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Pays très ouvert aux acquéreurs étrangers – pour peu qu’ils payent le bon prix –, le Royaume-Uni n’avait pas été habitué à ce rang. En 2015, il représentait plus de 10 % des opérations de fusions-acquisitions à travers la planète. Le record avait même été de 18 % en 2000. Selon Thomson Reuters, les achats d’entreprises britanniques par des étrangers ont totalisé 43,8 milliards de dollars (39 milliards d’euros) entre le 1er janvier et le 16 juin, en recul de 74 %.

Voilà une belle capsule-vidéo portant sur cette question bien connue des juristes québécois et canadiens : « Les pouvoirs du CA peuvent-ils être restreints ou retirés ? ». Me André Vautour y répond…

Rappelons simplement qu’en vertu de l’article 213 LSAQ, les actionnaires peuvent restreindre ou retirer les pouvoirs du CA. Ils alors conclure une convention unanime par écrit qu’ils aient un droit de vote ou non. Cette convention va prévoir par exemple :

• Définition de modalités spécifiques pour l’exercice des pouvoirs du conseil : majorité spéciale…
• Rapatriement d’une partie ou de tous les pouvoirs du conseil
• Imposition de l’approbation des actionnaires ou d’un tiers avant des décisions
• Prévision d’un droit de veto ou d’une autorisation pour donner effet à certaines décisions
• Contraindre les administrateurs à poser des gestes

La décision Allard c. Myhill de 2012 (EYB 2012-213993) a utilement rappelé que :

La convention unanime peut donc restreindre en totalité les pouvoirs des administrateurs de gérer les affaires de la société.

Mais attention aux conséquences ! Les actionnaires devront assumer les mêmes responsabilités (sur ce point, je vous souhaite une bonne lecture de l’article 214 LSAQ).

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Alors que Theresa May a fait part de son intérêt d’importer en Grande-Bretagne le système allemand, MM. Horst Eidenmüller,  Mathias Habersack, Caspar Behme et Lars Klöhn  reviennent sur la pertinence de cette proposition en jetant un regard prudent (de chercheurs !) sur ce système : « Corporate Co-Determination German-Style as a Model for the UK? » (18 juillet 2016).

On 13 July 2016, Theresa May took up office as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. Only shortly before, she had made headlines when she proposed to adopt European-style worker representation on the boards of leading companies.

Corporate co-determination hence seems to gain a certain degree of popularity with the British government – which is highly astonishing, considering that it was the UK which most fiercely fought against co-determination on a European level. It was mainly the diverging views of the UK and Germany on co-determination which have thwarted projects like the Draft Fifth Company Law Directive or the establishment of a European Private Company (Societas Privata Europaea, SPE). It is downright ironic that while the UK now shows an interest in co-determination, the concept is being questioned in Germany after decades of lying dormant. The reason for the new German discussion of co-determination are doubts regarding the compatibility of its specific form of co-determination with higher-ranking Union law. This post provides a brief overview of the most recent developments in German co-determination law that were the focus of a joint Oxford/Munich conference at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität (LMU) in Munich in March 2016.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Les 13 bonzes du secteur économique américains ont exposé une série de principes auxquels ils voudraient voir adhérer les entreprises américaines inscrites en Bourse (voir les affaires.com) : Commonsense Corporate Governance Principles. Ces principes touchent le rôle, les responsabilités et la composition des conseils d’adminstration; les plans de succession; la rémunération des dirigeants; les droits des actionnaires; le rôle des grands gestionnaires de portefeuille; et la communication des données financières.

Voici un résumé des principes (ici) :

Truly independent corporate boards are vital to effective governance, so no board should be beholden to the CEO or management. Every board should meet regularly without the CEO present, and every board should have active and direct engagement with executives below the CEO level;

Diverse boards make better decisions, so every board should have members with complementary and diverse skills, backgrounds and experiences. It’s also important to balance wisdom and judgment that accompany experience and tenure with the need for fresh thinking and perspectives of new board members;

Every board needs a strong leader who is independent of management. The board’s independent directors usually are in the best position to evaluate whether the roles of chairman and CEO should be separate or combined; and if the board decides on a combined role, it is essential that the board have a strong lead independent director with clearly defined authorities and responsibilities;

Our financial markets have become too obsessed with quarterly earnings forecasts. Companies should not feel obligated to provide earnings guidance — and should do so only if they believe that providing such guidance is beneficial to shareholders;

A common accounting standard is critical for corporate transparency, so while companies may use non-Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”) to explain and clarify their results, they never should do so in such a way as to obscure GAAP-reported results; and in particular, since stock- or options-based compensation is plainly a cost of doing business, it always should be reflected in non-GAAP measurements of earnings; and

Effective governance requires constructive engagement between a company and its shareholders. So the company’s institutional investors making decisions on proxy issues important to long-term value creation should have access to the company, its management and, in some circumstances, the board; similarly, a company, its management and board should have access to institutional investors’ ultimate decision makers on those issues.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Selon Anne Crothy de Business Day – et sans étonnement -, la rémunération des dirigeants est encore sur la sellette : « Executive pay returns to focus as report shines light on hypocrisy ». Notons qu’en Afrique du Sud, l’introduction d’un Say on pay contraignant est loin de faire l’unanimité selon cet article : « The South African report discourages the introduction of even binding votes, saying South African shareholders first need to have a better understanding of remuneration policies ».

EXECUTIVE directors awarded themselves considerably more than inflation-linked increases in pay during 2015, even as they called on workers to be responsible in their wage demands.

PwC’s latest remuneration report, released on Thursday, showed that executive directors of the largest JSE-listed companies had awarded themselves increases in total guaranteed pay of between 9% and 12%.

The report understates the full extent of the generosity enjoyed by executives, as it does not deal with variable pay, which can boost guaranteed pay between 30% and 200%, and which increased at much higher rates.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Les entreprises japonaises feraient-elles l’objet d’une gouvernance de type anglo-américaine ? C’est ce qu’il semble à la lecture de cet article : « Shareholders put Japan’s corporate governance to the test » (Nikkei Asian Review, 25 juin 2016).

Voici quelques extraits :

Many stockholders at security company Secom’s annual meeting Friday demanded explanations over why then-Chairman Shuji Maeda and then-President Hiroshi Ito were fired in May, despite the company’s strong performance last fiscal year. (…) Secom voluntarily created an executive nomination and compensation committee, but has not made the members’ names public. Attendees raised questions over the effectiveness of the company’s governance structure. « There’s still room for improvement in the selection process for executives, » one said.

Shareholders at Mitsubishi Chemical Holdings’ meeting the same day focused on earnings power and dividends. The chemical company had logged extraordinary losses from restructuring its petrochemical business, while return on equity fell under 5% for the year ended in March. Shareholders demanded more details over the loss, and urged the company to try to raise its stock price. (…)

Kobe Steel logged a group net loss last fiscal year, and its ROE has long remained low. Just 87.3% of shareholders voted for the proposal to retain Chairman and President Hiroya Kawasaki, down 8 percentage points from last year. (…)

Toshiba came under harsh criticism at its Wednesday meeting, with shareholders blaming the company’s top-down culture and the lack of independence at its accounting department for its bookkeeping scandal. Only 87.06% of shareholders voted to reappoint President Satoshi Tsunakawa,

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian