devoirs des administrateurs | Page 2

En voilà une nouvelle ! La province de Colombie-Britannique vient de faire place à une Benefit Corporation. Certaines modifications apportées à la Business Corporations Act de la Colombie-Britannique (la « BCBCA ») qui vont entrer en vigueur le 30 juin 2020 permettent la création d’un nouveau sous-type de société, la « société d’intérêt social » (la benefit company). La Colombie-Britannique est le premier territoire canadien à adopter ce concept qui n’est pourtant pas nouveau aux États-Unis. Pas sûr que ce choix soit heureux dans la mesure où la 3C existait déjà et qu’elle se révèle sans doute plus porteuse pour la RSE…

Pour en savoir plus : « Une première au Canada : les sociétés d’« intérêt social » arrivent en Colombie-Britannique » (Stikeman Elliott, 5 juin 2020)

Extrait :

The major distinctions between a B.C. benefit company and other B.C. companies are as follows:

• Notice of articles: The benefit company’s notice of articles will contain the following statement (the “benefit statement”):

This company is a benefit company and, as such, is committed to conducting its business in a responsible and sustainable manner and promoting one or more public benefits.

• Articles: The benefit company’s articles must include a provision that specifies the public benefits to be promoted (“benefit provision”). “Public benefit” refers to something that has a positive effect that benefits (i) a class of persons other than shareholders of the company in their capacity as shareholders, or a class of communities or organizations, or (ii) the environment. The positive effect can be:
  • Artistic
  • Charitable
  • Cultural
  • Economic
  • Educational
  • Environmental
  • Literary
  • Medical
  • Religious
  • Scientific
  • Technological

• Alterations: Any decision to adopt or eliminate the benefit statement (i.e. to alter the company’s status as a benefit company) must be approved by a special resolution of the voting shareholders. Both voting and non-voting shareholders of the benefit company are entitled to dissent rights with respect to such a change or to a change in the benefit provision.
• Benefit report: Each year, the benefit company must prepare, provide to its shareholders and post on its website (if it has one) a report (“benefit report”) that assesses the company’s performance in carrying out the commitments set out in the company’s benefit provision compared to a third-party standard. The report needs to include information about the process and rationale for selecting or changing the relevant third-party standard. Regulations may be enacted that provide more details about the third-party standard and the contents of the benefit report.
• Penalties relating to the benefit report: It will be an offence if the directors of the benefit company do not prepare and post the benefit report as required by the BCBCA and the regulations. There is a potential fine of up to $2,000 for individuals or $5,000 for persons other than individuals.
• Augmented fiduciary duty: The directors and officers of a benefit company will be required to act honestly and in good faith with a view to conducting the business in a responsible and sustainable manner and promoting the public benefits that the company has identified in its benefit provision. They must balance that public benefits duty against their duties to the company. (There is currently no guidance with respect to achieving this balance.) However, the amendments state that the public benefits duty does not create a duty on the part of directors or officers to persons who are affected by the company’s conduct or who would be personally benefitted by it.
• Enforcement and remedies where duty breached: Several significant provisions in the amendments relate to enforcement and remedies:
  • Shareholders are the only persons who are able to bring an action against a BCBCA benefit company’s directors and officers over an alleged violation of their duty relating to public benefits;
  • Only shareholders that, in the aggregate, hold at least 2% of the company’s issued shares may bring such an action (in the case of a public company, a $2 million shareholding, in the aggregate, will also suffice); and
  • The court may not order monetary damages in relation to a breach of that duty. Other remedies, such as removal or a direction to comply, would still be available.

À la prochaine…

Lecture de Leon Yehuda Anidjar sur le devoir de prudence et son intérêt dans le contexte de la COVID-19 : « A Firm-Specific View of Directors’ Duty of Care in Times of Global Epidemic Crisis » (Oxford Business Law Blog, 20 mai 2020).

Extrait :

In a recent paper, I discuss the directors’ duty of care in times of financial distress from a global perspective and focus on directors’ roles in different types of SMEs. I argue that while the economic crunch of the years 2007–2009 was a direct result of large governance deficiencies (Bruner, 2011), which generated various reforms that reinforced the monitoring role of directors, the current crisis will highlight the significance of the directors’ managerial roles. Accordingly, we can expect jurists and policymakers to design numerous regulatory reforms that will reinforce their advisory role in a fashion that will assist them in tackling the severe consequences of our current times. Moreover, supervisory authorities may decrease the regulatory burden imposed on directors to allow them to invest considerable managerial resources for supporting the survival of companies (as Enriques demonstrates concerning corporate law, and Chiu et al point out regarding financial regulation). 

Furthermore, I argue that the civil law on directors’ duty of care provides boards with a broader scope of discretion to confront the challenges associated with COVID-19 than the Anglo-American law. Delaware corporate law, for instance, posits that since directors, rather than shareholders, manage the affairs of the corporation, they should be protected by the business judgment rule. However, a recent empirical study demonstrated that challenges to business judgment in English and Welsh cases have been increasingly successful from the mid-nineteenth century until the present, with a marked increase in legal liability since 2007. This indicates that the proposition that English courts will generally not review directors’ business decisions is incorrect (Keay et al, 2020). In contrast, under the law applicable in countries such as Germany, France, Italy, and the Netherlands, the standard of care cannot be determined absolutely: it must address the specific situation for which the question of the due diligence of organ dealing arises. Accordingly, this standard is at the same time objective and relative, ie, a company comparable in size, business, and the economic situation shall serve as a model (as illustrated by, the Cancun ruling of the Dutch Supreme Court).

À la prochaine…

Le 30 avril 2020, Philip Gavin s’est interrogé sur l’intérêt de l’article 172 du Company Act pour les administrateurs et dirigeants dans le contexte de la COVID-19 : « Directors’ Duty under UK Law to Promote the Success of the Company during the COVID-19 Pandemic » (Oxford Business Law Blog).

Extrait :

A nuance to director’s duties in the United Kingdom is the expansive statutory delineation of s 172, which endows numerous considerations for directors when acting to promote the success of the company for the benefit of members. Given the unique circumstances of the present-day commercial sphere and the more humanitarian demands being put to businesses, having a statutory foundation upon which to base non-traditional business strategies may assist effective decision-making and financial reporting.

The initial three considerations enshrined within s 172 are (a) the likely long term consequences of any decision, (b) the interests of employees and (c) the need to foster business relationships with suppliers, customers and others. These factors are of particular relevance for firms who sought justification for voluntary shutdown of businesses prior to the wider governmental shutdown.

(…)

Where production changes become quasi-humanitarian in tone and companies internalise cost in the interim, directors may seek justification through s 172(1)(d) and (e), these being the impact on the community and the desirability of maintaining high business standards respectively.  Accordingly, directors can seek to frame these quasi-humanitarian efforts in long-term reputational terms, thereby engendering prospective communitarian goodwill.

Furthermore, as political pressure mounts, boards may evaluate reputational factors not simply in terms of market reputation, but also in terms of Governmental co-operation. This is particularly so where companies face increased intervention by public authorities through the Civil Contingencies Act. Comparatively, in a recent memorandum the Trump administration has attempted to exert control over the distribution of ventilators by the multinational conglomerate 3M. Cautious of such intervention occurring within their own enterprises, companies may shift business operations to such an extent to signal their compliance and co-operation with public authorities, thereby disincentivising the wholesale overrule of board discretion. 

Within jurisdictions with vaguer duties to act bona fide in the best interests of the company (Delaware, Australia, Ireland), directors may still engage in such quasi-humanitarian efforts. Nevertheless, utilising s 172 to steer directorial judgment may assist effective decision-making, and furthermore guide financial reporting, which mandates s 172 director’s statements.  Given that the tenor of 2020 reports will be likely dominated by COVID-19, UK directors will benefit from the homogenising structure of s 172 when making such disclosures in the coming months.

À la prochaine…

Merci au cabinet Stikeman Elliott pour ce billet daté du 24 avril 2020 intitulé « COVID et gouvernance d’entreprise : une mission plus large pour les conseils d’administration ». Un précieux éclairage sur ce qui va changer pour les CA avec la COVID-19…

Extrait :

Cette discussion aborde les principaux défis auxquels sont confrontés les chefs d’entreprise canadiens à l’approche de la phase de réouverture :

se concentrer sur les véritables enjeux; 

veiller à la gestion immédiate des crises et à la préparation du conseil d’administration; 

repenser la stratégie et la gestion des risques;

repenser les cadres incitatifs; et

repenser l’objectif de l’entreprise.

Comme en conclut l’article, cette crise redéfinira une grande partie de ce que nous considérons comme étant de la « bonne gouvernance ». Les conseils d’administration, en particulier, doivent élargir leurs missions pour s’assurer que leurs entreprises sont préparées à la nouvelle réalité qui les attend.

À la prochaine…

Bel article de Les Échos qui continue la réflexion sur la loi PACTE et le droit des sociétés : « Raison d’être, entreprise à mission, intérêt élargi… quels engagements et risques ? » (24 septembre 2019).

Extrait :

Une possible suppression du statut

Le statut de société à mission, également prévu par la loi Pacte , est plus engageant. Pour Bruno Dondero, avocat associé au sein du cabinet CMS Francis Lefebvre Avocats, la démarche est loin d’être anodine : «  Si un dirigeant se contente d’inscrire sa démarche dans les statuts, et qu’il ne fait rien pour prendre en compte les enjeux sociaux ou environnementaux dans ses choix, ou que son comportement est contraire à ses engagements, le ministère public ou toute personne intéressée, comme un fournisseur, un client ou une organisation associative, pourra demander la suppression de la mention », prévient l’avocat. Les risques qui pèsent sur le dirigeant sont-ils aussi importants pour la raison d’être ? Pas si sûr. «  Les conséquences juridiques de cette nouvelle notion sont assez incertaines. Cela dépend en partie de la façon dont la raison d’être est rédigée dans les statuts, tout en sachant que les associés pourront la modifier ou la supprimer. Plus elle est précise, plus elle sera contraignante  », estime Nicolas Borga. Mais une raison d’être définie de façon excessivement large pourrait également avoir des effets pervers tant son champ d’application serait vaste et tant elle donnerait prise à interprétation. 

Des labels pour sortir du lot

Une entreprise, dont la raison d’être serait de promouvoir le travail en France, qui déciderait de fermer une usine et de la délocaliser dans un pays où les coûts de production sont moins élevés, pourrait être chahutée. «  Une association pourrait se plaindre des effets d’une telle décision. Mais pourra-t-on reprocher à cette société d’avoir méconnu sa raison d’être lorsqu’elle sera en mesure d’établir qu’il en allait de sa survie et que son intérêt social commandait la prise d’une telle décision ? C’est improbable, poursuit Nicolas Borga. La raison d’être pourrait donc plus s’apparenter à un outil marketing. » Pour éviter qu’elle ne se limite à un effet de mode, sans lien avec la stratégie, les entreprises peuvent se tourner vers des labels. Des agréments comme Esus (entreprise solidaire d’utilité sociale), le label Lucie, ou B Corp, dont l’objectif est d’identifier et de faire progresser les entreprises qui intègrent à leurs activités des objectifs sociaux et environnementaux, vont réellement prendre de l’ampleur et devenir le moyen le plus évident de repérer les entreprises qui s’engagent.

Le 7 mars 2019, ecoDa a pris position sur le devoir de loyauté des administrateurs : « ecoDa’s position paper on Directors Duties »

Extrait :

ecoDa supports the fundamental concept of Corporate purpose. However the European Commission should propose policy principles and refrains from trying to standardize directors’ duties among Member States and sectors. ecoDa believes that soft law through Corporate Governance codes is more suitable to adapt to an evolving context.

Acknowledging that shareholders define the company’s purpose does not mean neither that the interests of other stakeholders should not be taken into account by the directors when fulfilling their duties towards the company. On the contrary, there is no doubt that boards are taking such interests into account to an extent deemed consistent with the company’s purpose. Basically, there is a sound business case for more social and environmental involvement. Understanding consumers’ expectations and employees’ aspiration is becoming a prerequisite to become more innovative, to attract the right talents and to ensure sustainability in the long run. It is obvious that companies cannot be run in a sustainable manner if boards ignore the context in which they operate.

Therefore, the European Commission should refrain from trying to harmonize the fundamental concept of corporate interest and directors’ duties due to the very important legal differences across Europe and the different contexts across sectors. No law should hold directors accountable to several “principals”, arguably with often mutually contradictory interests. The board can solely be accountable to the company for the discharge of its duty to promote the purpose of the company. If the criteria for liability are not clearly defined, the boards will be liable to nobody for nothing or to everybody for anything. “Being liable to everybody means being liable to nobody”. Legal certainty is the basis of a competitive economic environment.

À la prochaine…

Le professeur Bernard S. Sharfman a publié il y a deux ans un article très intéressant sur la primauté de la valeur actionnariale en droit des sociétés : « Shareholder Wealth Maximization and Its Implementation Under Corporate Law », 66 Fla. L. Rev. 389 (2015). À redécouvrir !

This Article tackles the question of when courts should intervene in the decision-making of a corporation and review a corporate business decision for shareholder wealth maximization. This Article takes a very traditional approach to answering this question. It notes with approval that courts have historically been very hesitant to participate in the process of determining if a corporate decision is wealth maximizing. Courts have restrained themselves from interfering with board decision-making because they understand that it is the board of directors (the board) in coordination with executive management that has the best information and expertise to determine if a corporate decision meets the objective of shareholder wealth maximization. Nevertheless, the courts have found that they can play a wealth-enhancing role if they focus on making corporate authority accountable when there is sufficient evidence to show that the corporate decision was somehow tainted. Therefore, the courts will interpose themselves as a corrective mechanism when a board decision is tainted with a conflict of interest, lack of independence, or where gross negligence in the process of becoming informed in the making of a business decision is implicated.

When judicial review veers from this traditional approach, the court’s opinion must be closely scrutinized to see if the court had valid reasons for implementing a different approach. Such a veering from the traditional path can be found in the Delaware Chancery case of eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, a case where the court, in its review of a shareholder rights plan under the Unocal test, required the directors to demonstrate that the corporate policy being defended by the poison pill enhanced shareholder value. As argued here, the court was wrong in its approach, and in general courts should never be in the position of adding this additional component of analyzing board decisions for shareholder wealth maximization unless the business decision was tainted with a conflict of interest, lack of independence, or gross negligence.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian