Normes d’encadrement | Page 2

La province de l’Ontario est en train de travailler sur une réforme de son droit des sociétés comme en témoigne ce document « Business Law Advisory Council Fall 2016 Report » déposé au début du mois de mars.

The Ministry of Government and Consumer Services sought public feedback on the draft report of the Business Law Advisory Council (BLAC) to the Minister of Government and Consumer Services on priorities and recommendations for reform of Ontario’s corporate and commercial legislation from November 16 to December 12, 2016.

Following the Council’s consideration of the consultation feedback, the Council has now finalized the report. Attached is the final report submitted by BLAC to the Minister on February 3, 2017.

This report suggests recommendations to amend the following acts:
• the Business Corporations Act
• the Personal Property Security Act
• the Arthur Wishart Act (Franchise Disclosure), 2000 (and the General Regulation under the Act)

It also now includes the following three issues for future consideration:
• board diversity
• majority voting
• benefit corporations

Extrait sur le vote majoritaire :

Under the OBCA (and most other Canadian corporate statutes), shareholders do not have the right to vote against a candidate for election to the board of directors. Majority voting is a work around that requires a public company to give shareholders the ability to vote for or withhold their votes (the only options under the OBCA) from individual directors and to have the numbers voted for and withheld made public. In its current form in Canada, directors who did not receive a majority of votes cast in favour of their election must tender their resignations to the board. It is then for the board to determine whether or not it is in the best interests of the corporation for the board to accept the resignation of any director.

Majority voting in various forms has been adopted by Canadian public companies since 2006. In 2014 the Toronto Stock Exchange made majority voting mandatory for its listed issuers.

There are many who do not believe that the TSX requirement is enough. Among other things, it leaves with the board of directors the authority to decide whether a director who has not received a majority of votes in favour of his or her election should remain on the board. Moreover, the TSX provisions do not apply to public companies that are listed on the TSX Venture Exchange. In September 2016, the federal government introduced proposed amendments to the CBCA which would result in director candidates who have not received a majority of votes cast in favour of their election not being elected (subject to certain exceptions).

Majority voting is an important priority for the Council. We are reviewing the approach in the proposed amendments to the CBCA and whether improvements could be made to this approach in developing proposals for the OBCA.

Extrait sur les Benefit Corporations :

3. Benefit Corporations

Benefit corporations are for profit corporations that have a broad purpose to create value for all stakeholders. The directors and officers of these entities are required to consider the impact of their decisions on shareholders, but also on employees, society and on the environment. In the U.S. 30 states (as well as the District of Columbia) have adopted legislation that provides for the creation of benefit corporations. Legislation providing for benefit corporations exists or is under discussion in other jurisdictions around the world as well.

Benefit corporations are different from social enterprise legislation currently in force in British Columbia and Nova Scotia. The legislation in those provinces provide for forms of « hybrid corporations » which are similar in form to not-for-profit corporations, but which also have a limited ability to engage in business activities (and are subject to a number of restrictions not imposed on for-profit organizations). The Ontario government has also explored the introduction of legislation to facilitate hybrid corporations as part of its social enterprise strategy.

The Council has received input on the value of and demand for benefit corporation legislation in Ontario and will consider this issue further.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Le Code de gouvernance allemand vient d’être réformé récemment : « Germany corp gov code to emphasise investor responsibility » (Susanna Rust, IPE, 15 février 2017). Vous trouverez dans cet article une belle synthèse de cette réforme.

Germany’s corporate governance code is being amended to emphasise that institutional investors have a responsibility to exercise their ownership rights.

The amendments follow a six-week consultation period that generated a strong response, both positive and critical, according to the government-appointed commission responsible for the code. The commission decided on changes to the code itself and the preamble, which sets out the spirit behind the code.

The preamble has been extended to argue that good corporate governance requires companies and their directors to conduct business ethically and take responsibility for their behaviour. The German word used by the commission for the latter is “Eigenverantwortung” – literally translated as “self-responsibility” or “own-responsibility”.

The guiding principle of an “honourable businessperson” (“ehrbarer Kaufmann”) was introduced to the preamble to reflect this.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Dans un article publié dans Le Temps « Nouveau paradigme pour la gouvernance des entreprises », Me Mathieu Blanc livre une intéressante réflexion qui raisonne avec notre blogue : « Il serait pertinent d’ancrer dans notre droit – ce que ne fait pas le projet du Conseil fédéral – le principe de la recherche de la prospérité à long terme des sociétés ».

Le débat sur le gouvernement d’entreprise (corporate governance en anglais) s’est imposé dans les agendas politiques et économiques suisses depuis au moins 15 ans, notamment en raison du poids croissant des investisseurs institutionnels dans les grandes sociétés. A l’origine, les règles et «bonnes pratiques» de corporate governance – qu’elles soient issues de l’autorégulation ou de normes étatiques – avaient pour but d’améliorer la situation des actionnaires. Dans les faits, cela revenait à réduire le rôle du conseil d’administration. L’initiative et la stratégie ont ainsi été en partie transférées des entrepreneurs et dirigeants d’entreprise aux investisseurs et fonds de placement.

Cette politique a eu pour effet de donner davantage de poids aux mesures à court terme, par exemple le versement de dividendes substantiels ou le rachat massif d’actions, qu’aux mesures prises pour renforcer la compétitivité de l’entreprise sur le long terme.

(…) A cet égard, le projet du Conseil fédéral publié à la fin du mois de novembre 2016 visant à «moderniser» de manière substantielle le droit de la société anonyme mentionne à juste titre que la croissance à long terme et l’amélioration des performances financières de la société doivent être le but d’un renforcement de la gouvernance. Plusieurs modifications proposées par le Conseil fédéral risquent toutefois d’entraîner des charges administratives supplémentaires en partie inutiles alors que les organes dirigeants devraient consacrer davantage de temps à la mise en œuvre d’une stratégie commerciale qu’à répondre à des demandes croissantes d’actionnaires minoritaires.

Si le projet maintient heureusement en grande partie l’équilibre actuel entre les organes de la société anonyme, il faut veiller à conserver autant que possible la flexibilité du droit suisse des sociétés, et ce dans l’intérêt de notre économie. De même, il serait à mon avis pertinent d’ancrer dans notre droit – ce que ne fait pas le projet du Conseil fédéral – le principe de la recherche de la prospérité à long terme des sociétés. A cet égard, différentes réglementations ou recommandations européennes ont récemment consacré ce principe.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Le Financial Reporting Council (FRC) a annoncé à la mi-février 2017 qu’il souhaitait faire évoluer le code de gouvernance des entreprises britanniques. Aussi, le FRC va-t-il procéder à une revue de son code pour obtenir des commentaires.

The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) has today announced plans for a fundamental review of the UK Corporate Governance Code. This will take account of work done by the FRC on corporate culture and succession planning, and the issues raised in the Government’s Green Paper and the BEIS Select Committee inquiry. The review will build on the Codes globally recognised strengths developed over the past 25 years while considering the appropriate balance between its principles and provisions and the growing demands on the corporate governance framework.

Les objectifs annoncés sont :

This will consider the appropriate balance between the Code’s principles and provisions.  In pursuing any changes, the current strengths of UK governance: the unitary board, strong shareholder rights, the role of stewardship and the ‘comply or explain’ approach, must be preserved. We must not throw out the baby with the bathwater.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Dans un article paru le 2 février 2017 (« CEOs share their views on corporate governance reform », The Telegraph), des PDG et des chefs de la haute-direction partage leur analyse de la réforme proposée par Theresa May.

So what changes, in what could be the most significant reform of corporate governance since the 2005 Greenbury report, is the paper proposing to make – and how are business leaders responding?

Morceaux choisis :

• “Unions are angry that the proposal to have workers on boards has been dropped, in favour of advisory panels for workers and consumers, and the allocation of special responsibilities to non-executives. Large private companies will be dismayed about proposals about new rules for them. They may argue that this has been based on the poor behaviour of a small minority.”
• “The paper toes a very careful line – raising important questions – and then delivering fairly watered-down recommendations. For example, the paper suggests a binding annual shareholder vote on executive pay, but excludes some elements of executive pay packages from the vote.
• “I welcome any effort that encourages business to do the right thing, but corporate governance is about so much more than regulating executive pay. The boardroom sets the standard for the whole of the business and must be accountable for that ».
• « For reform to be taken forward, business leaders should be encouraged to focus on changes that drive long-term prospects ».

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Le 10 octobre, The National Law Review a publié un article intéressant revenant sur la situation britannique et les réformes à venir en gouvernance d’entreprise : « UK Corporate Governance: Change Has Got to Come! ».

A number of themes trailed in UK’s Theresa May’s first speech after securing the Conservative nomination, were repeated at last week’s Conservative Party conference in Birmingham. The new Government reiterated its intention to occupy the centre ground of British politics and the delivery of this political objective will undoubtedly have implications for corporate Britain – in the words of the Prime Minister “ a change has got to come.”

At the moment we are short on detail, but the Government has promised to publish plans later this year to have consumers and workers represented on company boards of directors. Speech soundbites also focussed on executive pay, the taxation of international business and the payment of excessive dividends, together with a more general promise to protect and enhance workers’ rights.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Bonjour à toutes et à tous, la province de l’Alberta a décidé d’aller de l’avant avec le thème de la féminisation des CA. Aussi, sa commission des valeurs mobilières vient-elle de lancer une consultation publique sur un projet de type « se conformer ou s’expliquer » (Janet McFarlane, « Alberta Securities Commission proposes gender diversity rule », The Globe and Mail, 14 septembre 2014). Pour rappel, cette règle du « conformer ou s’expliquer » a été mis en place dans la plupart des autres provinces canadiennes à l’exception de l’Alberta, de la Colombie-Britannique et de l’Île du Prince Édouard..

Alberta’s securities regulator is reversing course and has unveiled a proposal to adopt new reporting rules requiring companies to disclose their approach to gender diversity on their boards.

The Alberta Securities Commission (ASC) said Wednesday it will seek public comment on a proposal to adopt “comply or explain” rules requiring companies to explain their policies regarding the representation of women on their boards and executive positions, including whether they have internal targets for women.

The rule, open for comment until Oct. 14, would not require companies to add women to their ranks or adopt a diversity policy, but would require them to explain why they have opted not to have one. Companies would also have to report on the proportion of women on their boards and in executive officer roles.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian