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Entreprises européennes, salariés et dividendes : tendance

Dans un article du Financial Times (« European companies were more keen to cut divis than executive pay », 9 septembre 2020), il est observé que les assemblées annuelles de grandes entreprises européennes montrent des disparités concernant la protection des salariés et la réduction des dividendes.

Extrait :

Businesses in Spain, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK were more likely to cut dividends than executive pay this year, despite calls from shareholders for bosses to share the financial pain caused by the pandemic.

More than half of Spanish businesses examined by Georgeson, a corporate governance consultancy, cancelled, postponed or reduced dividends in 2020. Only 29 per cent introduced a temporary reduction in executive pay. In Italy, 44 per cent of companies changed their dividend policies because of Covid-19, but just 29 per cent cut pay for bosses, according to the review of the annual meeting season in Europe.

This disparity between protection of salaries and bonuses at the top while shareholders have been hit with widespread dividend cuts is emerging as a flashpoint for investors. Asset managers such as Schroders and M&G have spoken out about the need for companies to show restraint on pay if they are cutting dividends or receiving government support. “Executive remuneration remains a key focal point for investors and was amongst the most contested resolutions in the majority of the markets,” said Georgeson’s Domenic Brancati.

But he added that despite this focus, shareholder revolts over executive pay had fallen slightly across Europe compared with 2019 — suggesting that investors were giving companies some leeway on how they dealt with the pandemic. Investors could become more vocal about this issue next year, he said.

One UK-based asset manager said it was “still having lots of conversations with companies around pay” but for this year had decided not to vote against companies on the issue. But it added the business would watch remuneration and dividends closely next year.

Companies around the world have cut or cancelled dividends in response to the crisis, hitting income streams for many investors. According to Janus Henderson, global dividends had their biggest quarterly fall in a decade during the second quarter, with more than $100bn wiped off their value. The Georgeson data shows that almost half of UK companies changed their dividend payout, while less than 45 per cent altered executive remuneration. In the Netherlands, executive pay took a hit at 29 per cent of companies, while 34 per cent adjusted dividends. In contrast, a quarter of Swiss executives were hit with a pay cut but only a fifth of companies cut or cancelled their dividend.

The Georgeson research also found that the pandemic had a significant impact on the AGM process across Europe, with many companies postponing their annual meetings or stopping shareholders from voting during the event.

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engagement et activisme actionnarial Gouvernance Normes d'encadrement normes de marché place des salariés

Activisme des salariés actionnaires : une menace ?

Article à lire de M. Ashwell dans Corporate Secretary : « The threat of employee shareholder activism » (7 août 2020). Intéressante perspective sur l’activisme poussé de manière indirecte par la situation des salariés des entreprises.

Extrait :

Facing an employee-backed or employee-led shareholder proposal generates media attention and causes embarrassment for senior management. But are these recent examples a flash in the pan, or should more companies be bracing for employee-shareholder activism?

A confluence of circumstances

Pat Tomaino is director of socially responsible investing at Zevin Asset Management and has filed shareholder proposals at Alphabet and Amazon, as well as other large technology companies, in recent years. He worked with an employee group at Alphabet, following a mass employee walkout at Google in 2018.

‘It’s a strategy that we as impact investors want to leverage more in the future, but it really depends on a confluence of circumstances,’ he says. ‘We’re not in the business of instigating employee activity inside companies – that’s not the role of investors. We have a stake in the financial outlook of the company. We’re not creating employee activism but, where we do see that it exists, we take that into account. What are employees asking for and why are they acting that way? What signal should we take for how companies are handling their long-term ESG goals?’

Tomaino says that when he has talked to employee groups at large technology companies about shareholder proposals, there’s a feeling that they have tried other avenues of feedback and activism internally. ‘These employees had tried the usual channels and were looking for levers to make change,’ he says. ‘They’d done direct action, they’d talked to the press and they’d noticed that there’s power through shareholder proposals.’

