Normes d’encadrement | Page 2

Me Errol Cohen publie un intéressant article dans Les Échos.fr sur l’entreprise à mission : « La société à mission : un fonctionnement spécifique, Fiscalité et droit des entreprises » (13 août 2020).

Extrait :

La société à mission : un fonctionnement spécifique, Fiscalité et droit des entreprises

Le statut de société à mission s’appuie sur les travaux académiques relatifs à la société à objet social étendu. Mais il les adapte aux nouvelles dispositions relatives à la « raison d’être » . Ce dernier étage de la fusée regroupe essentiellement les principes suivants : une définition de la mission, étendant l’objet social, marquant l’engagement de l’entreprise et assurant l’opposabilité de la mission ; une mission qui intègre des objectifs d’ordre social et environnemental, propres à l’entreprise, et non réductibles au profit ; une mission qui constitue un outil d’ancrage de l’entreprise dans son environnement, ses écosystèmes et plus largement dans le cours de l’histoire, et qui vient donc donner un déploiement plus approfondi et plus opérationnel à la « raison d’être » ; un principe de contrôle interne de cet engagement par un comité de mission dont la composition reflète les différentes parties inscrites dans la mission, et notamment un salarié. Les parties prenantes de l’entreprise (sans que cette liste soit exhaustive, clients, fournisseurs, salariés, famille de ceux-ci, le territoire où ils se trouvent, etc.) ne sont pas explicitement mentionnées dans le texte de la « société à mission » mais elles sont clairement évoquées dans les débats parlementaires.

La notion de mission englobe aussi indirectement les principes suivants : la prise en compte du temps long, de l’innovation et de la recherche ; le développement pérenne, comme fondement de l’entreprise et de son engagement collectif ; la restauration de la liberté d’arbitrage du dirigeant et des instances de direction ; l’arbitrage éclairé dans le cadre de la mission.

La raison d’être, tout comme la mission, se distingue de la vocation habituelle de la société ou d’une activité qui se justifierait avant tout par son but lucratif. Elles doivent marquer des « avancées » et des engagements par rapport à l’objet social habituel, et donc impliquer des engagements nouveaux et des transformations à venir promises à certaines parties. Raison d’être et mission sont clairement des vecteurs de mouvement et de progrès collectif. Certes, des particularismes dans l’activité ou dans le déploiement d’une société peuvent rendre plus aisé le passage en société à mission, mais ils ne peuvent pour autant lui servir de substitut.

Indépendance du dirigeant face aux actionnaires

L’établissement d’une mission invite les dirigeants, dans leurs relations avec les actionnaires et les parties prenantes, à une prise de conscience plus large de leur action, des énergies à libérer et des partenaires à prendre en compte. La mission sera une vigoureuse incitation à projeter les valeurs sociales, environnementales et d’innovation dans un monde plus responsable et riche de sens. Ce plaidoyer peut paraître « idéaliste », mais il ne l’est en rien.

Il est facile de constater que les entreprises sont devenues des acteurs fondamentaux de nos sociétés, tant par la croissance économique et sociale qu’elles peuvent amener que par les impacts négatifs (pollutions, inégalités…) qu’elles peuvent induire.

Rappelons que ce qui s’est révélé être un parti pris idéaliste, c’était l’idée que les entreprises par la seule prise en compte de leur « intérêt bien compris » adopteraient spontanément des démarches engagées en faveur d’une responsabilité sociale et environnementale accrue. Or – et c’est là que se cachait l’idéalisme – c’était supposer que les dirigeants ont toujours les moyens de résister face aux exigences et aux pressions en termes de valeur actionnariale ; la recherche a bien montré que cette résistance, si elle existe, ne dure pas longtemps. Car l’univers des actionnaires est lui-même un univers en mouvement rapide.

Et si certains actionnaires peuvent être attentifs à l’intérêt à long terme de l’entreprise, encore faut-il que cette stratégie ne joue pas trop sur le cours des actions, car une baisse attirerait immédiatement des fonds activistes avides d’opérations aux effets rapides et qui rapportent gros. Paradoxalement, dans un monde dominé par la valeur actionnariale et les codes de gouvernance standards, un comportement vertueux vulnérabilise l’entreprise et peut la soumettre à des risques difficilement soutenables. Ce qui revient simplement à dire que l’idéalisme réside surtout dans l’idée que les dirigeants peuvent installer un comportement responsable envers et contre tous les mécanismes juridiques et normatifs actuels.

La société à mission permet de sortir du paradoxe de la vertu contre-productive et vulnérabilisante. Elle offre un schéma de gouvernance alternatif et cohérent qui soutient le dirigeant en réorganisant ses relations avec les actionnaires et les parties prenantes.L’auteur

À la prochaine…

Dans « Beware of the Panacea of Stakeholder-friendly Corporate Purposes », le professeur Marco Ventoruzzo propose une critique sévèrement de l’ouverture de la gouvernance d’entreprise aux parties prenantes (Oxford Business Law Blog, 13 avril 2020). À réfléchir…

Extrait :

In this short essay (…), I take issue with the relevance and effectiveness of ’corporate purpose’ as a form of private ordering (eg, as a bylaws provision), or in other sources of soft-law (self-regulation in corporate governance codes, declarations of business associations, etc). I challenge whether these are, in fact, effective tools to induce greater commitment toward stakeholders.

(…) My possible disagreement with Mayer and other similar approaches and initiatives—or, more precisely, with a possible reading of these approaches and initiatives—lays in the excessive trust and emphasis that has been reserved to formulas concerning the purpose of the corporation and their possible consequences. Mayer argues that the corporate contract should include a reference to stakeholders and general social interests beyond value for shareholders, suggesting that this simple trick would have a meaningful impact on business conduct.

(…) The reasons are obvious.

First, these formulas are so broad, vague and ephemeral that they cannot possibly represent a compass for corporate action; they cannot provide meaningful guidance for virtually any specific corporate decision that implies a (legitimate) tradeoff between the interests of different stakeholders. Also, as precedents show, these formulas can be used even less to invoke the violation of directors’ duties and their liability. This conclusion is inevitable because the very essence of the agency relationship, the crucial function of a director or executive, is exactly mediating and balancing the different and often conflicting interests that converge on the corporation in an uncertain and evolving scenario. The idea of constraining the necessary discretion of directors within the boundaries of a simple purpose declaration is no better than the idea of writing in the contract with a painter that her work must be a masterpiece. Such an attempted shortcut to real value is self-evidently flawed.

Second, multiplying the goals and interests that directors must or can pursue, if it can have any effect at all, by definition increases their flexibility and discretion and makes it easier to justify, ex ante and ex post, very different choices. Without being cynical, from this perspective it is not surprising that these formulas are often welcomed, if not sponsored, by business associations and interest groups linked to managers, executives and entrenched shareholders.

Third, self-regulation and private ordering are often a way to avoid or delay the adoption of more stringent statutory or regulatory provisions. The former might be more or less effective, but they might also create an illusion of responsibility. The risk of putting too much trust into the beneficial consequences of these formulas is a disregard for more biting mandatory provisions, which may be necessary to avoid externalities and other market failures.

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Les entreprises et les banques canadiennes semblent avoir fait le choix de la RSE et des parties prenantes comme l’illustre cet article : « Canadian companies can care about more than profit, and could pay a price if they don’t «  (Financial Post, 3 juin 2020).

Extrait :

It is not the first time a leader with a fiduciary responsibility waded into the public discourse. In January, Michael McCain, chief executive of Maple Leaf Foods Inc., used Twitter to criticize the White House for creating geopolitical conditions that led to Iran’s military destroying a Ukrainian airliner carrying more than 170 people, including 55 Canadian citizens and 30 permanent residents.  

(…) Corporate stances on environmental, social and political issues are becoming more common. And in Canada, a change to corporate law last year freed executives of some companies to expand their mandates beyond simply maximizing shareholder returns without fear of legal reprisal.

(…) “Companies and investors are beginning to recognize that what happens out there in the real world is arguably even more important than what happens on their spreadsheets and terminals,” said Kevin Thomas, chief executive of the Shareholder Association for Research and Education, a not-for-profit group focused on responsible investing. 

The responses by the heads of some of Canada’s biggest companies to the protests in the United States, as well as their various attempts to assist customers during the coronavirus pandemic, come as companies are also embracing more “stakeholder” capitalism, wherein the raison d’être for firms is more than just returning cash to shareholders. 

(…) Stakeholder capitalism was the theme of this year’s World Economic Forum’s gathering in Davos, Switzerland, where one of Masrani’s peers, Royal Bank of Canada chief executive Dave McKay, was in attendance. 

“As trust in governments wanes, and the complexity of society’s problems grows, companies are charting their own course on environment, social and governance issues, to maintain public confidence in business and ensure the prosperity of communities that business serves,” McKay wrote in January. 

On Tuesday, McKay published a post on LinkedIn stating he was “personally outraged at the senseless and tragic deaths in the U.S., which are clearly symptomatic of ongoing racial discrimination and injustice, and I know we are not immune to it in Canada.”

A year ago, Parliament passed legislation that amended the Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA), which lays out the legal and regulatory framework for thousands of federally incorporated firms, to spell out in greater detail how directors and company officers could meet their legal responsibility to “act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation.”

The updated law states that directors and officers may consider shareholders, as well as employees, retirees, creditors, consumers and governments when setting corporate strategy. The law also now states that both the environment and “the long-term interests of the corporation” can be taken into consideration.

À la prochaine…

Martin Lipton, William Savitt et Karessa L. Cain ont publié sur le Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance un intéressant papier intitulé : « On the Purpose of the Corporation » (27 mai 2020).

Extrait :

The growing view that corporations should take into account environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues in running their businesses, and resistance from those who believe that companies should be managed solely to maximize share price, has intensified the focus on the more fundamental question of corporate governance: what is the purpose of the corporation?

The question has elicited an immense range of proposed answers. The British Academy’s Future of the Corporation Project, led by Colin Mayer, suggests that the purpose of the corporation is to provide profitable solutions to problems of people and planet, while not causing harm. The Business Roundtable has articulated a fundamental commitment of corporations to deliver value to all stakeholders, each of whom is essential to the corporation’s success. Each of the major US-based index funds has also expressed their views about the purpose of the corporations in which they invest, which, considered collectively, can be summarized as the pursuit of sustainable business strategies that take into account ESG factors in order to drive long-term value creation. On the other hand, the Council of Institutional Investors, some leading economists and law professors, and some activist hedge funds and other active investors continue to advocate a narrow scope of corporate purpose that is focused exclusively on maximizing shareholder value. The Covid-19 pandemic has brought into sharp focus the inequality in our society that, in considerable measure, is attributable to maximizing shareholder value at the expense of employees and communities.

For our part, we have supported stakeholder governance for over 40 years—first, to empower boards of directors to reject opportunistic takeover bids by corporate raiders, and later to combat short-termism and ensure that directors maintain the flexibility to invest for long-term growth and innovation. We continue to advise corporations and their boards that they may exercise their business judgment to manage for the benefit of all stakeholders over the long term.

As the pandemic disrupts settled expectations and provokes fresh perspectives, we believe it is critical to the vitality of our economic system for corporations—and the asset managers and investors who hold their shares—to recognize that ESG and stakeholder purpose are necessary elements of sustainable business success, and to engage on a regular basis to rationalize their views as to governance and stewardship. The roadmap for this shared understanding is elaborated in The New Paradigm: A Roadmap for an Implied Corporate Governance Partnership Between Corporations and Investors to Achieve Sustainable Long-Term Investment and Growth, which we developed for the World Economic Forum in 2016.

These imperatives lead us to a simple formulation of corporate purpose:

The purpose of a corporation is to conduct a lawful, ethical, profitable and sustainable business in order to create value over the long-term, which requires consideration of the stakeholders that are critical to its success (shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, creditors and communities), as determined by the corporation and the board of directors using its business judgment and with regular engagement with shareholders, who are essential partners in supporting the corporation’s pursuit of this mission.

This conception of purpose is broad enough to apply to every business entity but at the same time supplies clear principles for action and engagement. The basic objective of sustainable profitability recognizes that the purpose of for-profit corporations is to create value for investors. The requirement of lawful and ethical conduct ensures minimum standards of corporate social compliance. Going further, the broader mandate to take into account corporate stakeholders—including communities, which is not limited to local communities, but comprises society and the economy at large—directs boards to exercise their business judgment within the scope of this broader responsibility. The requirement of regular shareholder engagement acknowledges accountability to investors, but also shared responsibility with shareholders for responsible long-term corporate stewardship.

Fulfilling this purpose will require different approaches for each corporation, dependent on its industry, history, governance and other factors. We expect that board committees—focusing on stakeholders, ESG issues and the stewardship obligations of shareholders—may be useful or even necessary for some companies. But for all the differences among companies, there is an important unifying commonality: corporate action, taken against the backdrop of this view of corporate purpose, will be fully protected by the business judgment rule, so long as it reflects the decisions of unconflicted directors acting upon careful deliberation.

Executed in this way, stakeholder governance is more consistent with a value-creation mandate than the shareholder primacy model. Directors and managers enjoy broad authority to act for the corporate entity they represent, over the long term, balancing its many rights and obligations and taking into account both risks and opportunities, in regular consultation with shareholders. Directors will not be forced to act as if any one interest trumps all others, with potentially destructive consequences, but will instead have latitude to make decisions that reasonably balance the interests of all constituencies and operate to the benefit of the sustainable, long-term business success of the corporation as a whole.

À la prochaine…

En voilà tout un titre ! Le professeur Brian Cheffins livre tout un article sur SSRN : « Brian R. Cheffins, « Stop Blaming Milton Friedman! », 11 mars 2020, University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 9/2020.

Résumé :

A 1970 New York Times essay on corporate social responsibility by Milton Friedman is often said to have launched a shareholder-focused reorientation of managerial priorities in America’s public companies. The essay correspondingly is a primary target of those critical of a shareholder-centric approach to corporate governance. This paper argues that it is erroneous to blame (or credit) Milton Friedman for the rise of shareholder primacy in corporate America. In order for Friedman’s views to be as influential as has been assumed, his essay should have constituted a fundamental break from prevailing thinking that changed minds with some alacrity. In fact, what Friedman said was largely familiar to readers in 1970 and his essay did little to change managerial priorities at that point in time. The shareholder-first mentality that would come to dominate in corporate America would only take hold in the mid-1980s. This occurred due to an unprecedented wave of hostile takeovers rather than anything Friedman said and was sustained by a dramatic shift in favor of incentive-laden executive pay. Correspondingly, the time has come to stop blaming him for America’s shareholder-oriented capitalism.

À la prochaine…