engagement et activisme actionnarial | Page 10

May expressed discontent with the current model of corporate governance used by FTSE companies and in particular the effectiveness of supposedly independent non-executive directors. ‘In practice, they are often drawn from the same narrow social and professional circles as the executive team and the scrutiny they provide is often limited,’ she said. So, she suggests, workers and even consumers should be given a seat at the table.

May wrote she wants to tackle the ‘unhealthy and growing gap between what these companies pay their workers and what they pay their bosses.’ Specifically she wants to make shareholder votes on corporate pay packages binding instead of advisory and ‘simplify the way bonuses are paid so that the bosses’ incentives are better aligned with the long-term interests of the company.’

Le blog de l’Université d’Oxford publie un très récent billet analysant sur le dilemme et la position délicate dans laquelle peut être placé l’État actionnaire : « Exercise of Shareholder Control Over a State Owned Enterprise – Comments on Comissão de Valores Mobiliários’s decision in the Eletrobras case » (par le professeur Mario Engler Pinto Junior).

The Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (CVM), the Brazilian equivalent of the SEC, has recently imposed sanctions on the Federal Government for actions taken as the controlling shareholder of the public company Eletrobras. More precisely, the sanctions were imposed on the Federal Government for voting in a general meeting to grant approval of an Elecrobras significant transaction. CVM considered that the Federal Government had a conflict of interest and should have abstained from voting in a shareholders’ meeting called to approve the renewal of the concession contract held by Eletrobras and its subsidiaries for electrical power generation.

 In Brazil, the Federal Government is also the public authority responsible for regulating the electrical sector. According to CVM, the renewal of the concession contract for electrical power generation was a related party transaction that could bring indirect economic benefits to the Federal Government.

My paper criticizes CVM’s approach, arguing that the contract renewal was a legitimate public policy decision in the context of the electrical sector as a whole.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Jacques Grisé relaie sur son blogue (ici) un intéressant article sur la pratique de la rémunération par les fonds activistes de candidats à des postes d’administrateurs : « Rémunération, par les fonds activistes, de candidats à des postes d’administrateurs | Est-ce acceptable ? ».

Un actionnaire activiste (Hedge Funds) qui veut faire élire un de ses partisans à un conseil d’administration ciblé peut-il le rémunérer afin qu’il puisse faire campagne pour son élection à un poste d’administrateur ?

Quelle est la loi à cet égard ? Quelles sont les recommandations de la firme ISS dans ces cas ?

La laisse dorée (« golden leash »), comme on appelle ce lien avec le promoteur de la campagne électorale, est-elle congruente avec le droit des actionnaires ? Ou, cette pratique est-elle sujette à d’éventuels conflits d’intérêts au détriment des actionnaires ?

Il semble bien que cette pratique soit de plus en plus répandue et qu’elle soit « légale », bien que la SEC n’ait pas dit son dernier mot à ce stade-ci. La pratique est appuyée par les grandes firmes de conseil en votation (ISS et Glass Lewis).

L’article publié par Andrew A. Schwartz, professeur à l’École de droit de l’Université du Colorado, est paru aujourd’hui sur le forum de la HBL School on Corporate Governance. On y présente différentes  problématiques, telles que la volonté des CA de bloquer l’élection d’administrateurs externes et la volonté des fonds activistes de remplacer certains administrateurs par des candidats favorables aux changements stratégiques souhaités.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Le message a le mérite d’être clair ! Le blog of Manifest, the proxy voting agency se montre pour le moins critique (!) d’une réforme américaine qui vient d’être proposé et qui vise notamment à mettre en place un encadrement des agences de conseil en vote : « Global investors condemn US attempt to undermine their voting decisions »

The US House of Representatives’ Finance Services Committee last week passed a series of  Bills which seek to repeal large chunks of the Dodd-Frank Act which was passed in response to the 2008 financial crash.

The bills would amend the mandate on public companies to provide shareholders with a vote on executive compensation to occur only when the company has made a material change to the executive compensation; repeal the Security and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) authority to issue rules on proxy access and repeal the mandate that publicly-traded companies disclose the ratio of median versus chief executive officer pay.

Part of the package of legislative proposals is the Corporate Governance Reform & Transparency Act of 2016 would, if passed by Congress and signed by President Obama, require mandatory SEC registration for proxy advisory firms such as Manifest wishing to operate in the US.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian