Normes d’encadrement | Page 16

actualités internationales Gouvernance normes de droit parties prenantes place des salariés Responsabilité sociale des entreprises

Bulletin Joly Travail : deux articles à lire

Ivan Tchotourian 7 juillet 2020 Ivan Tchotourian

Dans le dossier Droit du travail et droit des sociétés : questions d’actualité réalisé sous la coordination scientifique de Jérôme Chacornac et Grégoire Duchange, je signale deux articles intéressants touchant les thématiques du blogue :

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Gouvernance Normes d'encadrement objectifs de l'entreprise parties prenantes Responsabilité sociale des entreprises Valeur actionnariale vs. sociétale

Des doutes sur le modèle stakeholder

Ivan Tchotourian 6 juillet 2020 Ivan Tchotourian

Dans « Beware of the Panacea of Stakeholder-friendly Corporate Purposes », le professeur Marco Ventoruzzo propose une critique sévèrement de l’ouverture de la gouvernance d’entreprise aux parties prenantes (Oxford Business Law Blog, 13 avril 2020). À réfléchir…

Extrait :

In this short essay (…), I take issue with the relevance and effectiveness of ’corporate purpose’ as a form of private ordering (eg, as a bylaws provision), or in other sources of soft-law (self-regulation in corporate governance codes, declarations of business associations, etc). I challenge whether these are, in fact, effective tools to induce greater commitment toward stakeholders.

(…) My possible disagreement with Mayer and other similar approaches and initiatives—or, more precisely, with a possible reading of these approaches and initiatives—lays in the excessive trust and emphasis that has been reserved to formulas concerning the purpose of the corporation and their possible consequences. Mayer argues that the corporate contract should include a reference to stakeholders and general social interests beyond value for shareholders, suggesting that this simple trick would have a meaningful impact on business conduct.

(…) The reasons are obvious.

First, these formulas are so broad, vague and ephemeral that they cannot possibly represent a compass for corporate action; they cannot provide meaningful guidance for virtually any specific corporate decision that implies a (legitimate) tradeoff between the interests of different stakeholders. Also, as precedents show, these formulas can be used even less to invoke the violation of directors’ duties and their liability. This conclusion is inevitable because the very essence of the agency relationship, the crucial function of a director or executive, is exactly mediating and balancing the different and often conflicting interests that converge on the corporation in an uncertain and evolving scenario. The idea of constraining the necessary discretion of directors within the boundaries of a simple purpose declaration is no better than the idea of writing in the contract with a painter that her work must be a masterpiece. Such an attempted shortcut to real value is self-evidently flawed.

Second, multiplying the goals and interests that directors must or can pursue, if it can have any effect at all, by definition increases their flexibility and discretion and makes it easier to justify, ex ante and ex post, very different choices. Without being cynical, from this perspective it is not surprising that these formulas are often welcomed, if not sponsored, by business associations and interest groups linked to managers, executives and entrenched shareholders.

Third, self-regulation and private ordering are often a way to avoid or delay the adoption of more stringent statutory or regulatory provisions. The former might be more or less effective, but they might also create an illusion of responsibility. The risk of putting too much trust into the beneficial consequences of these formulas is a disregard for more biting mandatory provisions, which may be necessary to avoid externalities and other market failures.

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actualités canadiennes Base documentaire Divulgation doctrine Gouvernance Normes d'encadrement rémunération Responsabilité sociale des entreprises

Pour un ratio d’équité au Canada

Ivan Tchotourian 5 juillet 2020 Ivan Tchotourian

Bonjour à toutes et à tous, voici une intéressante tribune parue dans The Globe and Mail : « Why Canada should adopt pay ratio disclosures » (19 avril 2020).

Extrait :

In particular, securities regulators should make pay ratio disclosures mandatory to improve transparency of executive pay packages at public companies. Pay ratio disclosures reveal the difference in the total remuneration between a company’s top executives and its rank and file workers….

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Divulgation divulgation extra-financière divulgation financière Gouvernance normes de droit parties prenantes Responsabilité sociale des entreprises

SEC : une réponse à sa consultation sur la divulgation en matière de risque COVID-19

Ivan Tchotourian 4 juillet 2020 Ivan Tchotourian

Par la voix de Carter Dougherty, l’Americans for Financial Reform a adressé sa réponse à la SEC à propos de la divulgation obligatoire du risque COVID-19 : « SEC Should Mandate Disclosures on COVID-19 Risks and Responses » (1er juillet 2020).

Extrait :

The impact of the losses on shareholders will be significant. Investors, however, are being forced to rely on news reports to try to understand how the crisis is impacting companies in their portfolios and how those companies are responding. The SEC must act to require companies to provide consistent, reliable data to investors about the economic impact of the pandemic on their business, human capital management practices, and supply chain risks. These disclosures should include:

  • Workplace COVID-19 Prevention and Control Plan—Companies should disclose a written infectious disease prevention and control plan including information such as the company’s practices regarding hazard identification and assessment, employee training, and provision of personal protective equipment.
  • Identification, Contact Tracing, and Isolation—Companies should disclose their policies for identifying employees who are infected or symptomatic, contact tracing and notification for potentially exposed employees and customers, and leave policies for infected employees who are isolating.
  • Compliance with Quarantine Orders and phased reopening orders—Companies should disclose how they are complying with federal, state, and local government quarantine orders and public health recommendations to limit operations.
  • Financial Implications—Companies should disclose the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on their cash flows and balance sheet as well as steps taken to preserve liquidity such as accessing credit facilities, government assistance, or the suspension of dividends and stock buybacks.
  • Executive Compensation—Companies should promptly disclose the rationale for any material modifications of senior executive compensation due to the COVID-19 pandemic, including changes to performance targets or issuance of new equity compensation awards.
  • Employee Leave—Companies should disclose whether or not they provide paid sick leave to encourage sick workers to stay home, paid leave for quarantined workers, paid leave at any temporarily closed facilities, and family leave options to provide for childcare or sick family
  • Health Insurance—Companies should disclose the health insurance coverage ratio of their workforce and whether the company has a policy to provide employer-paid health insurance for any employees who are laid off during the COVID-19 pandemic.
  • Contingent Workers—Companies should disclose if part-time employees, temporary workers, independent contractors, and subcontracted workers receive all the protections and benefits provided to full-time company employees, including those outlined above.
  • Supply Chains-Companies should disclose whether they are current on payments to their supply chain vendors. Timely and prompt payments to suppliers will help retain suppliers’ workforces and ensure that a stable supply chain is in place for business operations going forward.
  • Workers’ Rights-Companies should disclose their policies for protecting employees who raise concerns about workplace health and safety from retaliation, including whistleblower protections and contractual provisions protecting workers’ rights to raise concerns about workplace conditions.
  • Political activity—Companies should disclose all election spending and lobbying activity, especially money spent through third parties like trade associations and social welfare 501(c)4 organizations.

Prior to the onset of COVID-19, it was often argued that human rights, worker protection and supply chain matters were moral issues not relevant to a company’s financial performance. As millions of workers are laid off and supply chains unravel, the pandemic has proven that view wrong. Businesses that protect workers and consumers will be better positioned to continue operations and respond to consumer demand throughout the pandemic. The disclosures outlined above will provide investors with important information to help them understand how COVID-19 is impacting the companies they are invested in. In addition, by requiring these disclosures, the Commission has the opportunity to encourage companies to review their current practices and consider whether updates are necessary in light of recent events. The process of preparing these disclosures may help some public companies to recognize that their current practices are not sufficiently robust to protect their workers, consumers, supply chains and, as a result, their investors’ capital given the impact of the pandemic.

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actualités internationales Gouvernance Normes d'encadrement normes de droit objectifs de l'entreprise parties prenantes Responsabilité sociale des entreprises Structures juridiques

Intéressantes dispositions du Code civil chinois

Ivan Tchotourian 11 juin 2020 Ivan Tchotourian

Le Code civil chinois a été adopté le 28 mai 2020. Il ne rentrera en vigueur qu’au 1er janvier 2021. Deux articles ont attirés mon attention dans une perspective de responsabilité sociétale, articles qui concerne le régime des For-Profit Legal Person (section 2). En substances, voici ce que précisent lesdits articles :

Les actionnaires ne doivent pas intenter à l’intérêt de la personne morale ou à celui des créanciers.

Les entreprises assument une responsabilité sociale.

Order of the President of the People’s Republic of China (No. 45)
The Civil Code of the People’s Republic of China, as adopted at the 3rd Session of the Thirteenth National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on May 28, 2020, is hereby issued, and shall come into force on January 1, 2021.
President of the People’s Republic of China: Xi Jinping
May 28, 2020
Civil Code of the People’s Republic of China
(Adopted at the 3rd Session of the Thirteenth National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on May 28, 2020)

Extrait :

  • Article 83

An investor of a for-profit legal person shall not damage the interests of the legal person or any other investor by abusing the rights of an investor. If the investor abuses the rights of an investor, causing any loss to the legal person or any other investor, the investor shall assume civil liability in accordance with the law.
An investor of a for-profit legal person shall not damage the interests of a creditor of the legal person by abusing the independent status of the legal person and the limited liability of the investor. If the investor abuses the legal person’s independent status or the investor’s limited liability to evade debts, causing serious damage to the interests of a creditor of the legal person, the investor shall be jointly and severally liable for the legal person’s debts.

  • Article 86

In business activities, a for-profit legal person shall comply with business ethics, maintain the safety of transactions, receive government supervision and public scrutiny, and assume social responsibilities.

Merci à mon collègue, le professeur Bjarne Melkevik, de cette information.

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devoirs des administrateurs Gouvernance normes de droit parties prenantes Responsabilité sociale des entreprises Structures juridiques

La Benefit corporation adoptée en Colombie-Britannique

Ivan Tchotourian 10 juin 2020 Ivan Tchotourian

En voilà une nouvelle ! La province de Colombie-Britannique vient de faire place à une Benefit Corporation. Certaines modifications apportées à la Business Corporations Act de la Colombie-Britannique (la « BCBCA ») qui vont entrer en vigueur le 30 juin 2020 permettent la création d’un nouveau sous-type de société, la « société d’intérêt social » (la benefit company). La Colombie-Britannique est le premier territoire canadien à adopter ce concept qui n’est pourtant pas nouveau aux États-Unis. Pas sûr que ce choix soit heureux dans la mesure où la 3C existait déjà et qu’elle se révèle sans doute plus porteuse pour la RSE…

Pour en savoir plus : « Une première au Canada : les sociétés d’« intérêt social » arrivent en Colombie-Britannique » (Stikeman Elliott, 5 juin 2020)

Extrait :

The major distinctions between a B.C. benefit company and other B.C. companies are as follows:

  • Notice of articles: The benefit company’s notice of articles will contain the following statement (the “benefit statement”):

This company is a benefit company and, as such, is committed to conducting its business in a responsible and sustainable manner and promoting one or more public benefits.

  • Articles: The benefit company’s articles must include a provision that specifies the public benefits to be promoted (“benefit provision”). “Public benefit” refers to something that has a positive effect that benefits (i) a class of persons other than shareholders of the company in their capacity as shareholders, or a class of communities or organizations, or (ii) the environment. The positive effect can be:
    • Artistic
    • Charitable
    • Cultural
    • Economic
    • Educational
    • Environmental
    • Literary
    • Medical
    • Religious
    • Scientific
    • Technological
  • Alterations: Any decision to adopt or eliminate the benefit statement (i.e. to alter the company’s status as a benefit company) must be approved by a special resolution of the voting shareholders. Both voting and non-voting shareholders of the benefit company are entitled to dissent rights with respect to such a change or to a change in the benefit provision.
  • Benefit report: Each year, the benefit company must prepare, provide to its shareholders and post on its website (if it has one) a report (“benefit report”) that assesses the company’s performance in carrying out the commitments set out in the company’s benefit provision compared to a third-party standard. The report needs to include information about the process and rationale for selecting or changing the relevant third-party standard. Regulations may be enacted that provide more details about the third-party standard and the contents of the benefit report.
  • Penalties relating to the benefit report: It will be an offence if the directors of the benefit company do not prepare and post the benefit report as required by the BCBCA and the regulations. There is a potential fine of up to $2,000 for individuals or $5,000 for persons other than individuals.
  • Augmented fiduciary duty: The directors and officers of a benefit company will be required to act honestly and in good faith with a view to conducting the business in a responsible and sustainable manner and promoting the public benefits that the company has identified in its benefit provision. They must balance that public benefits duty against their duties to the company. (There is currently no guidance with respect to achieving this balance.) However, the amendments state that the public benefits duty does not create a duty on the part of directors or officers to persons who are affected by the company’s conduct or who would be personally benefitted by it.
  • Enforcement and remedies where duty breached: Several significant provisions in the amendments relate to enforcement and remedies:
    • Shareholders are the only persons who are able to bring an action against a BCBCA benefit company’s directors and officers over an alleged violation of their duty relating to public benefits;
    • Only shareholders that, in the aggregate, hold at least 2% of the company’s issued shares may bring such an action (in the case of a public company, a $2 million shareholding, in the aggregate, will also suffice); and
    • The court may not order monetary damages in relation to a breach of that duty. Other remedies, such as removal or a direction to comply, would still be available.

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