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Excellent texte auquel je viens d’accéder rédigé par Yvon Allaire et François Dauphin daté du 11 août 2016 et intitulé : “Making Say-on-Pay Vote Binding: a Good Idea?” (IGOPP).

Petit extrait :

The challenge of reading and understanding the particulars of executive compensation has become far more daunting. Indeed, for the 50 largest (by market cap) companies on the TSX in 2015 that were also listed back in 2000, the median number of pages to describe their compensation went from 6 in 2000 to 34 pages in 2015, ranging all the way up to 66 pages. Investors with holdings in dozens or hundreds of stocks face a formidable task. The simplest way out is either to vote per the stock’s performance or, more likely, rely on the recommendation of proxy advisory firms (which also base their “advice” on relative stock market performance. (…)

Boards of directors, compensation committees and their consultants have come to realize that it is wiser and safer to toe the line and put forth pay packages that will pass muster with proxy advisory firms. The result has been a remarkable standardization of compensation, a sort of “copy and paste” across publicly listed companies. Thus, most CEO pay packages are linked to the same metrics, whether they operate in manufacturing, retailing, banking, mining, energy, pharmaceuticals or services. For the companies on the S&P/TSX 60 index, the so-called long term compensation for their CEO in 2015 was based on total shareholder return (TSR) or the earnings per share growth (EPS) in 85% of cases. The proxy advisory firm ISS has been promoting these measures as the best way to connect compensation to performance. (…)

At a more fundamental level, the setting of pay policies should be the preserve of the board, as Canadian corporate law clearly states. When egregious pay packages are given to executives, a say-on-pay vote, compulsory or not, binding or not, will always be much less effective than a majority of votes against the election of members of the compensation committee. But that calls upon large investment funds to show fortitude and cohesiveness in the few instances of unwarranted compensation which occur every year.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Bonjour à toutes et à tous, information intéressante qui divulgue Le Devoir : « Londres veut punir les conseillers qui facilitent l’évasion fiscale » (18 août 2016).

Le gouvernement britannique entend durcir la répression contre l’évasion fiscale en ciblant les cabinets d’avocats et autres consultants qui l’encouragent et qui pourraient risquer de lourdes amendes, selon des propositions soumises à consultation publiées mercredi.

Le HMRC (Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs), la direction des impôts britannique, veut sévir contre tous ceux qui « rendent possible ou utilisent des systèmes d’évasion fiscale », selon le document en consultation publié sur son site Internet. Sont ainsi visés les avocats ou les cabinets de conseil, incontournables à la City de Londres, qui ont un rôle essentiel auprès des grands groupes ou des particuliers fortunés. La principale mesure consisterait à leur infliger une amende équivalente au montant de la somme qui a échappé au fisc.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Le FRC vient de publier un intéressant rapport intitulé : « Corporate Culture and the Role of Boards: Report of Observations » (juillet 2016).

Quels sont les enseignements ?

• Recognise the value of culture: A healthy corporate culture is a valuable asset, a source of competitive advantage and vital to the creation and protection of long-term value. It is the board’s role to determine the purpose of the company and ensure that the company’s values, strategy and business model are aligned to it. Directors should not wait for a crisis before they focus on company culture.
  Demonstrate Leadership: Leaders, in particular the chief executive, must embody the desired culture, embedding this at all levels and in every aspect of the business. Boards have a responsibility to act where leaders do not deliver.
• Be Open and Accountable: Openness and accountability matter at every level. Good governance means a focus on how this takes place throughout the company and those who act on its behalf. It should be demonstrated in the way the company conducts business and engages with and reports to stakeholders. This involves respecting a wide range of stakeholder interests.
• Embed and Integrate: The values of the company need to inform the behaviours which are expected of all employees and suppliers. Human resources, internal audit, ethics, compliance, and risk functions should be empowered and resourced to embed values and assess culture effectively. Their voice in the boardroom should be strengthened.
• Assess, Measure and Engage: Indicators and measures used should be aligned to desired outcomes and material to the business. The board has a responsibility to understand behaviour throughout the company and to challenge where they find misalignment with values or need better information. Boards should devote sufficient resource to evaluating culture and consider how they report on it.
  Align Values and Incentives: The performance management and reward system should support and encourage behaviours consistent with the company’s purpose, values, strategy and business model. The board is responsible for explaining this alignment clearly to shareholders, employees and other stakeholders.
  Exercise Stewardship: Effective stewardship should include engagement about culture and encourage better reporting. Investors should challenge themselves about the behaviours they are encouraging in companies and to reflect on their own culture.

Voici le résumé :

Today the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) publishes the results of a study, exploring the relationship between corporate culture and long-term business success in the UK. Stakeholders and society in general have a vested interest in healthy corporate values, attitudes and behaviours that lead to sustainable growth and long term economic success.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Excellent document produit par McKinsey & Company : « Nonfinancial risk: A growing challenge for the bank » (juillet 2016). Ce document rappelle que l’extra-financier est devenu un facteur à gérer par les institutions financières…

Yet the direct financial consequences of non Financial risk (NFR) are not the only concern. The reputational damage wrought can hit a bank hard at a time when customers, shareholders, and public stakeholders are questioning banks’ business models. And there are also the personal consequences for senior managers, whom regulators increasingly hold accountable for misconduct or failure to comply with laws and regulations. All of this, and the prospect of still tighter regulation, puts considerable pressure on banks to manage NFR better.

(…) Against this backdrop, many institutions seek a more integrated NFR-management approach in order to reduce the risk of further failures, meet stakeholders’ requirements and expectations, and limit costs. This article describes the three key components of such an integrated approach: an enhanced governance framework, a set of enablers, and changes in the front office’s approach and mind-set. It is based on our work with many financial institutions globally and an informal survey of 15 global and regional banks. Some of the structures and ideas we outline here are familiar to banks from their work on financial risk; many are newly conceived for the management of nonfinancial risk. Taken together, a full implementation of these concepts represents a paradigm shift in the NFR-management practices of many banks today.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Dans son Risques et tendances n° 17 de juillet 2016, l’AMF France offre une belle cartographie des risques auxquels font face les entreprises et les marchés.

L’AMF a publié sa cartographie 2016 qui constitue un panorama de l’évolution sur un an des risques liés à l’actualité économique, financière et réglementaire. Elle analyse le financement de l’économie, les marchés ainsi que l’épargne des ménages et la gestion collective. Pour sa dixième édition, sa publication intervient quelques jours seulement après le référendum ayant conclu à la sortie du Royaume-Uni de l’Union Européenne qui constitue une décision sans précédent et ouvre une période de fortes incertitudes.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Le High Pay Centre du Royaume-Uni a récemment publié sa réponse à la consultation de l’Investment Association « Executive Remuneration Working Group ». Au travers de cette réponse, le High Pay Center demande une remise en question fondamentale des principes d’attribution de la rémunération des hauts-dirigeants.

Voici une synthèse des propositions faites :

• Fix the flaws in the 2013 UK pay regulations
• Return to the principle that reward follows performance
• Realign the governance of remuneration with the legal financial governance framework.
• Stop accepting discounting as an appropriate basis for pay negotiations
• Remove all formal obstacles to the use of retrospective discretion by remuneration committees
• Require the involvement of representatives of the genuine long term economic interest in a company in the process for determining executive pay

The Executive Remuneration Working Group was set up by the Investment Association in late 2015 and is currently consulting on its interim report looking at the problems with executive pay in the UK.

The High Pay centre’s response to the Working Group’s interim report is available here in its entirety and represents a fundamental rethink of some of the principles which underpin the current system.

Our submission takes as its starting point the statement by Nigel Wilson, Chairman of the working group that « the current approach to executive pay in UK listed companies is not fit for purpose ».

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

La professeure Dionysia Katelouzou publie une très belle étude sur SSRN : « Reflections on the Nature of the Public Corporation in an Era of Shareholder Activism and Shareholder Stewardship ». L’auteure y revient sur le mythe que les actionnaires seraient passifs et que la lecture contractualiste de l’entreprise serait pertinente. Comme elle le souligne, il y a eu un changement de paradigme depuis l’émergence des investisseurs institutionnels consacrant un « investor paradigm for corporate law ».

For the greater part of the twentieth century the role of shareholders within the public corporation has been conceptualized within the contractarian framework influenced by the neo-liberal emphasis on market efficiency. For the supporters of the contractual nature of the corporation, shareholders have in general been viewed as the main beneficiaries of corporate activity. Contractarianism goes further, dispelling the notion of shareholder ‘ownership’, and thereby relying on the efficacy of individual contracting and the constraining forces of various markets to control managerial discretion and reduce monitoring costs. Within this contractarian framework shareholders do not wish to be involved in the corporation’s management, nor do they gain any benefits from an active engagement, mainly because of the market efficacy to control managerial discretion and a series of legal and extra-legal obstacles to shareholders’ active involvement. There is, therefore, no a priori reason why shareholders should exercise control over managerial decision-making and any legally imposed reform to empower the monitoring role of shareholders is viewed as unnecessary and counterproductive. Through most of the twentieth century, this contractarian orthodoxy of the rather passive role of shareholders also coincided with practice.

My paper argues that these contractarian assertions in relation to the role of shareholders within the internal functioning of the public corporation do not hold anymore in the face of the rise in the holdings and influence of institutional investors in recent years.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian