Gouvernance | Page 2

Alors que Theresa May a fait part de son intérêt d’importer en Grande-Bretagne le système allemand, MM. Horst Eidenmüller,  Mathias Habersack, Caspar Behme et Lars Klöhn  reviennent sur la pertinence de cette proposition en jetant un regard prudent (de chercheurs !) sur ce système : « Corporate Co-Determination German-Style as a Model for the UK? » (18 juillet 2016).

On 13 July 2016, Theresa May took up office as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. Only shortly before, she had made headlines when she proposed to adopt European-style worker representation on the boards of leading companies.

Corporate co-determination hence seems to gain a certain degree of popularity with the British government – which is highly astonishing, considering that it was the UK which most fiercely fought against co-determination on a European level. It was mainly the diverging views of the UK and Germany on co-determination which have thwarted projects like the Draft Fifth Company Law Directive or the establishment of a European Private Company (Societas Privata Europaea, SPE). It is downright ironic that while the UK now shows an interest in co-determination, the concept is being questioned in Germany after decades of lying dormant. The reason for the new German discussion of co-determination are doubts regarding the compatibility of its specific form of co-determination with higher-ranking Union law. This post provides a brief overview of the most recent developments in German co-determination law that were the focus of a joint Oxford/Munich conference at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität (LMU) in Munich in March 2016.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Le blog de l’Université d’Oxford publie un très récent billet analysant sur le dilemme et la position délicate dans laquelle peut être placé l’État actionnaire : « Exercise of Shareholder Control Over a State Owned Enterprise – Comments on Comissão de Valores Mobiliários’s decision in the Eletrobras case » (par le professeur Mario Engler Pinto Junior).

The Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (CVM), the Brazilian equivalent of the SEC, has recently imposed sanctions on the Federal Government for actions taken as the controlling shareholder of the public company Eletrobras. More precisely, the sanctions were imposed on the Federal Government for voting in a general meeting to grant approval of an Elecrobras significant transaction. CVM considered that the Federal Government had a conflict of interest and should have abstained from voting in a shareholders’ meeting called to approve the renewal of the concession contract held by Eletrobras and its subsidiaries for electrical power generation.

 In Brazil, the Federal Government is also the public authority responsible for regulating the electrical sector. According to CVM, the renewal of the concession contract for electrical power generation was a related party transaction that could bring indirect economic benefits to the Federal Government.

My paper criticizes CVM’s approach, arguing that the contract renewal was a legitimate public policy decision in the context of the electrical sector as a whole.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

AccountingWeb (par Terri Sheridan, 24 juin 2016) relaie un excellent article : « Staggered Boards Impede Improvements to Audit Committees ». Cet article revient sur la pratique des stagerred board et l’effet négatif qu’elle induit sur les comités d’audit en termes de performance et d’amélioration.

The Efficacy of Shareholder Voting in Staggered and Non-Staggered Boards: The Case of Audit Committee Elections, published in the May/July issue of the American Accounting Association’s Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, indicates that staggered boards can interfere with shareholders’ goals and hinder audit committee improvements. In staggered boards, only a third of the directors are up for re-election annually, with members elected to three-year terms.

“Low shareholder approval rates in firms with nonstaggered boards are associated with improvements to audit committee structure, activity, and financial reporting quality,” the study states.

Pour rappel, en vertu du staggered board, un CA est renouvelable par tranches. Au Canada et au Québec, les dispositions 106(3) L.C.S.A. et 110 L.S.A. mentionnent que les administrateurs sont élus pour un mandat n’excédant pas trois ans, sans imposer cependant que les mandats de ces administrateurs aient à être de la même durée.  Cette pratique fait l’objet d’une sérieuse remise en question au Canada même si elle se révèle moins utilisée qu’aux États-Unis (CCGG, « Response to OSC Staff Notice 54-701: Regulatory Developments regarding Shareholder Democracy Issues », 31 mars 2011, à la p. 5).

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Critique acerbe du professeur Stephen Bainbridge sur la récente réforme française du Say on pay : « Binding say on pay coming (probably) to France: What a terrible idea » (14 juin 2016). Au regard de sa réputation et de la grande qualité de son travail dans le domaine de la gouvernance d’entreprise, cette critique est à prendre en compte.

Voici un extrait :

Professor Jeffrey Gordon argues that the U.K. experience with say on pay makes a mandatory vote a “dubious choice.” First, because individualized review of compensation schemes at the 10,000-odd U.S. reporting companies will be prohibitively expensive, activist institutional investors will probably insist on a narrow range of compensation programs that will force companies into something close to a one size fits all model. Second, because many institutional investors rely on proxy advisory firms, a very small number of gatekeepers will wield undue influence over compensation. This likely outcome seriously undercuts the case for say on pay. Proponents of say on pay claim it will help make management more accountable, but they ignore the probability that say on pay really will shift power from boards of directors not to shareholders but to advisory firms like RiskMetrics. There is good reason to think that boards are more accountable than those firms. “The most important proxy advisor, RiskMetrics, already faces conflict issues in its dual role of both advising and rating firms on corporate governance that will be greatly magnified when it begins to rate firms on their compensation plans.” Ironically, the only constraint on RiskMetrics’ conflict is the market—i.e., the possibility that they will lose credibility and therefore customers—the very force most shareholder power proponents claim does not work when it comes to holding management accountable.

 

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Belle tribune de M. Gérard Bérubé dans Le Devoir du 11 juin : « Les ravages du court terme ». Ce dernier revient sur ce qu’il appelle – à juste titre – le diktat qui se se trouve pérenniser par une politique de rémunération des hauts dirigeants basée sur des indicateurs incitant à la performance à court terme. Comme l’auteur le note, « on pense à un bénéfice par action cible et à un objectif de rendement total pour l’actionnaire ».

Le cri du coeur est venu cette semaine d’un cabinet de services comptables. PwC a dit s’inquiéter de la vision à court terme des actionnaires. PwC faisait le bilan 2015 de l’industrie minière. Une année « caractérisée par une dégringolade générale ». Les 40 plus grandes sociétés minières ont enregistré collectivement une perte nette pour la première fois. Leur capitalisation boursière a fondu de 37 %, effaçant « tous les gains réalisés durant le supercycle des matières premières ». Le cabinet d’ajouter : « À l’échelle mondiale, on s’inquiète de la vision à court terme des actionnaires, qui se concentrent sur la variation des prix des matières premières et privilégient les rendements à court terme plutôt que l’horizon de placement à long terme indispensable dans le domaine minier. »

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian