Nouvelles diverses | Page 11

UCLA School of Law vient de publier un rapport d’une dizainede pages sur la gestion du capital humain et son intégration dans la gouvernance des entreprises : « Corporate Governance : The growing Importance of Human Capital Management » (avril 2020).

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1. Over the last several years, investors and proxy advisory firms have increasingly focused their attention on environmental, sustainability and governance (ESG) and human capital management (HCM) issues. While there is no one definition of HCM, the term is widely used to cover a very broad range of workforce matters that are of concern to investors and the public as they focus on building long-term value and reducing business and reputational risks. These concerns have resulted in calls for enhanced company disclosures about their HCM practices and processes.

2. Under Delaware and federal law, directors have no duties that are specifically focused on HCM. However, under Delaware law and that of many other states, directors have duties of care, loyalty and oversight that can under certain circumstances apply to HCM matters and can result in director liability.

3. While federal securities laws and rules contain several corporate disclosure requirements that apply to employees and touch on HCM issues, current laws and rules are not as robust or focused as many investors would like and have proposed. In response to rulemaking and other investor requests, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has proposed amendments to its disclosure rules that would expressly require companies to describe their human capital resources to the extent that they are material to an understanding of a company’s business as a whole.

4. Some public companies have already articulated board responsibilities for oversight of HCM matters; some have renamed and expanded the responsibilities of their compensation committees to reflect their expanded focus; and some have disclosed their HCM polices and efforts in their securities law filings and other publications.

5. Separate and apart from the legal requirements that apply to corporate board duties and corporate disclosure requirements, there are important business, governance and reputational reasons for boards and companies to care about and address HCM matters. 6. While there is no one-size-fits-all approach to board oversight of HCM matters, areas for possible board attention are (i) diversity and inclusion, (ii) employee satisfaction and engagement, (iii) succession and talent management, (iv) attrition and retention, and (v) ethics, workforce culture and risk.

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Bonjour à toutes et à tous, je signale cette intéressante étude : Zetzsche, Dirk Andreas and Anker-Sørensen, Linn and Consiglio, Roberta and Yeboah-Smith, Miko, « The COVID-19-Crisis and Company Law – Towards Virtual Shareholder Meetings », 15 avril 2020, University of Luxembourg Faculty of Law, Economics & Finance, WPS 2020-007.

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Regulators and Parliaments around the world have responded to the COVID-19 epidemic by amending company law. This crisis legislation allows us to examine how, and to what effect, the corporate governance framework can be amended in times of crisis. In fact, almost all leading industrialized nations have already enacted crisis legislation in the field of company law. 

In our recent working paper, ‘The COVID-19-Crisis and Company Law – Towards Virtual Shareholder Meetings’,  we have sought to (1) document the respective crisis legislation; (2) assist countries looking for solutions to respond rapidly and efficiently to the crisis; (3) exchange experiences of crisis measures; and (4) spur academic discussion on the extent to which the crisis legislation can function as a blueprint for general corporate governance reform.

Countries considered in full or in part include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Readers are encouraged to highlight any inaccuracies in our presentation of the respective laws, and to bring further crisis-related legislation not considered in this working draft to the attention of the authors. Moreover, readers are invited to indicate where there is room for improvement therein, and/or to signal the need for policy reform.

Drawing on the analysis of these more than twenty countries, we note five fields in which legislators have been particularly active. First, the extension of filing periods for annual and quarterly reports to reflect the practical difficulties regarding the collection of numbers and the auditing of financial statements. Second, company law requires shareholders to take decisions in meetings—and these meetings were for the most part in-person gatherings. However, since the gathering of individuals in one location is now at odds with the measures being implemented to contain the virus, legislators have generally allowed for virtual-only meetings, online-only proxy voting and voting-by-mail, and granted relief to various formalities aimed at protecting shareholders (including fixed meeting and notice periods). Third, provisions requiring physical attendance of board members, including provisions on signing corporate documents, have been temporarily lifted for board matters. Fourth, parliaments have enacted changes to allow for more flexible and speedy capital measures, including the disbursement of dividends and the recapitalization of firms, having accepted that the crisis impairs a company’s equity. Fifth and finally, some countries have implemented temporary changes to insolvency law to delay companies’ petitioning for insolvency as a result of the liquidity shock prompted by the imposition of overnight lockdowns.

The legislation passed in response to the COVID-19 crisis provides for an interesting case study through which to examine what can be done to modernize the corporate governance framework with a view to furthering digitalization. Given the difficulties or indeed the impossibility of conducting in-person meetings currently, the overall trajectory of company law reforms has been to allow for digitalization of corporate governance, and ensuring the permissibility of virtual shareholder meetings (VSM), in particular. 

In this respect, it is safe to assume that the rules on VSM will have model character. While the details of the modus operandi of VSM will require careful adjustment, to ensure that shareholders will be afforded the same rights and opportunities to participate as they would at an in-person meeting (including Q&A), the experimental phase during the crisis will feed into the policy discussion, with some more successful and some less successful examples providing food for thought. Yet, it is safe to say that the COVID-19 pandemic has unveiled the need for virtual-only shareholder meetings, and that some types of VSM will stay for good long after the current crisis has subsided. 

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Dans FastCompany, le journaliste Christopher Zara publie un intéressant article reprenant une étude menée actuellement par The Conference Board sur la réduction des rémunérations : « Pandemic pay cuts: The growing list of companies reducing salaries during COVID-19 ». Le constat est éloquent pour l’application de la RSE et de la théorie des parties prenantes par les entreprises, je vous le laisse découvrir ci-dessous :

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More than 30 million Americans have filed for unemployment benefits since the economy first began to unravel due to the coronavirus pandemic. That figure may not count untold millions of freelancers or self-employed individuals who are also out of work, nor does it factor in countless people who simply couldn’t get through to their state labor department to file a claim. And of those who are still working, many are making considerably less money due to reduced hours.

And then there are the company-imposed pay cuts. Over the past few weeks, the Conference Board has been tracking pay reduction announcements for publicly traded companies, using SEC filings by firms listed in the Russell 3000 Index.

Some the findings may surprise you: For instance, the salary reductions are not just hitting top executives and their fat bonuses. At last count, 61% of the affected companies applied pay reductions to the base salaries of senior managers who make less than top-tier executives, the Conference Board says. It adds that 11% of all companies in the index announced base pay cuts between March 1 and April 24.

The good news is, the announcements peaked in early April and have declined a bit in recent weeks. The bad news? The group anticipates a “second wave” of salary reductions could emerge in the weeks ahead as the ripple effects of COVID-19 continue to wreak havoc on bottom lines.

The Conference Board posted the insights in a new report that also includes a wealth of data visualizations and the full list of companies. It says the list will be updated weekly as long as the crisis continues. The data is being compiled in collaboration with consulting firm Semler Brossy and Esgauge Analytics. It shows that the industries hardest hit by the coronavirus are what you would expect, including retail and hospitality.

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Dans le contexte de la pandémie mondiale qui sévit, la tribune de Franck Renaudin prennent un tout autre relief : « « Il est temps que les chefs d’entreprise changent radicalement de paradigme » » (Le Monde, 26 août 2019).

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Dans l’histoire de l’humanité, autant de responsabilités auront-elles jamais pesé sur les épaules de quelques hommes et femmes ? Ces épaules, ce sont celles des actionnaires et dirigeants de grandes entreprises : ils sont la courroie de transmission d’un système qui a atteint les limites de la biosphère terrestre. Mais ils ne donnent pas le sentiment d’avoir compris l’urgence de le réformer en profondeur.

Quand on les interroge sur leur compréhension des menaces qui pèsent sur notre planète, leurs discours sont toujours rassurants. Bien sûr, ils agissent pour un meilleur respect de l’environnement ! Bien sûr, leur entreprise est socialement responsable, et ils peuvent nous en donner maintes illustrations. Leurs pratiques sont plus transparentes, leurs fournisseurs sont passés au crible d’un cahier des charges exigeant, ils recrutent des personnes en situation de handicap ou en réinsertion, ils pratiquent la compensation carbone.

Je vous laisse lire la suite…

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Bel article qui amène à réfléchir : Akshaya Kamalnath, « Shareholder Primacy in the Time of Coronavirus », Oxford Business Law Blog, 7 avril 2020.

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It has become fashionable in these troubled times to write about how the coronavirus (or Covid-19) situation shows that the writer’s favourite policies are the best ones. Trite as it may be, I don’t want to miss the opportunity to explain and defend shareholder primacy as a theory / principle followed in corporate law.

Do companies have an ethical obligation to take care of employees during the coronavirus pandemic? If not, why are companies asking employees to work from home and even paying employees when they are not coming in to work? Even companies in the gig economy like Uber are stepping up and offering unexpected support to their drivers whom they have refused to consider as employees. For instance, Uber announced that it would offer 14 days of financial assistance to drivers affected by Covid-19. Similarly, to accommodate the demand from workplaces and educational institutions to switch to working online, tech companies like Google, Microsoft, and Zoom have begun offering some of their products’ features for free. Why are they going well beyond what current laws require them to do?

Have they begun to embrace stakeholderism (the idea that companies should service all stakeholders equally) and, if so, can we expect such continued benefits being offered to employees in need even after the pandemic has passed? I’d answer both parts of this question in the negative. In my view, these companies are guided by shareholder primacy (the idea that shareholder interests have primacy over that of other stakeholders).

The first and most obvious reason is that shareholders would want directors of the company they have invested in to step up to the occasion when a crisis as big as a pandemic is staring us in the face. While it is normally assumed that shareholder interests translate into profit-making or wealth maximization, intelligent directors would understand that a crisis calls for a different understanding of what shareholders want. The second possible reason for companies to act in the interests of stakeholders at this time is to enhance their reputation. A company making accommodations during a time of crisis might forego some profits in the short-term but will have reputational gains in the long term. The consideration of reputational incentives is not to suggest that companies acting altruistically should be seen as cynical. On the contrary, it is laudable that the directors of these companies have acted in the interests of the company by taking care of relevant stakeholders when it was most needed. The fact that company reputation was one of the variables in the calculus should be noted positively because that shows that shareholder primacy ensures companies act in the interests of other stakeholders when it is most essential. A third reason is that by offering benefits to employees (or independent contractors as in the case of Uber’s drivers) or customers as in the case of the tech companies, the companies have ensured that the relevant stakeholders (customers and employees / independent contractors) would want to work or continue to work with these companies.

If shareholder primacy leads to beneficial outcomes, why is it so reviled? Shareholder primacy is often confused with a myopic focus on short-term profits. To be sure, the company law of most countries requires directors to act in the best interests of the company and, in determining which interests within the company are to be prioritised, to give primacy to that of shareholders. The default assumption is that most shareholders would want to maximise the wealth that they have invested in the company. However, it is left to directors to consider other relevant interests where they are in the best interests of the company. As I have argued above, it was clearly in the interests of the company to prioritise various stakeholders’ interests and act accordingly, and in this instance they have acted accordingly. Not every situation has such an easy answer and so it is left to directors to choose the course of action best suited to the company, with the interests of shareholders being ultimately prioritised.

What happens after the pandemic has passed? While the coronavirus situation is a big crisis and companies have been stepping up, decisions prioritising the interests of one stakeholder over those of others are routine, even in calmer situations, or where a company alone is facing a crisis of some sort. Take for example, employees’ complaints about toxic work culture and harassment, which we now know was the case with Uber in the past. Often the response is to keep the issue under wraps or refuse to address the particular stakeholder’s needs. This unsavoury behaviour cannot however be attributed to either shareholder primacy or stakeholderism. We would expect that shareholders would want companies to clean their house as soon as they know there is trouble so that they are not at the receiving end of the law suit at a later date and, more importantly, because shareholders would want talented employees to be retained within the company. Unfortunately, the unsavoury behaviour is simply an expression of human nature in some cases and better incentives to prevent such behaviour need to be devised. Similarly, for concerns of other stakeholders, the environment for instance, environment protection and climate change laws would constrain directors’ actions rather than relying on principles of either shareholder primacy or stakeholderism to do the job.

All this is to say that there are problems with how companies are run and we need innovative solutions to create better incentives rather than falling back on paying lip service to stakeholderism as the Business Roundtable recently did in its 2019 statement.

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Plusieurs entreprises européennes ont choisi de s’immatriculer aux Pays-Bas plutôt que dans leur pays d’origine. Pourquoi ce choix ? Mme Laurence Boisseau fournit un bel éclairage dans l’article suivant : « Siège social aux Pays-Bas : les risques pour les actionnaires » (Les Échos.fr, novembre 2019).

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Actions à droit de vote multiple

La différence la plus sensible réside dans les actions à droit de vote multiple, qui sont autorisées aux Pays-Bas et pas en France. Dans l’Hexagone, seuls des droits de vote double sont possibles. Aux Pays-Bas existent différentes catégories d’actions, sans aucune limite sur les droits de vote. Cela permet de verrouiller un capital et donc de protéger une entreprise contre une tentative de prise de contrôle.

Autre point, moins favorable aux actionnaires, le seuil à partir duquel il est possible de déposer des résolutions aux assemblées générales. Aux Pays-Bas, il faut avoir rassemblé 3 % du capital, en France, seulement 0,5 %. Et c’est déjà beaucoup, se plaignent certains représentants de fonds. Pour déposer une résolution chez Total, cela suppose d’avoir investi plusieurs centaines de millions d’euros. En revanche, les résolutions sont votées avec les mêmes majorités, simples la plupart du temps. La majorité qualifiée, soit 66 %, concerne des modifications de statuts.

Salaires des patrons

Les salaires des patrons sont en revanche scrutés de plus près en France. Pour l’instant, seule la politique de rémunération est soumise au vote des actionnaires néerlandais. Mais, en 2020, la donne sera différente car les Pays-Bas auront transposé la directive des actionnaires. L’assemblée générale votera donc les rémunérations individuelles des dirigeants, avec un vote consultatif. En France, ce vote est devenu contraignant avec la loi Sapin II suite à l’affaire Renault.

Les minoritaires sont mieux traités aux Pays-Bas en matière de retrait de la cote : le seuil à partir duquel une société peut être retirée est de 95 % aux Pays-Bas contre 90 % en France depuis la loi Pacte. Il est donc plus favorable aux minoritaires dans le premier cas.

Enfin, les Pays Bas offrent un cadre plus accueillant aux « class actions », ces actions collectives en justice par lesquelles des actionnaires peuvent demander des comptes à des entreprises. Dans certaines affaires, des plaignants ont obtenu des sommes importantes. En 2007, la justice a accordé 1,37 milliard d’euros à près de 300.000 actionnaires de la banque franco-belge Dexia, en lien avec l’effondrement du cours de Bourse en 2001. En France, les « class actions » n’existent pas pour les affaires concernant la Bourse.

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