged that the stand-alone (or other best strategic) option can be different from the strategic option favored by a majority of the shareholders and the option that creates the most shareholder value. This principle was confirmed by the Dutch Enterprise Chamber in 2017 in the AkzoNobel case.
A meaningful stakeholder model requires teeth. The right governance structures need to be put in place to create and protect the long-term stakeholder mission in the face of short-term market pressure. The reality—in the Netherlands as well as in the US—is that shareholders are the most powerful constituency in the stakeholder universe, with the authority to replace the board. In Dutch practice, various countervailing measures can be used to protect the stakeholder mission. A commonly used instrument is the independent protection foundation, the Dutch poison pill. The independent foundation can exercise a call option and acquire and vote on preference shares. It can neutralize the newly acquired voting power of hostile bidders or activists and is effective against actions geared at replacing the board, including a proxy fight. Once the threat no longer exists, the preference shares are cancelled. These measures have been effective, for example, against hostile approaches of America Movil for KPN (2013) and Teva for Mylan (2015).
Foster a stakeholder mindset, governance and environment
Perhaps the most important prerequisite for a well-functioning stakeholder model is the actual mindset of executives and directors. This mindset drives how they will use their stakeholder powers. Fiduciary duties—also in a stakeholder model—are “open norms” and leave a lot of freedom to boards to pursue the strategic direction and to use their authority as they deem fit. The prevailing spirit and opinions about governance are important, as they influence how powers are interpreted and exercised. As an example, the Dutch requirement that boards need to act in the interest of the company and its business dates from 1971, but that did not prevent boards in the 2000s from seeing shareholders as the first among equals. Today, the body of ideas about governance in the developed world is tending to converge towards stakeholder-oriented governance. This seems to indicate a fundamental change in mindset, not merely a fashionable trend or lip service. Board members with a stakeholder conviction should not be afraid to follow their mission, even if it runs counter to past experience or faces shareholder opposition. Of course, the future will hold the ultimate test for the stakeholder model. Can it, in practice, deliver on its promise to create sustainable success and long-term value and provide better protection for stakeholders? If so, this will create a positive feedback loop in which more boards embrace it.
Stakeholder-based governance models remain works in progress. In order to succeed in the long term, models that grant boards the authority to determine the strategy need to stay viable and attractive for shareholders. Going forward, boards following a stakeholder-based model will likely need to focus more on accountability, for example by concretely substantiating their strategic plans and goals and, where possible, providing the relevant metrics to measure their achievements. In reality, stakeholder models are already attractive for foreign investors: about 90% of investors in Dutch listed companies are US or UK investors. In addition, developments in the definition of the corporate purpose will further refine the stakeholder model. In the Netherlands, there has been a call to action by 25 corporate law professors who argue that companies should act as responsible corporate citizens and should articulate a clear corporate purpose.
To make stakeholder governance work, ideally, all stakeholders are committed to the same mission. It is encouraging that key institutional investors are embracing long-term value creation and the consideration of other stakeholders’ interests, for instance by supporting the New Paradigm model of corporate governance and stewardship codes to that effect. However, the “proof of the pudding” is whether boards can continue to walk the stakeholder talk and pursue the long-term view in the face of short-term pressure, either through generally accepted goals and behavior or, if necessary, countervailing governance arrangements. Today, it is still far from certain whether institutional investors will reject pursuing a short-term takeover premium, even where they consider the offer to be undervalued or not supportive of long-term value creation. Annual bonuses of the deciding fund manager may depend on accepting that offer. Until the behavior of investors in such scenarios respects the principle of long-term value creation, appropriate governance protection is important to prevent a legal pathway for shareholders to impose their short-term goals. Therefore, even in jurisdictions where stakeholder-based approaches have been embraced, and are actually pursued by boards, governance arrangements might need to be changed to make the stakeholder mission work in practice. Clear guidance for boards is needed on what the stakeholder mission is and how to deal with stakeholders’ interests, as well as catering for adequate powers and protection for boards.
