Nouvelles diverses | Page 14

Sympathique petit billet de Me Lapierre du cabinet TJD sur une question simple : « Est-ce qu’une société fermée a l’obligation d’avoir un certain nombre d’administrateurs et de dirigeants issus de la diversité? ».

Extrait :

Non. Les sociétés par actions à capital fermé régies par la Loi sur les sociétés par actions et par la Loi canadienne sur les sociétés par actions n’ont pas de règles particulières à suivre en matière de diversification des membres composant le conseil d’administration et la haute direction.

Un important mouvement de diversification des administrateurs et dirigeants d’entreprises de divers secteurs a cependant vu le jour au cours des dernières années. Plusieurs sociétés canadiennes, qu’elles soient ou non des émetteurs assujettis, ont adopté, dans le cadre de ce mouvement, des politiques internes afin de promouvoir la diversité au sein de leur entreprise.

Le 1^er janvier 2020, la Loi canadienne sur les sociétés par actions a par ailleurs été modifiée afin d’imposer aux sociétés fédérales ayant fait un appel public à l’épargne et aux émetteurs émergents de divulguer à leurs actionnaires des renseignements sur la diversité au sein de leur conseil d’administration et de la haute direction. La représentation relative de quatre groupes désignés soit les femmes, les autochtones (Premières nations, Inuit et Métis), les personnes handicapées et les personnes qui font partie des minorités visibles est désormais obligatoire pour ces sociétés. Les sociétés doivent soit divulguer des renseignements sur leurs politiques et objectifs relativement à la représentation des groupes désignés ou expliquer les raisons pour lesquelles elles n’ont pas adopté de tels politiques et objectifs.¹ Cela aura vraisemblablement pour effet de promouvoir dans les prochaines années la participation des membres issus de ses groupes dans des postes importants au sein de ces entreprises.

Nous ne retrouvons cependant pas à l’heure actuelle cette exigence pour les sociétés à capital fermé et pour les sociétés régies par la loi provinciale. Il y a lieu d’indiquer que nombreuses sont les études et les recherches dans le milieu des affaires démontrant une corrélation entre la diversité au sein d’un conseil d’administration, la performance financière et la création de valeur pour les entreprises ayant fait le choix de diversifier le profil des candidats dans des postes décisionnels. Il serait par ailleurs pertinent pour certaines d’entre-elles de se questionner quant à la pertinence d’adopter une politique en ce sens, afin de bénéficier, qui sait, des avantages rattachés à cette diversification.

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Minerva Analytics apporte une belle mise à jour à la problématique de la diversité en m’apprenant que la Grèce vient de renforcer son dispositif juridique en matière de féminisation : « Greek companies will soon be mandated to meet a 25% female quota on their boards following a landmark decision for gender diversity ».

Extrait :

The quota requirement has been included as an amendment to the bill transposing the EU Shareholder Rights Directive II (SRD II) into Greek law, and is the result of a consultation led by a group of academics specialising in corporate governance.

(…)

Overall, the directive is designed to encourage companies away from short-termism, focusing on areas such as director remuneration. However, the Greek amendment marks the first time it has been used to tackle the EU’s poor record on gender diversity at a board level.

According to the European Commission’s 2019 report on equality between men and women, since 2015, progress on corporate gender inclusivity has stalled. As of October 2018, the proportion of women on the boards of the EU’s biggest companies was only 26.7%.

Within this, France was the only EU member state with at least 40% female representation at board-level, while women account for less than a third of board-level positions in Italy, Sweden, Finland and Germany.

According to the same data, women made up less than 10% of board members in Greece.

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David Larcker, Bradford Lynch, Brian Tayan et Daniel Taylor publient un texte qui revient sur la transparence des ghrandes entreprises américaines en matière de COVID-19 « The Spread of Covid-19 Disclosure » (29 juin 2020). Un document plein de statistiques et de tendances sur la transparence… vraiment intéressant sachant que l’enjeu de la question n’est pas à négliger.

Extrait :

The COVID-19 pandemic presents an interesting scenario whereby an unexpected shock to the economic system led to a rapid deterioration in the economic landscape, causing sharp changes in performance relative to expectations just a few months prior. For most companies, the pandemic has been detrimental. For a few, it brought unexpected demand. In many cases, supply chains have been strained, causing ripple effects that extend well beyond any one company.

How do companies respond to such a situation? What choices do they make, and how much transparency do they offer? How does disclosure vary in a setting where the potential impact is so widely uncertain? The COVID-19 pandemic provides a unique setting to examine disclosure choices in a situation of extreme uncertainty that extends across all companies in the public market. This devastating outlier event provides a rare glimpse into disclosure behavior by managers and boards.

Why This Matters

1. The COVID-19 pandemic provides a unique opportunity to examine disclosure practices of companies relative to peers in real time about a somewhat unprecedented shock that impacted practically every publicly listed company in the U.S. We see that decisions varied considerably about whether to make disclosure and, if so, what and how much to say about the pandemic’s impact on operations, finances, and future. What motivates some companies to be forthcoming about what they are experiencing, while others remain silent? Does this reflect different degrees of certitude about how the virus would impact their businesses, or differences in managements’ perception of their “obligations” to be transparent with the public? What does this say about a company’s view of its relation and duty to shareholders?
2. In one example, we saw a consumer beverage company make zero references to COVID-19 in its SEC filings and website, despite the virus plausibly having at least some impact on its business. In another example, we saw a company claim no material changes to its previously reported risk factors when managers almost certainly had relevant information about the virus and the likely impact on sales and operations. What discussion among the senior managers, board members, external auditor, and general counsel leads to a decision to make no disclosures? What should shareholders glean from this decision, particularly in light of peer disclosure?
3. The COVID-19 pandemic represents a so-called “black swan” event that inflicted severe and unexpected damage to wide swaths of the economy. What strategic insights will companies learn from this event? Can boards use these insights to prepare for other possible outlier events, such as climate events, terrorism, cyber-attacks, pandemics, and other emergencies? Should these insights be disclosed to shareholders?

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Le 26 juin 2020, Deloitte a publié une étude intéressante : « Global businesses divided on implications of COVID-19 crisis for company ethics ».

Extrait :

As businesses start to look beyond the COVID-19 crisis, the EY Global Integrity Report 2020 reveals divisions on the repercussions for company ethics as a result of the pandemic.

The findings are part of a survey of almost 3,000 respondents from 33 countries up to February 2020, analyzing the ethical challenges companies face in turbulent times. An additional 600 employees across all levels of seniority were surveyed at the height of the COVID-19 crisis in April in companies across six countries – China, Germany, Italy, the UK, India and the US.

The majority (90%) of respondents surveyed during the crisis believe that disruption, as a result of COVID-19, poses a risk to ethical business conduct, but there is a concerning disparity between boards, senior management and employees on the implications for compliance. While 43% of board members and 37% of senior managers surveyed believe the pandemic could lead to change and better business ethics, only 21% of junior employees appear to agree.

The survey highlights that signs of an integrity disconnect at different levels within organizations were evident even before the pandemic with more than half of board members (55%) believing management demonstrate professional integrity, but only 37% of junior employees sharing the same sentiment. In addition, over half of board members (55%) believe there are managers in their organization who would sacrifice integrity for short term gain.

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Intéressant article du Financial Times du 1er juillet 2020 qui revient sur le modèle allemand « German corporations — and regulation — are in the dock ».

Extrait :

Now the consensual German model of business has suffered multiple mechanical failures. Wirecard, the payments group that bolstered German tech credentials, has imploded in fraud. Bayer is taking up to $11bn in charges mostly triggered by a disastrous US takeover. Once-proud conglomerates Siemens and Thyssenkrupp are shrinking. Volkswagen’s service life shortens each time Tesla’s outlook improves.

(…) Germany, can we talk? “Sure. I’m driving but I’m German so that’s second nature,” jokes an economist via his hands-free, “I don’t think there is any common thread between Wirecard and these other examples.” According to him, the worst accidents occur when German business adopts US ways. Wirecard had a two-tier board structure, like most German businesses. But its supervisory board was seemingly full of corporate yespersons, not vigilant workers as governance rules dictate. And the group was led by a bossy entrepreneur. Kenneth Amaeshi, a professor of business at Edinburgh university, disagrees with such exceptionalism. He believes the Wirecard scandal puts German stakeholder capitalism “in the dock”. It points to a structural weakness of regulation, he says. He is right.

(…) Corporate governance must be overhauled this time.

Supervisory boards must shrink, meet more often and include more independent directors. Regulators must adopt the adversarial approach of US peers. Industrial giants should unbundle further to create a new tier of focused medium-sized businesses. Siemens’ 2018 flotation of Healthineers, a healthcare equipment unit, shows what can be done. Germany’s biggest challenge is spurring investment in disruptive technology. Business has depended on debt finance from risk-averse investors. But there is no lack of equity, as Guntram Wolff of Bruegel, a think-tank, points out. It features as retained corporate earnings rather than footloose investment capital. This is reflected in total equity of some €1.2tn on the balance sheets of Germany’s top 100 quoted companies, according to S&P Global data. Tax breaks are needed to chivvy more of this capital into start-ups and electric vehicle development. It would be a shame to waste two good crises — the meltdown of the German model plus coronavirus. Moreover, support is growing worldwide for stakeholder capitalism, in which social and environmental goals rank alongside profits. Germany just needs to reduce its emphasis on safe jobs for workers and well-networked managers. A little less consensus can make the German model roadworthy again.

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Dans le dossier Droit du travail et droit des sociétés : questions d’actualité réalisé sous la coordination scientifique de Jérôme Chacornac et Grégoire Duchange, je signale deux articles intéressants touchant les thématiques du blogue :

• L’obligation de prendre en considération les enjeux sociaux : quel impact pour les salariés d’une société ? Par Matthieu Buchberger
• Les administrateurs représentant les salariés : un renforcement de principe mais des difficultés pratiques ignorées… Par Valentino Armillei

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