In Germany, employee-shareholder activism is much more established. Labor groups have experimented with shareholder proposals since the early 1990s, according to an academic report from Natascha van der Zwan, assistant professor of public administration at Leiden University. One particularly notable example she highlights is the Deutsche Telecom annual meeting in 2007, when around 1,000 employees entered the meeting to voice discontent about increased working hours and pay cuts as part of a corporate restructuring. Employee-shareholders reportedly signed their voting rights over to local labor unions to oppose the restructuring, as part of a broader campaign involving employee walkouts and labor union protests.

For board directors in the US, Gillian Emmett Moldowan, partner at Shearman & Sterling, says it’s never been more important to receive meaningful updates about nonexecutive employees.

‘Employee campaigns of any nature get significant press attention,’ she explains. ‘Boards have historically been more separated from non-executive employee issues, whether it’s compensation or workers’ issues, or how employees feel about the firm as a whole. I would encourage boards to get an understanding from those who report into the board of human capital management risk and enterprise risks, as well as an understanding of what the company is doing to assess and mitigate those risks.

‘If boards have not historically received information about employee satisfaction and employee sentiment about the company management, then getting hold of that information is a good first step.’

Structural issues

Instances of recent employee shareholder activism have defining traits that may not be replicated elsewhere. For instance, Tomaino explains that many Alphabet employees involved in the shareholder action feel aggrieved at how they think the company’s mission has changed. Google’s motto in its IPO documents was ‘Don’t be evil’, but it has since dropped the slogan and employees have expressed concerns about the direction the company is moving, including in its bidding for national defense contracts.

Aalap Shah, managing director at Pearl Meyer, highlights several structural issues that may make companies more at risk of employee shareholder activism in the future.

‘Part of the issue is the power some companies have given to their employees through equity,’ he explains. ‘In addition, many of these companies are recruiting from the same talent pool, where there’s a desire to work for a company that has some sort of positive purpose. There is significantly more desire [on the part of] millennials and Gen Z to be part of an organization that has purpose, and you’re going to have to compete for that top talent by giving them equity.’

Tomaino says employees with large amounts of their personal net worth tied up in company stock will view themselves as engaged investors as much as employees. But Moldowan says this shouldn’t make companies think differently about granting stock options to employees as part of their compensation packages.

‘Shareholders can bring a proposal if they qualify to do so under the proxy rules, and those shares can be bought on the market – they need not come from an equity compensation plan,’ she says. ‘Not giving equity awards won’t stop an employee acquiring equity by other means.’

An Amazon employee group recently filed a comment letter with the SEC expressing concerns and opposition to proposed changes to Rule 14a-8, on the grounds that planned shifts to share ownership and proposal resubmission thresholds would make it harder for employee groups to advocate for change.

All of the interviewees for this article agree that it’s important for boards to receive information about employee sentiment and for boards or management to be seen to respond appropriately when employee groups express significant levels of discontent. Tomaino acknowledges that it’s unlikely large passive investors would vote in favor of employees and against management – unless the proposal was on something truly egregious – but that a proposal can help cause embarrassment for management that may drive change.

As Covid-19 shines a greater light on the treatment and recognition of employees, and the Business Roundtable’s statement equally prompts stakeholders to question companies when they feel they’re not being given a fair hearing, this may not be the last we see of employee participation in shareholder proposals in the US.

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Gouvernance mission et composition du conseil d'administration Normes d'encadrement

Is A Director Resignation Policy Good For Governance?

Corporate Board Member fait une intéressante synthèse de la politique de démission d’un administrateur qui ne recevrait pas 50 % des votes lors de son élection : « Is A Director Resignation Policy Good For Governance? » (Matthew Scott). Promeut par les grands investisseurs de ce monde, comment résumer les effets positifs d’une telle politique ? C’est ce que vous propose l’auteur !

Extrait :

While historically such policies have not been strictly enforced, adopting them challenges directors to do what’s right for the organization based on moral considerations and their fiduciary responsibility. Such a policy can also act as an indicator for when board refreshment might be necessary, particularly if support for the entire board begins to fall close to or below the 50 percent threshold.

That shareholders would lobby for this type of policy suggests they are looking for a very direct way to hold board members accountable for the work they do on behalf of the company. This is a growing trend for public companies. Shareholders have reasoned that if a director who is up for re-election to the board and is running unopposed can’t manage to get more than 50 percent of shareholders to vote for their return, then a change is needed. Shareholders aren’t happy that directors who receive less than the majority of votes are allowed to keep their board seats simply because no one ran against them. For corporate boards, the question “Why aren’t shareholders supporting that director?” must be asked, answered and dealt with swiftly. If the largest shareholders aren’t supporting certain board members, it’s only a matter of time before they suggest someone to run against them. It may be better for at-risk directors to resign gracefully before being forced out by a dissident shareholder running a candidate against them.

Additionally, this policy gives affected directors a chance to ask themselves, “Is it the best decision for me to continue to serve on a board where shareholders don’t support my service?” Future career opportunities, reputational impact and board appointments might be at stake.

Having such a resignation policy could have another positive effect on governance – it may make a few more board seats open up faster. Only a limited number of board seats become available each year, so anything that can encourage board turnover in a good way is welcome. This policy could help create more open positions for boards that are looking to add diverse candidates, and at the same time, add new perspectives and innovative thought to board discussions. And most governance professionals would favor that.

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Gouvernance Normes d'encadrement normes de droit

Agences de conseil en vote : la SEC modifie les règles

La Securities and Exchange Commission des États-Unis (la SEC) a récemment publié les modifications définitives à ses règles sur les procurations visant à réglementer certaines activités des agences de conseils en matière de vote par procuration. Les règles définitives sont conformes aux modifications proposées, émises par la SEC en décembre 2019. Dans l’ensemble, les règles définitives sont moins contraignantes que celles proposées en décembre 2019 et reposent davantage sur des principes. Le cabinet Osler en offre une belle synthèse !

  • Pour en savoir plus, cliquez ici.

Résumé :

Parmi les points saillants des modifications définitives, on compte notamment les suivants :

  • Les nouvelles dispositions précisent que les recommandations de vote par procuration formulées par les agences de conseils en matière de vote par procuration constituent des « sollicitations » soumises aux règles sur les procurations de la SEC (notamment l’interdiction d’énoncés qui sont faits d’une manière fausse ou trompeuse).
  • Ces dispositions précisent que la dispense de l’obligation de divulgation de renseignements concernant les procurations et des exigences de dépôt auprès de la SEC est autorisée uniquement si les agences de conseils en matière de vote par procuration
    • divulguent, dans le cadre de leurs prestations de conseils sur le vote aux clients, de l’information précise sur les conflits d’intérêts;
    • adoptent des politiques rendues publiques destinées
      • à assurer que les émetteurs visés par des conseils sur le vote par procuration ont eu droit à ces conseils au plus tard au moment où ils ont été communiqués aux clients de l’agence de conseils en matière de vote par procuration;
      • à fournir aux clients un mécanisme leur permettant de prendre connaissance, en temps opportun avant l’assemblée des actionnaires, de toute déclaration écrite par les émetteurs visés par les conseils sur le vote par procuration.
  • Il n’est pas nécessaire de fournir aux émetteurs une ébauche préliminaire des conseils sur le vote par procuration proposés aux fins d’examen et de commentaires.
  • L’obligation de fournir un avis à un émetteur concernant les conseils sur le vote par procuration et d’offrir un mécanisme aux clients concernant les déclarations écrites d’un émetteur ne s’applique pas aux dossiers contestés, à la majorité des fusions et à certaines opérations sur actifs.
  • Les agences de conseil en vote doivent se conformer aux nouvelles règles concernant les conflits et les avis d’ici le 1er décembre 2021.
  • Les règles ne s’appliquent pas aux émetteurs canadiens qui sont des émetteurs privés étrangers aux termes des lois sur les valeurs mobilières des États-Unis. Par contre, le rapport de consultation du Groupe de travail sur la modernisation relative aux marchés financiers de l’Ontario publié en juillet 2020 envisage l’adoption d’un cadre réglementaire conforme aux règles proposées en 2019.

La SEC a souligné, dans son communiqué, l’importance et l’éminence du rôle des agences de conseils en matière de vote par procuration en tant qu’intermédiaires dans les procédures de vote par procuration au nom des investisseurs institutionnels, lesquels détiennent la majorité des actions en circulation sur les marchés actuels et font appel à ces agences en vue de les aider dans le cadre de leurs décisions de vote et des votes à l’égard de leurs actions. La SEC constate que les émetteurs, les investisseurs et autres entités concernées expriment depuis quelques années des réserves quant au rôle des agences de conseils en matière de vote par procuration. Ces réserves portent notamment sur l’exactitude des renseignements et la transparence des méthodologies appliquées dans le cadre de la formulation de recommandations par les agences de conseils en matière de vote par procuration. De plus, des questions ont été soulevées quant à la possibilité par un émetteur de prendre connaissance des conseils et d’y répondre dans un délai convenable avant l’expression des votes de l’actionnaire, sur les conseils de l’agence de conseils en matière de vote par procuration, et quant à la possibilité par un actionnaire de prendre connaissance des conseils sur le vote par procuration, notamment de toute réponse d’un émetteur ou autres entités, avant l’expression de ses votes.

La SEC a déterminé que les agences de conseils en matière de vote par procuration n’avaient pas à se conformer à cette obligation d’information et de dépôt des règles fédérales sur les procurations applicables à la sollicitation de procurations tant qu’elles respectent certaines règles propres à leur rôle dans le cadre du processus de vote par procuration. Ces règles permettent de s’assurer que les clients de ces agences ont un accès raisonnable et en temps opportun à des renseignements transparents, exacts et exhaustifs pertinents pour les investisseurs sur les questions soumises aux fins de vote.

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Divulgation divulgation extra-financière Normes d'encadrement normes de droit

Rapport extra-financier en France : un bilan en demi-teinte

Dans un article paru dans Alternatives Économiques de juillet 2020, Bénédicte Weiss livre une analyse critique du reporting extra-financier en France : « Les rapports environnementaux des entreprises laissent à désirer ».

Résumé :

Les grandes entreprises françaises sont tenues de faire auditer leurs risques sociaux et environnementaux depuis la loi Grenelle II. Mais bien que le législateur français soit en avance sur la plupart des autres pays, l’absence de standardisation des informations requises rend leurs déclarations inégales.

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engagement et activisme actionnarial finance sociale et investissement responsable Gouvernance mission et composition du conseil d'administration Normes d'encadrement parties prenantes Responsabilité sociale des entreprises

COVID-19, purpose et critères ESG : une alliance nécessaire

Billet à découvrir sur le site de Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance pour y lire cet article consacré à la sortie de crise sanitaire et aux apports de la raison d’être et des critères ESG : « ESG and Corporate Purpose in a Disrupted World » (Kristen Sullivan, Amy Silverstein et Leeann Galezio Arthur, 10 août 2020).

Extrait :

Corporate purpose and ESG as tools to reframe pandemic-related disruption

The links between ESG, company strategy, and risk have never been clearer than during the COVID-19 pandemic, when companies have had to quickly pivot and respond to critical risks that previously were not considered likely to occur. The World Economic Forum’s Global Risks Survey 2020, published in January 2020, listed “infectious diseases” as number 10 in terms of potential economic impact, and did not make the top 10 list of risks considered to be “likely.” The impact of the pandemic was further magnified by the disruption it created for the operations of companies and their workforces, which were forced to rethink how and where they did business virtually overnight.

The radical recalibration of risk in the context of a global pandemic further highlights the interrelationships between long-term corporate strategy, the environment, and society. The unlikely scenario of a pandemic causing economic disruption of the magnitude seen today has caused many companies—including companies that have performed well in the pandemic—to reevaluate how they can maintain the long-term sustainability of the enterprise. While the nature and outcomes of that reevaluation will differ based on the unique set of circumstances facing each company, this likely means reframing the company’s role in society and the ways in which it addresses ESG-related challenges, including diversity and inclusion, employee safety, health and well-being, the existence of the physical workplace, supply chain disruptions, and more.

ESG factors are becoming a key determinant of financial strength. Recent research shows that the top 20 percent of ESG-ranked stocks outperformed the US market by over 5 percentage points during a recent period of volatility. Twenty-four out of 26 sustainable index funds outperformed comparable conventional index funds in Q1 2020. In addition, the MSCI ACWI ESG Leaders Index returned 5.24 percent, compared to 4.48 percent for the overall market, since it was established in September 2007 through February 2020. Notably, BlackRock, one of the world’s largest asset managers, recently analyzed the performance of 32 sustainable indices and compared that to their non-sustainable benchmarks as far back as 2015. According to BlackRock the findings indicated that “during market downturns in 2015–16 and 2018, sustainable indices tended to outperform their non-sustainable counterparts.” This trend may be further exacerbated by the effects of the pandemic and the social justice movement.

Financial resilience is certainly not the only benefit. Opportunities for brand differentiation, attraction and retention of top talent, greater innovation, operational efficiency, and an ability to attract capital and increase market valuation are abundant. Companies that have already built ESG strategies, measurements, and high-quality disclosures into their business models are likely to be well-positioned to capitalize on those opportunities and drive long-term value postcrisis.

As businesses begin to reopen and attempt to get back to some sense of normalcy, companies will need to rely on their employees, vendors, and customers to go beyond the respond phase and begin to recover and thrive. In a postpandemic world, this means seeking input from and continuing to build and retain the confidence and trust of those stakeholder groups. Business leaders are recognizing that ESG initiatives, particularly those that prioritize the health and safety of people, will be paramount to recovery.

What are investors and other stakeholders saying?

While current events have forced and will likely continue to force companies to make difficult decisions that may, in the short term, appear to be in conflict with corporate purpose, evidence suggests that as companies emerge from the crisis, they will refresh and recommit to corporate purpose, using it as a compass to focus ESG performance. Specific to the pandemic, the public may expect that companies will continue to play a greater role in helping not only employees, but the nation in general, through such activities as manufacturing personal protective equipment (PPE), equipment needed to treat COVID-19 patients, and retooling factories to produce ventilators, hand sanitizer, masks, and other items needed to address the pandemic. In some cases, decisions may be based upon or consistent with ESG priorities, such as decisions regarding employee health and well-being. From firms extending paid sick leave to all employees, including temporary workers, vendors, and contract workers, to reorienting relief funds to assist vulnerable populations, examples abound of companies demonstrating commitments to people and communities. As companies emerge from crisis mode, many are signaling that they will continue to keep these principles top of mind. This greater role is arguably becoming part of the “corporate social contract” that legitimizes and supports the existence and prosperity of corporations.

In the United States, much of the current focus on corporate purpose and ESG is likely to continue to be driven by investors rather than regulators or legislators in the near term. Thus, it’s important to consider investors’ views, which are still developing in the wake of COVID-19 and other developments.

Investors have indicated that they will assess a company’s response to the pandemic as a measure of stability, resilience ,and adaptability. Many have stated that employee health, well-being, and proactive human capital management are central to business continuity. Investor expectations remain high for companies to lead with purpose, particularly during times of severe economic disruption, and to continue to demonstrate progress against ESG goals.

State Street Global Advisors president and CEO Cyrus Taraporevala, in a March 2020 letter to board members, emphasized that companies should not sacrifice the long-term health and sustainability of the company when responding to the pandemic. According to Taraporevala, State Street continues “to believe that material ESG issues must be part of the bigger picture and clearly articulated as part of your company’s overall business strategy.” According to a recent BlackRock report, “companies with strong profiles on material sustainability issues have potential to outperform those with poor profiles. We believe companies managed with a focus on sustainability may be better positioned versus their less sustainable peers to weather adverse conditions while still benefiting from positive market environments.”

In addition to COVID-19, the recent social justice movement compels companies to think holistically about their purpose and role in society. Recent widespread protests of systemic, societal inequality leading to civil unrest and instability elevate the conversation on the “S” and “G” in ESG. Commitments to the health and well-being of employees, customers, communities, and other stakeholder groups will also require corporate leaders to address how the company articulates its purpose and ESG objectives through actions that proactively address racism and discrimination in the workplace and the communities where they operate. Companies are responding with, among other things, statements of support for diversity and inclusion efforts, reflective conversations with employees and customers, and monetary donations for diversity-focused initiatives. However, investors and others who are pledging to use their influence to hold companies accountable for meaningful progress on systemic inequality will likely look for data on hiring practices, pay equity, and diversity in executive management and on the board as metrics for further engagement on this issue.

What can boards do?

Deloitte US executive chair of the board, Janet Foutty, recently described the board as “the vehicle to hold an organization to its societal purpose.” Directors play a pivotal role in guiding

companies to balance short-term decisions with long-term strategy and thus must weigh the needs of all stakeholders while remaining cognizant of the risks associated with each decision. COVID-19 has underscored the role of ESG principles as central to business risk and strategy, as well as building credibility and trust with investors and the public at large. Boards can advise management on making clear, stakeholder-informed decisions that position the organization to emerge faster and stronger from a crisis.

It has been said before that those companies that do not control their own ESG strategies and narratives risk someone else controlling their ESG story. This is particularly true with regards to how an organization articulates its purpose and stays grounded in that purpose and ESG principles during a crisis. Transparent, high-quality ESG disclosure can be a tool to provide investors with information to efficiently allocate capital for long-term return. Boards have a role in the oversight of both the articulation of the company’s purpose and how those principles are integrated with strategy and risk.

As ESG moves to the top of the board agenda, it is important for boards to have the conversation on how they define the governance structure they will put in place to oversee ESG. Based on a recent review, completed by Deloitte’s Center for Board Effectiveness, of 310 company proxies in the S&P 500, filed from September 1, 2019, through May 6, 2020, 57 percent of the 310 companies noted that the nominating or governance committee has primary oversight responsibility, and only 9 percent noted the full board, with the remaining 34 percent spread across other committees. Regardless of the primary owner, the audit committee should be engaged with regard to any ESG disclosures, as well as prepared to oversee assurance associated with ESG metrics.

Conclusion

The board’s role necessitates oversight of corporate purpose and how corporate purpose is executed through ESG. Although companies will face tough decisions, proactive oversight of and transparency around ESG can help companies emerge from recent events with greater resilience and increased credibility. Those that have already embarked on this journey and stay the course will likely be those well-positioned to thrive in the future.

Questions for the board to consider asking:

How are the company’s corporate purpose and ESG objectives integrated with strategy and risk?

  1. Has management provided key information and assumptions about how ESG is addressed during the strategic planning process?
  2. How is the company communicating its purpose and ESG objectives to its stakeholders?
  3. What data does the company collect to assess the impact of ESG performance on economic performance, how does this data inform internal management decision- making, and how is the board made aware of and involved from a governance perspective?
  4. Does the company’s governance structure facilitate effective oversight of the company’s ESG matters?
  5. How is the company remaining true to its purpose and ESG, especially now given COVID-19 pandemic and social justice issues?
  6. What is the board’s diversity profile? Does the board incorporate diversity when searching for new candidates?
  7. Have the board and management discussed executive management succession and how the company can build a diverse pipeline of candidates?
  8. How will the company continue to refresh and recommit to its corporate purpose and ESG objectives as it emerges from the pandemic response and recovery and commit to accelerating diversity and inclusion efforts?
  9. How does the company align its performance incentives for executive leadership with attaining critical ESG goals and outcomes?

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Gouvernance Normes d'encadrement objectifs de l'entreprise Responsabilité sociale des entreprises

On the Purpose and Objective of the Corporation

Nouvel article sur la raison d’être par Martin Lipton et al. : « On the Purpose and Objective of the Corporation » (Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, 5 août 2020).

Extrait :

Recent events—notably including the pandemic, its disparate impact on various segments of society, and the focus on inequality and injustice arising in the wake of the death of George Floyd—have accelerated the conversation on corporate purpose. The result has been substantial, salutary reflection about the role that corporations play in creating and distributing economic prosperity and the nexus between value and values.

For our part, we have supported stakeholder governance for over 40 years—first, to empower boards of directors to reject opportunistic takeover bids by corporate raiders, and later to combat short-termism and ensure that directors maintain the flexibility to invest for long-term growth and innovation. We continue to advise corporations and their boards that—consistent with Delaware law—they may exercise their business judgment to manage for the benefit of the corporation and all of its stakeholders over the long term.

In looking beyond the disruption caused by the pandemic, boards and corporate leaders have an opportunity to rebuild with the clarity and conviction that come from articulating a corporate purpose, anchored in a holistic understanding of the key drivers of their business, the ways in which those drivers shape and are shaped by values, and the interdependencies of multiple stakeholders that are essential to the long-term success of the business.

This opportunity leads us to reiterate and refine a simple formulation of corporate purpose and objective, as follows:

The purpose of a corporation is to conduct a lawful, ethical, profitable and sustainable business in order to ensure its success and grow its value over the long term. This requires consideration of all the stakeholders that are critical to its success (shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers and communities), as determined by the corporation and its board of directors using their business judgment and with regular engagement with shareholders, who are essential partners in supporting the corporation’s pursuit of its purpose. Fulfilling purpose in such manner is fully consistent with the fiduciary duties of the board of directors and the stewardship obligations of shareholders.

This statement of corporate purpose is broad enough to apply to every business entity, but at the same time supplies clear guideposts for action and engagement. The basic objective of sustainable profitability recognizes that the purpose of for-profit corporations includes creation of value for investors. The requirement of lawful and ethical conduct ensures generally recognized standards of corporate social compliance. Going further, the broader mandate to take into account all corporate stakeholders, including communities, is not limited to local communities, but comprises society and the economy at large and directs boards to exercise their business judgment within the scope of this broader responsibility. The requirement of regular shareholder engagement acknowledges accountability to investors, but also the shared responsibility of shareholders for responsible long-term corporate stewardship.

Fulfilling this purpose will require different approaches for each corporation depending on its industry, history, regulatory environment, governance and other factors. We expect that board committees—focusing on stakeholders, ESG issues and the stewardship obligations of shareholders— will be useful or even necessary for some companies. But for all the differences among companies, there is an important unifying commonality: corporate action, taken against the backdrop of this formulation of corporate purpose, will be fully protected by the business judgment rule, so long as decisions are made by non-conflicted directors acting upon careful consideration and deliberation.

Executed in this way, stakeholder governance will be a better driver of long-term value creation and broad-based prosperity than the shareholder primacy model. Directors and managers have the responsibility of exercising their business judgment in acting for the corporate entity that they represent, balancing its rights and obligations and taking into account both risks and opportunities over the long term, in regular consultation with shareholders. Directors will not be forced to narrow their focus and act as if any one interest trumps all others, with potentially destructive consequences, but will instead have latitude to make decisions that reasonably balance the interests of all constituencies in a manner that will promote the sustainable, long-term business success of the corporation as a whole.

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