The Dutch model, which requires a company to be business success-driven, have a “shall duty” to stakeholders that applies even in a sale of the company, and that recognizes that corporations are dependent on stakeholders for success and have a corresponding responsibility to stakeholders, has been demonstrated to be consistent with a high-functioning economy. By highlighting the Dutch system, however, I do not mean to claim that it is unique. For policymakers who are considering the merits of a stakeholder-based governance model, the Dutch system should be seen as one example among many corporate governance systems in successful market economies (such as Germany) that embrace this form of stakeholder-based governance. There is likely no one-size-fits-all approach; each jurisdiction should find the tailor-made model that works best for it, like perhaps the introduction of the corporate purpose in the UK and France. In any event, there is a great benefit in exchanging ideas and learning from experiences in different jurisdictions to find common ground and best practices in order to increase the acceptance and appreciation of stakeholder-oriented governance models.
US governance practices have been, and are, influential around the world. In the 2000s the pendulum in developed countries, including to some extent in the Netherlands, clearly swung in the direction of shareholder-centric governance as championed in the US. In the current environment, if the US system’s focus on shareholders is not adjusted to protect stakeholder interests, it may over time perhaps become an outlier among many of the world’s leading market economies that in one way or the other have adopted a stakeholder approach. Adjustment towards stakeholder governance seems certainly possible in the US, for example through the emerging model of corporate governance, the Delaware Public Benefit Corporation. The benefit corporation seems to have many if not all of the key attributes of the Dutch system and could provide a promising path forward if American corporate governance is to change in a way that makes the US model truly focused on the long-term value for all stakeholders. The question for US advocates of stakeholder governance is whether they will embrace it, or adopt another effective governance change, and make their commitment to respect stakeholders rea
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Nouvelles diverses objectifs de l'entreprise Responsabilité sociale des entreprises Structures juridiques Valeur actionnariale vs. sociétale
Public Benefit Corporation : premières études empiriques
Ivan Tchotourian 7 avril 2020 Ivan Tchotourian
Bonjour à toutes et à tous, on revient toujours aux B Corporation notamment la Public Benefit Corporation du Delaware ! Voici une des premières études empiriques menées sur le sujet : Michael B. Dorff, James Hicks et Steven Solomon Davidoff , « The Future or Fancy? An Empirical Study of Public Benefit Corporations » (4 février 2020).
Une belle question que se posent les auteurs : Using our novel dataset, we can discern whether for-profit investment is occurring in PBCs, and if so, whether it is different in kind from ordinary early stage investment.
Extrait :
The PBC has stirred much debate and speculation about the future of
the corporation. Some have called it the future while others decried the
form as mere public relations or purpose washing. In this article we
have attempted to add data to the debate. Using a hand-collected
sample of all Delaware-registered PBCs that received investment
between 2013 and 2018 we examine whether PBCs are the future or
mere fancy.
We find that neither hypothesis holds. Instead, we find that there are
295 PBCs which have received investment from VC funds amounting
to over $2.5 billion in the aggregate. This investment is significant
because it shows that the PBC form is not a failure and that it is
capable of attracting for-profit investment, a marker of success. This
investment is coming not just from pro-social VCs but from top-tier
firms.
Nonetheless, we also find that PBCs are being funded over a wide
range of mostly consumer-focused industries (banking, food,
education, technology, and more), implying that the form is a
secondary consideration to the for-profit motive. In other words, the
PBC form is most likely to receive VC funding when the PBC’s
business strategy suggests the form will benefit a for-profit mission.
Our evidence also suggests that PBC round sizes are smaller than their
purely profit-seeking peers, implying that VCs are taking less risk with
these forms than with traditional corporations.
Ultimately, we theorize that, based on our findings, the future course
of the PBC is uncertain.
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engagement et activisme actionnarial Gouvernance Normes d'encadrement Nouvelles diverses objectifs de l'entreprise parties prenantes Responsabilité sociale des entreprises
Les investisseurs institutionnels réclament de la responsabilité !
Ivan Tchotourian 6 avril 2020 Ivan Tchotourian
L’ICCR (Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility) américain vient de prendre une position intéressante dans le contexte de la pandémie de Coronavirus : elle exhorte les entreprises à plus de responsabilité et fait connaître ses 5 priorités. Preuve une fois de plus que l’engagement des investisseurs institutionnels en faveur de la RSE est présent !
Global institutional investors comprising public pensions, asset management firms and faith-based funds issued a Statement on Coronavirus Response calling on the business community to step up as corporate citizens, and recommending measures corporations can take to protect their workforces, their communities, their businesses and our markets as a whole while we all confront the Coronavirus crisis.
Extrait :
1. Provide paid leave: We urge companiesto make emergency paid leave available to all employees, including temporary, part time, and subcontracted workers. Without paid leave, social distancing and self-isolation are not broadly possible.
2. Prioritize health and safety: Protecting worker and public safety is essential for maintaining business reputations, consumer confidence and the social license to operate, as well as staying operational. Workers should avoid or limit exposure to COVID-19 as much as possible. Potential measures include rotating shifts; remote work; enhanced protections, trainings or cleaning; adopting the occupational safety and health guidance, and closing locations, if necessary.
3. Maintain employment: We support companies taking every measure to retain workers as widespread unemployment will only exacerbate the current crisis. Retaining a well-trained and committed workforce will permit companies to resume operations as quickly as possible once the crisis is resolved. Companies considering layoffs should also be mindful of potential discriminatory impact and the risk for subsequent employment discrimination cases.
4. Maintain supplier/customer relationships: As much as possible, maintaining timely or prompt payments to suppliers and working with customers facing financial challenges will help to stabilize the economy, protect our communities and small businesses and ensure a stable supply chain is in place for business operations to resume normally in the future.
5. Financial prudence: During this period of market stress, we expect the highest level of ethical financial management and responsibility. As responsible investors, we recognize this may include companies’ suspending share buybacks and showing support for the predicaments of their constituencies by limiting executive and senior management compensation for the duration of this crisis.
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Gouvernance Normes d'encadrement Nouvelles diverses objectifs de l'entreprise
COVID-19 : la fin de la théorie de l’agence ?
Ivan Tchotourian 6 avril 2020 Ivan Tchotourian
Bel article de M. Barker sur LinkedIn intitulé : « The irrelevance of agency theory during the Covid-19 crisis » (5 avril 2020). Il est effectivement temps de revoir le modèle de l’agence et sa place comme paradigme central de toute réflexion sur la gouvernance d’entreprise : d’autres modèles existent, il est bon de le rappeler !
Extrait :
The implicit mistrust between principals and agents must be replaced by a pooling of resources and know-how, and a more cooperative attitude to other stakeholders such as employees and society as a whole.
Corporate governance scholars have developed a range of alternative theoretical paradigms through which to embody this more team-based approach, including stewardship theory, stakeholder theory and resource dependency theory. These frameworks seem to offer a more relevant perspective on what we should demand from corporate governance during the crisis.
A first is that non-executive directors should see themselves as sharing more of a common agenda with management. They must be prepared to work side by side with them in order to overcome the profound challenges being faced by most organisations at the current time.
Second, investors will have to exhibit greater trust in boards and management. Once they are satisfied that the right leadership is in place, they need to let them get on with it.
Third, it becomes more important than ever for boards to understand and incorporate into decision-making the different perspectives of groups whose motivation and participation is critical to the survival of the organisation. These will include middle managers, employees, customers, suppliers and the wider community.
Finally, we should not view existing shareholder rights as sacrosanct during the crisis. Shareholder rights are not the same thing as human rights, which should never be seen as negotiable. Rather, they are pragmatic arrangements that have been established in order to underpin the prosperity of the economy as a whole.
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finance sociale et investissement responsable Gouvernance mission et composition du conseil d'administration Normes d'encadrement Nouvelles diverses objectifs de l'entreprise Publications publications de l'équipe Responsabilité sociale des entreprises Valeur actionnariale vs. sociétale
COVID-19 et CA : des questions et des dividendes
Ivan Tchotourian 5 avril 2020 Ivan Tchotourian
Bonjour à toutes et à tous, mon nouveau billet sur Contact est maintenant en ligne : « Le défi des CA à l’heure de la COVID-19 » (3 avril 2020).
