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Entreprises et parties prenantes : focus sur les Pays-Bas

Le 2 août 2020, Christiaan de Brauw a publié un intéressant billet sur l’Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance sous le titre « The Dutch Stakeholder Experience ».

Extrait :

Lessons learned

The Dutch experience shows that the following lessons are key to make the stakeholder-oriented governance model work in practice.

Embed a clear stakeholder mission in the fiduciary duties of the board

To have a real stakeholder model, the board must have a duty to act in the interests of the business and all the stakeholders, not only the shareholders. In shareholder models there may be some room to consider stakeholder interests. For example, in Delaware and various other US states, the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders may be considered in the context of achieving overall long-term shareholder value creation. In US states with constituency statutes, the board’s discretion is preserved: the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders can be, but do not have to be, taken into account. A meaningful stakeholder model requires the board to act in the interests of the business and all stakeholders. This is a “shall” duty, in the words of Leo Strine and Robert Eccles (see Purpose With Meaning: A Practical Way Forward, Robert G. Eccles, Leo E. Strine and Timothy Youmans, May 16, 2020). Rather than allowing for the possibility that all stakeholders’ interests will be taken into account; it should create a real duty to do so. Since 1971, boards of Dutch companies have had such a “shall” duty to follow a stakeholder mission, similar to that of a benefit corporation in, for example, Delaware.

The stakeholder duty must be clear and realistic for boards in the economic environment in which they operate. To define the contours of such a mission in a clear and practical way is not easy, as the journey of the Dutch stakeholder model shows. Today, the Netherlands has a meaningful and realistically defined fiduciary duty for boards. The primary duty is to promote the sustainable success of the business, focused on long-term value creation, while taking into account the interests of all stakeholders and ESG and similar sustainability perspectives. These principles are broadly similar to the corporate purpose and mission proposed by Martin Lipton and others (see On the Purpose of the Corporation, Martin Lipton, William Savitt and Karessa L. Cain, posted May 27, 2020).

Critics of the stakeholder model sometimes point to the ambiguity and lack of clarity of such a pluralistic model. The developments of the Dutch stakeholder model since its inception show that a pluralistic model can work in practice. By now, Dutch boards’ overriding task is adequately clear and aligned with what is typically expected of a company’s executives: pursuing the strategic direction that will most likely result in long-term and sustainable business success. The Dutch stakeholder model also has a workable roadmap to deal with stakeholders’ interests, particularly if they diverge or cannot all be protected fully at the same time, which necessarily results in trade-offs between stakeholders. A realistic approach to governance acknowledges that a stakeholder model does not mean that boards can or should seek to maximize value for all the stakeholders equally and at the same time. It is simply unrealistic to simultaneously pay (and progressively increase) dividends, increase wages and improve contract terms, while also promoting the success of the business. The Dutch interpretation of the stakeholder model, as developed through practice over decades, boils down to the focus on the sustainable success of the business and long-term value creation. As said above, stakeholders are protected by the board’s duty to prevent disproportionate or unnecessary harm to any class of stakeholders. Boards should avoid or mitigate such harm, for example, by agreeing “non-financial covenants” in a takeover. This makes sense as a way to protect stakeholder interests in a realistic manner, much more so than merely requiring boards—without any further guidance—to create value for all the stakeholders.

A stakeholder-oriented model should also be modern and flexible enough to address and incorporate important developments. The Dutch model is especially well positioned to embrace ESG and similar sustainability perspectives. For example, the Dutch company DSM has successfully illustrated this, while being profitable and attractive for investors. There is growing appreciation that being a frontrunner in ESG is required for sustainable business success. In addition to the fact that ESG is required for continuity of the business model and can often give a company a competitive edge, stakeholders increasingly require it. Simply “doing the right thing”, as an independent corporate goal, is more and more seen as important by (new millennial) employees, customers, institutional investors and other stakeholders.

There is no standard test to determine whether a business has achieved sustainable success. There will be different ways to achieve and measure success for different companies, depending on the respective circumstances. Therefore, the test will always have to be bespoke, implemented by the board and explained to stakeholders.

The Dutch stakeholder model has proven to work quite well in times of crisis, such as today’s Covid-19 crisis, as it bolsters the board’s focus on the survival and continuity of the business. The board must first assess whether there is a realistic chance of survival and continuity of the business. If not, and if insolvency becomes imminent, the board’s duties transform to focus on creditors’ interests, such as preventing wrongful trading and the winding down or restarting of the business in line with applicable insolvency/restructuring proceedings. Driven by the economic reality and the need to survive, in times of crisis, boards typically have more freedom to do what it takes to survive: from pursuing liquidity enhancing measures, implementing reorganizations, suspending dividends to shareholders and payments to creditors and so on. The success of the business remains the overriding aim, and in some cases harm to one or more classes of stakeholders may need to be accepted. In addition, in a true stakeholder model, in times of crisis there may not be sympathy for corporate raiders or activists (so-called “corona profiteers” in the current case) who want to buy listed companies on the cheap. A just say not now defense in addition to the just say no defense will readily be available for boards who are occupied with dealing with the crisis and revaluating the best strategic direction. This idea that during the Covid-crisis protection against activists and hostile bidders may be needed seems to be understood as well by, for example, ISS and Glass Lewis, evidenced by their willingness to accept new poison pills for a one year duration (see, for example, ISS and Glass Lewis Guidances on Poison Pills during COVID-19 Pandemic, Paul J. Shim, James E. Langston, and Charles W. Allen, posted on April 26, 2020).

Teeth to protect the stakeholder mission and appropriate checks and balances

The Netherlands has adopted a model in which matters of strategy are the prerogative of the executive directors under supervision of the non-executive directors or, in the still widely used two-tier system, of the management board under supervision of the supervisory board. Similar to the discretion afforded to directors under Delaware’s business judgment rule, a Dutch board has a lot of freedom to choose the strategic direction of the company. In a dispute, the amount of care taken by the board in the decision-making process will be scrutinized by courts, but normally objectively reasonable decisions will be respected. In the Dutch model the board is the captain of the ship; it is best equipped to determine the course for the business and take difficult decisions on how to serve the interests of stakeholders. Generally, the board has no obligation to consult with, or get the approval of, the shareholders in advance of a decision.

At the same time, in recognition of the significant power that boards have in the Dutch stakeholder model, there should be checks and balances to ensure the board’s powers are exercised in a careful manner, without conflicts of interest and without entrenchment. Non-executive/supervisory directors will need to exercise critical and hands-on oversight, particularly when there are potential conflicts of interest. Further, shareholders and other stakeholders are entitled to hold boards to account: boards need to be able to explain their strategic decisions. Shareholders can use their shareholder rights to express their opinions and preferences. Shareholders can also pursue the dismissal of failing and entrenched boards. Boards need regular renewed shareholder mandates through reappointments. The courts are the ultimate guardian of the stakeholder model. The Dutch Enterprise Chamber at the Amsterdam Court of Appeals, which operates in a comparable manner to the Delaware Chancery Court, is an efficient and expert referee of last resort.

The stakeholder model should not convert to a shareholder model in takeover scenarios. The board should focus on whether a takeover is the best strategic option and take into account the consequences for all the stakeholders. In most cases, the best strategic direction for the business will create the highest valuation of the business. But, and this is a real difference with shareholder models, it should be acknowledged that the stand-alone (or other best strategic) option can be different from the strategic option favored by a majority of the shareholders and the option that creates the most shareholder value. This principle was confirmed by the Dutch Enterprise Chamber in 2017 in the AkzoNobel case.

A meaningful stakeholder model requires teeth. The right governance structures need to be put in place to create and protect the long-term stakeholder mission in the face of short-term market pressure. The reality—in the Netherlands as well as in the US—is that shareholders are the most powerful constituency in the stakeholder universe, with the authority to replace the board. In Dutch practice, various countervailing measures can be used to protect the stakeholder mission. A commonly used instrument is the independent protection foundation, the Dutch poison pill. The independent foundation can exercise a call option and acquire and vote on preference shares. It can neutralize the newly acquired voting power of hostile bidders or activists and is effective against actions geared at replacing the board, including a proxy fight. Once the threat no longer exists, the preference shares are cancelled. These measures have been effective, for example, against hostile approaches of America Movil for KPN (2013) and Teva for Mylan (2015).

Foster a stakeholder mindset, governance and environment

Perhaps the most important prerequisite for a well-functioning stakeholder model is the actual mindset of executives and directors. This mindset drives how they will use their stakeholder powers. Fiduciary duties—also in a stakeholder model—are “open norms” and leave a lot of freedom to boards to pursue the strategic direction and to use their authority as they deem fit. The prevailing spirit and opinions about governance are important, as they influence how powers are interpreted and exercised. As an example, the Dutch requirement that boards need to act in the interest of the company and its business dates from 1971, but that did not prevent boards in the 2000s from seeing shareholders as the first among equals. Today, the body of ideas about governance in the developed world is tending to converge towards stakeholder-oriented governance. This seems to indicate a fundamental change in mindset, not merely a fashionable trend or lip service. Board members with a stakeholder conviction should not be afraid to follow their mission, even if it runs counter to past experience or faces shareholder opposition. Of course, the future will hold the ultimate test for the stakeholder model. Can it, in practice, deliver on its promise to create sustainable success and long-term value and provide better protection for stakeholders? If so, this will create a positive feedback loop in which more boards embrace it.

Stakeholder-based governance models remain works in progress. In order to succeed in the long term, models that grant boards the authority to determine the strategy need to stay viable and attractive for shareholders. Going forward, boards following a stakeholder-based model will likely need to focus more on accountability, for example by concretely substantiating their strategic plans and goals and, where possible, providing the relevant metrics to measure their achievements. In reality, stakeholder models are already attractive for foreign investors: about 90% of investors in Dutch listed companies are US or UK investors. In addition, developments in the definition of the corporate purpose will further refine the stakeholder model. In the Netherlands, there has been a call to action by 25 corporate law professors who argue that companies should act as responsible corporate citizens and should articulate a clear corporate purpose.

To make stakeholder governance work, ideally, all stakeholders are committed to the same mission. It is encouraging that key institutional investors are embracing long-term value creation and the consideration of other stakeholders’ interests, for instance by supporting the New Paradigm model of corporate governance and stewardship codes to that effect. However, the “proof of the pudding” is whether boards can continue to walk the stakeholder talk and pursue the long-term view in the face of short-term pressure, either through generally accepted goals and behavior or, if necessary, countervailing governance arrangements. Today, it is still far from certain whether institutional investors will reject pursuing a short-term takeover premium, even where they consider the offer to be undervalued or not supportive of long-term value creation. Annual bonuses of the deciding fund manager may depend on accepting that offer. Until the behavior of investors in such scenarios respects the principle of long-term value creation, appropriate governance protection is important to prevent a legal pathway for shareholders to impose their short-term goals. Therefore, even in jurisdictions where stakeholder-based approaches have been embraced, and are actually pursued by boards, governance arrangements might need to be changed to make the stakeholder mission work in practice. Clear guidance for boards is needed on what the stakeholder mission is and how to deal with stakeholders’ interests, as well as catering for adequate powers and protection for boards.

The Dutch model, which requires a company to be business success-driven, have a “shall duty” to stakeholders that applies even in a sale of the company, and that recognizes that corporations are dependent on stakeholders for success and have a corresponding responsibility to stakeholders, has been demonstrated to be consistent with a high-functioning economy. By highlighting the Dutch system, however, I do not mean to claim that it is unique. For policymakers who are considering the merits of a stakeholder-based governance model, the Dutch system should be seen as one example among many corporate governance systems in successful market economies (such as Germany) that embrace this form of stakeholder-based governance. There is likely no one-size-fits-all approach; each jurisdiction should find the tailor-made model that works best for it, like perhaps the introduction of the corporate purpose in the UK and France. In any event, there is a great benefit in exchanging ideas and learning from experiences in different jurisdictions to find common ground and best practices in order to increase the acceptance and appreciation of stakeholder-oriented governance models.

US governance practices have been, and are, influential around the world. In the 2000s the pendulum in developed countries, including to some extent in the Netherlands, clearly swung in the direction of shareholder-centric governance as championed in the US. In the current environment, if the US system’s focus on shareholders is not adjusted to protect stakeholder interests, it may over time perhaps become an outlier among many of the world’s leading market economies that in one way or the other have adopted a stakeholder approach. Adjustment towards stakeholder governance seems certainly possible in the US, for example through the emerging model of corporate governance, the Delaware Public Benefit Corporation. The benefit corporation seems to have many if not all of the key attributes of the Dutch system and could provide a promising path forward if American corporate governance is to change in a way that makes the US model truly focused on the long-term value for all stakeholders. The question for US advocates of stakeholder governance is whether they will embrace it, or adopt another effective governance change, and make their commitment to respect stakeholders rea

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La Benefit corporation adoptée en Colombie-Britannique

En voilà une nouvelle ! La province de Colombie-Britannique vient de faire place à une Benefit Corporation. Certaines modifications apportées à la Business Corporations Act de la Colombie-Britannique (la « BCBCA ») qui vont entrer en vigueur le 30 juin 2020 permettent la création d’un nouveau sous-type de société, la « société d’intérêt social » (la benefit company). La Colombie-Britannique est le premier territoire canadien à adopter ce concept qui n’est pourtant pas nouveau aux États-Unis. Pas sûr que ce choix soit heureux dans la mesure où la 3C existait déjà et qu’elle se révèle sans doute plus porteuse pour la RSE…

Pour en savoir plus : « Une première au Canada : les sociétés d’« intérêt social » arrivent en Colombie-Britannique » (Stikeman Elliott, 5 juin 2020)

Extrait :

The major distinctions between a B.C. benefit company and other B.C. companies are as follows:

  • Notice of articles: The benefit company’s notice of articles will contain the following statement (the benefit statement”):

This company is a benefit company and, as such, is committed to conducting its business in a responsible and sustainable manner and promoting one or more public benefits.

  • Articles: The benefit company’s articles must include a provision that specifies the public benefits to be promoted (benefit provision). “Public benefit” refers to something that has a positive effect that benefits (i) a class of persons other than shareholders of the company in their capacity as shareholders, or a class of communities or organizations, or (ii) the environment. The positive effect can be:
    • Artistic
    • Charitable
    • Cultural
    • Economic
    • Educational
    • Environmental
    • Literary
    • Medical
    • Religious
    • Scientific
    • Technological
  • Alterations: Any decision to adopt or eliminate the benefit statement (i.e. to alter the company’s status as a benefit company) must be approved by a special resolution of the voting shareholders. Both voting and non-voting shareholders of the benefit company are entitled to dissent rights with respect to such a change or to a change in the benefit provision.
  • Benefit report: Each year, the benefit company must prepare, provide to its shareholders and post on its website (if it has one) a report (benefit report) that assesses the company’s performance in carrying out the commitments set out in the company’s benefit provision compared to a third-party standard. The report needs to include information about the process and rationale for selecting or changing the relevant third-party standard. Regulations may be enacted that provide more details about the third-party standard and the contents of the benefit report.
  • Penalties relating to the benefit report: It will be an offence if the directors of the benefit company do not prepare and post the benefit report as required by the BCBCA and the regulations. There is a potential fine of up to $2,000 for individuals or $5,000 for persons other than individuals.
  • Augmented fiduciary duty: The directors and officers of a benefit company will be required to act honestly and in good faith with a view to conducting the business in a responsible and sustainable manner and promoting the public benefits that the company has identified in its benefit provision. They must balance that public benefits duty against their duties to the company. (There is currently no guidance with respect to achieving this balance.) However, the amendments state that the public benefits duty does not create a duty on the part of directors or officers to persons who are affected by the company’s conduct or who would be personally benefitted by it.
  • Enforcement and remedies where duty breached: Several significant provisions in the amendments relate to enforcement and remedies:
    • Shareholders are the only persons who are able to bring an action against a BCBCA benefit company’s directors and officers over an alleged violation of their duty relating to public benefits;
    • Only shareholders that, in the aggregate, hold at least 2% of the company’s issued shares may bring such an action (in the case of a public company, a $2 million shareholding, in the aggregate, will also suffice); and
    • The court may not order monetary damages in relation to a breach of that duty. Other remedies, such as removal or a direction to comply, would still be available.

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Devoir de prudence des administrateurs en contexte de COVID-19

Lecture de Leon Yehuda Anidjar sur le devoir de prudence et son intérêt dans le contexte de la COVID-19 : « A Firm-Specific View of Directors’ Duty of Care in Times of Global Epidemic Crisis » (Oxford Business Law Blog, 20 mai 2020).

Extrait :

In a recent paper, I discuss the directors’ duty of care in times of financial distress from a global perspective and focus on directors’ roles in different types of SMEs. I argue that while the economic crunch of the years 2007–2009 was a direct result of large governance deficiencies (Bruner, 2011), which generated various reforms that reinforced the monitoring role of directors, the current crisis will highlight the significance of the directors’ managerial roles. Accordingly, we can expect jurists and policymakers to design numerous regulatory reforms that will reinforce their advisory role in a fashion that will assist them in tackling the severe consequences of our current times. Moreover, supervisory authorities may decrease the regulatory burden imposed on directors to allow them to invest considerable managerial resources for supporting the survival of companies (as Enriques demonstrates concerning corporate law, and Chiu et al point out regarding financial regulation). 

Furthermore, I argue that the civil law on directors’ duty of care provides boards with a broader scope of discretion to confront the challenges associated with COVID-19 than the Anglo-American law. Delaware corporate law, for instance, posits that since directors, rather than shareholders, manage the affairs of the corporation, they should be protected by the business judgment rule. However, a recent empirical study demonstrated that challenges to business judgment in English and Welsh cases have been increasingly successful from the mid-nineteenth century until the present, with a marked increase in legal liability since 2007. This indicates that the proposition that English courts will generally not review directors’ business decisions is incorrect (Keay et al, 2020). In contrast, under the law applicable in countries such as Germany, France, Italy, and the Netherlands, the standard of care cannot be determined absolutely: it must address the specific situation for which the question of the due diligence of organ dealing arises. Accordingly, this standard is at the same time objective and relative, ie, a company comparable in size, business, and the economic situation shall serve as a model (as illustrated by, the Cancun ruling of the Dutch Supreme Court).

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Directors’ Duty under UK Law to Promote the Success of the Company during the COVID-19 Pandemic

Le 30 avril 2020, Philip Gavin s’est interrogé sur l’intérêt de l’article 172 du Company Act pour les administrateurs et dirigeants dans le contexte de la COVID-19 : « Directors’ Duty under UK Law to Promote the Success of the Company during the COVID-19 Pandemic » (Oxford Business Law Blog).

Extrait :

A nuance to director’s duties in the United Kingdom is the expansive statutory delineation of s 172, which endows numerous considerations for directors when acting to promote the success of the company for the benefit of members. Given the unique circumstances of the present-day commercial sphere and the more humanitarian demands being put to businesses, having a statutory foundation upon which to base non-traditional business strategies may assist effective decision-making and financial reporting.

The initial three considerations enshrined within s 172 are (a) the likely long term consequences of any decision, (b) the interests of employees and (c) the need to foster business relationships with suppliers, customers and others. These factors are of particular relevance for firms who sought justification for voluntary shutdown of businesses prior to the wider governmental shutdown.

(…)

Where production changes become quasi-humanitarian in tone and companies internalise cost in the interim, directors may seek justification through s 172(1)(d) and (e), these being the impact on the community and the desirability of maintaining high business standards respectively.  Accordingly, directors can seek to frame these quasi-humanitarian efforts in long-term reputational terms, thereby engendering prospective communitarian goodwill.

Furthermore, as political pressure mounts, boards may evaluate reputational factors not simply in terms of market reputation, but also in terms of Governmental co-operation. This is particularly so where companies face increased intervention by public authorities through the Civil Contingencies Act. Comparatively, in a recent memorandum the Trump administration has attempted to exert control over the distribution of ventilators by the multinational conglomerate 3M. Cautious of such intervention occurring within their own enterprises, companies may shift business operations to such an extent to signal their compliance and co-operation with public authorities, thereby disincentivising the wholesale overrule of board discretion. 

Within jurisdictions with vaguer duties to act bona fide in the best interests of the company (Delaware, Australia, Ireland), directors may still engage in such quasi-humanitarian efforts. Nevertheless, utilising s 172 to steer directorial judgment may assist effective decision-making, and furthermore guide financial reporting, which mandates s 172 director’s statements.  Given that the tenor of 2020 reports will be likely dominated by COVID-19, UK directors will benefit from the homogenising structure of s 172 when making such disclosures in the coming months.

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actualités canadiennes devoirs des administrateurs Gouvernance mission et composition du conseil d'administration Normes d'encadrement normes de droit objectifs de l'entreprise

COVID et gouvernance d’entreprise : mission des CA

Merci au cabinet Stikeman Elliott pour ce billet daté du 24 avril 2020 intitulé « COVID et gouvernance d’entreprise : une mission plus large pour les conseils d’administration ». Un précieux éclairage sur ce qui va changer pour les CA avec la COVID-19…

Extrait :

Cette discussion aborde les principaux défis auxquels sont confrontés les chefs d’entreprise canadiens à l’approche de la phase de réouverture :

se concentrer sur les véritables enjeux; 

veiller à la gestion immédiate des crises et à la préparation du conseil d’administration; 

repenser la stratégie et la gestion des risques;

repenser les cadres incitatifs; et

repenser l’objectif de l’entreprise.

Comme en conclut l’article, cette crise redéfinira une grande partie de ce que nous considérons comme étant de la « bonne gouvernance ». Les conseils d’administration, en particulier, doivent élargir leurs missions pour s’assurer que leurs entreprises sont préparées à la nouvelle réalité qui les attend.

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Rappel sur les devoirs du CA

Bonjour à toutes et à tous, un rappel bienvenu du cabinet Stein Monast à propos du rôle et des obligations du CA : « Rappel du rôle et des obligations des administrateurs ».

Aux termes de la Loi canadienne sur les sociétés par actions (Canada) (« LCSA ») et de la Loi sur les sociétés par actions (Québec) (« LSA »), en plus d’agir avec intégrité et bonne foi, et avec le soin, la diligence et la compétence d’une personne prudente en pareilles circonstances, l’administrateur et le dirigeant d’une société ont l’obligation d’agir « avec pour seul objectif le bien de la société, personne distincte, sans tenir compte des intérêts d’aucune autre personne, groupe ou entité. » [nous soulignons]3.

En effet, « l’administrateur ne doit défendre ni l’intérêt du groupe d’actionnaires qui l’a spécialement désigné, ni celui de la majorité des actionnaires à qui il doit son élection, ni celui de la catégorie distincte d’actionnaires qui l’a élu, le cas échéant, ni même celui de la totalité des actionnaires. Les administrateurs ne sont en effet pas mandataires des actionnaires : la loi dit expressément qu’ils sont mandataires de la société »4, principe que vient codifier le Code civil du Québec à l’article 321 qui se lit comme suit :

« 321 L’administrateur est considéré comme mandataire de la personne morale. Il doit, dans l’exercice de ses fonctions, respecter les obligations que la loi, l’acte constitutif et les règlements lui imposent et agir dans les limites des pouvoirs qui lui sont conférés. » [nous soulignons].

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actualités internationales devoirs des administrateurs Gouvernance normes de droit Nouvelles diverses objectifs de l'entreprise Responsabilité sociale des entreprises Valeur actionnariale vs. sociétale

Loi PACTE : la réflexion continue

Bel article de Les Échos qui continue la réflexion sur la loi PACTE et le droit des sociétés : « Raison d’être, entreprise à mission, intérêt élargi… quels engagements et risques ? » (24 septembre 2019).

Extrait :

Une possible suppression du statut

Le statut de société à mission, également prévu par la loi Pacte , est plus engageant. Pour Bruno Dondero, avocat associé au sein du cabinet CMS Francis Lefebvre Avocats, la démarche est loin d’être anodine : «  Si un dirigeant se contente d’inscrire sa démarche dans les statuts, et qu’il ne fait rien pour prendre en compte les enjeux sociaux ou environnementaux dans ses choix, ou que son comportement est contraire à ses engagements, le ministère public ou toute personne intéressée, comme un fournisseur, un client ou une organisation associative, pourra demander la suppression de la mention », prévient l’avocat. Les risques qui pèsent sur le dirigeant sont-ils aussi importants pour la raison d’être ? Pas si sûr. «  Les conséquences juridiques de cette nouvelle notion sont assez incertaines. Cela dépend en partie de la façon dont la raison d’être est rédigée dans les statuts, tout en sachant que les associés pourront la modifier ou la supprimer. Plus elle est précise, plus elle sera contraignante  », estime Nicolas Borga. Mais une raison d’être définie de façon excessivement large pourrait également avoir des effets pervers tant son champ d’application serait vaste et tant elle donnerait prise à interprétation. 

Des labels pour sortir du lot

Une entreprise, dont la raison d’être serait de promouvoir le travail en France, qui déciderait de fermer une usine et de la délocaliser dans un pays où les coûts de production sont moins élevés, pourrait être chahutée. «  Une association pourrait se plaindre des effets d’une telle décision. Mais pourra-t-on reprocher à cette société d’avoir méconnu sa raison d’être lorsqu’elle sera en mesure d’établir qu’il en allait de sa survie et que son intérêt social commandait la prise d’une telle décision ? C’est improbable, poursuit Nicolas Borga. La raison d’être pourrait donc plus s’apparenter à un outil marketing. » Pour éviter qu’elle ne se limite à un effet de mode, sans lien avec la stratégie, les entreprises peuvent se tourner vers des labels. Des agréments comme Esus (entreprise solidaire d’utilité sociale), le label Lucie, ou B Corp, dont l’objectif est d’identifier et de faire progresser les entreprises qui intègrent à leurs activités des objectifs sociaux et environnementaux, vont réellement prendre de l’ampleur et devenir le moyen le plus évident de repérer les entreprises qui s’engagent.