Extrait :
Si la destruction de l’environnement (déforestation, pollution…), les bouleversements climatiques (fonte des glaces, augmentation de la température, inondations…). la violation des droits de certaines communautés, les scandales commerciaux ou l’opportunisme stratégique de contournement de la loi (comme en fiscalité) n’étaient pas encore arrivés à induire un vrai changement de mentalité et de philosophie dans la gouvernance d’entreprise, la COVID-19, elle, va contraindre cette transformation. Une nouvelle ère pour la gouvernance d’entreprise responsable commence donc, mais à quel prix!
Qu’est-ce qui force ce retournement? Essentiellement, le fait que les CA doivent assumer un rôle de gestion et de sortie de crise. Comment me direz-vous? D’abord, que les CA n’angoissent pas outre mesure devant la tâche qui les attend!
Se poser les questions
Ces multiples questions que tout membre d’un CA devrait se poser doivent être les bonnes!
- Les rencontres entre le CA et la haute direction sont-elles assez fréquentes pour assurer une évaluation des risques auxquels fait face l’entreprise?
- Le CA a-t-il accès à une information suffisante pour avoir une compréhension adéquate des risques et des défis liés à la COVID-19?
- Quelles sont les répercussions financières de la crise sanitaire sur l’entreprise?
- Quelles sont les conséquences pour les salariés et les infrastructures?
- Quelles sont les conséquences de l’épidémie du coronavirus sur les rémunérations?
- Quelles sont les répercussions à anticiper en ce qui concerne les clients?
- Quelles sont les conséquences sur les circuits de distribution?
- Le cadre de gestion de risques établi pour l’entreprise est-il adapté aux circonstances?
- Les plans et procédures de continuation de l’entreprise sont-ils suffisants pour apporter une réponse au risque sanitaire et faut-il les adapter?
- Les lois et les évolutions réglementaires sont-elles respectées par l’entreprise? Question simple, mais qui est importante lorsque les États, comme maintenant, ajustent leur réglementation, par exemple, en droit du travail ou en droit des sociétés…
- Quels sont les effets de la COVID-19 à l’égard des actionnaires?
- Quelle communication devrait être adoptée dans le contexte de crise sanitaire?
- Quelles sont les conséquences de la crise en termes de sécurité et de cybersécurité? Le sujet n’est surtout pas à négliger à l’heure du recours en masse au télétravail!
- À quelles aides étatiques l’entreprise a-t-elle droit?
- Quels sont les effets de la COVID-19 en termes d’activisme actionnarial et de défenses anti-OPA pour l’entreprise?
- L’équipe de direction est-elle épuisée dans le contexte de l’épidémie de coronavirus? Comment la soutenir en considérant la durée de la crise sanitaire qui se dessine?
- Quel est le suivi intra-groupe qui est mis en place?
2. Oublier le versement de dividendes
Si les motivations de ce versement sont diverses (compensation du risque d’échec pris par les actionnaires, réponse à une pression exercée par certains actionnaires activistes court-termistes, volonté de saluer le succès de la haute direction, souhait de plaire, etc.), et plus ou moins légitimes, rien dans la situation actuelle ne semble justifier un tel versement. Les entreprises souffrent pour la plupart (chute d’activité, salariés au chômage ou licenciés, fermeture) et vont avoir besoin d’argent pour se relancer. Le financement interne sera donc le bienvenu. Or, ce financement passe par les bénéfices réalisés et non distribués. Ainsi, comment serait-il justifiable de puiser dans la trésorerie pour privilégier les actionnaires au détriment de la pérennité de l’entreprise et des autres parties prenantes?
Bref, si versement de dividendes il y a au sein des entreprises, celui-ci devra être raisonnable et réservé à quelques-unes d’entre elles qui ont la chance d’être à l’abri des turbulences.
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