Gouvernance | Page 28

Dans BoardAgenda, Gavin Hinks propose une solution pour que les parties prenantes soient mieux pris en compte : la création d’un comité social et éthique (déjà en fonction en Afrique du Sud) : « Companies ‘need new mechanism’ to integrate stakeholder interests » (4 septembre 2020).

Extrait :

While section 172 of the Companies Act—the key law governing directors’ duties—has been sufficiently flexible to enable companies to re-align themselves with stakeholders so far, it provides no guarantee they will maintain that disposition.

In their recent paper, MacNeil and Esser argue more regulation is needed and in particular a mandatory committee drawing key stakeholder issues to the board and then reporting on them to shareholders.

Known as the “social and ethics committee” in South Africa, a similar mandatory committee in the UK considering ESG (environmental, social and governance) issues “will provide a level playing field for stakeholder engagement,” write MacNeil and Esser.

Recent evidence, they concede, suggests the committees in South Africa are still evolving, but there are advantages, with the committee “uniquely placed with direct access to the main board and a mandate to reach into the depths of the business”.

“As a result, it is capable of having a strong influence on the way a company heads down the path of sustained value creation.”

Will stakeholderism stick?

The issue of making “stakeholder” capitalism stick has vexed others too. The issue was a dominant agenda item at the World Economic Forum’s Davos conference this year, as well as becoming a key element in the presidential campaign of Democrat candidate Joe Biden.

Others worry that stakeholderism is a talking point only, prompting no real change in some companies. Indeed, when academics examined the practical policy outcomes from the now famous 2019 pledge by the Business Roundtable—a group of US multinationals—to shift their focus from shareholders to stakeholders, they found the companies wanting.

In the UK, at least, some are taking the issue very seriously. The Institute of Directors recently launched a new governance centre with its first agenda item being how stakeholderism can be integrated into current governance structures.

Further back the Royal Academy, an august British research institution, issued its own principles for becoming a “purposeful business”, another idea closely associated with stakeholderism.

The stakeholder debate has a long way to run. If the idea is to gain traction it will undoubtedly need a stronger commitment in regulation than it currently has, or companies could easily wander from the path. That may depend on public demand and political will. But Esser and MacNeil may have at least indicated one way forward.

À la prochaine…

C’est sous ce titre (« Raison d’être ou entreprise à mission, le faux débat », La Tribune, 2 septembre 2020) que M. Patrick d’Humières propose une lecture de la raison d’être et du statut d’entreprise à mission qui, selon lui, vont se rejoindre dans une trajectoire commune.

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En apparence, le statut d’entreprise à mission rencontre un succès d’estime avec une cinquantaine d’entreprises très différentes, d’agences conseils à des sociétés mutuelles, qui l’ont adopté. Ce n’est pas le cas du statut de raison d’être, au bilan beaucoup plus mitigé, car les démarches que l’on connaît expriment des positionnements déclaratifs dans la veine de « la RSE de bonne volonté » qui ne s’accompagnent pas de mécanisme de mesure, de pression et de transparence garantissant de vrais changements d’orientation des modèles.

À la décharge des entreprises qui ont fait preuve d’initiative en la matière, il faut dire que le dispositif légal proposé comporte de considérables faiblesses. L’essentiel du changement juridique porté par la loi réside dans la modification de l’article 1833 du Code civil qui enjoint à toutes les entreprises de « prendre en considération les enjeux sociaux et environnementaux » au côté de l’intérêt social de l’entreprise, dont on n’a pas tiré les implications fondamentales. Les organisations professionnelles concernées ont fait preuve d’un souci défensif, pour limiter la mise en cause conséquente de cette assertion fondamentale, qui acte la nouvelle mission de l’entreprise, à savoir créer de la valeur dans le respect des enjeux sociétaux ; mais ni les juges, ni la puissance publique n’ont eu encore le souci d’accompagner ce cadre, cherchant plutôt à le minimiser, alors même que c’est une innovation majeure : il articule l’économie de marché avec la stratégie nationale de développement durable (ODD) et il crée le socle de ce qu’on appelle désormais « l’économie responsable », consacrée par la nomination pertinente d’une ministre en charge du sujet, qu’on aurait pu ou du appeler aussi « l’économie durable » dans un souci de cohérence politique.

Le texte de loi appelle des transformations de fond dans la gouvernance des entreprises qui devrait se poser des questions à cet effet, sans attendre qu’une jurisprudence fasse le travail pour dire qu’un Conseil d’administration ou une direction générale a mesestimé les enjeux sociaux et environnementaux, définis désormais de façon claire et objective (cf. indicateurs des ODD, incluant l’alignement sur l’Accord de Paris etc.).

L’entreprise dispose de tous les éléments pour établir son niveau de durabilité qui reconnaît cette prise de considération attendue des enjeux communs ; le travail de fond engagé parallèlement en Europe afin de standardiser l’information extra-financière ne pourra qu’encourager les Conseils à débattre et à décider de l’état de leur trajectoire économique au regard de leurs impacts acceptables qui sera la règle en 2025, à n’en pas douter.

Certaines entreprises ont tenu à disposer d’un cadre formel beaucoup plus structuré pour assumer cette responsabilité élargie à la Société, celui de « l’entreprise à mission » ; il constitue une facilité juridique et une aide technique qui a le plus grand intérêt pour accélérer la mutation d’un « capitalisme a-moral » vers « un capitalisme « parties prenantes ». Ce choix implique le vote par les actionnaires, le comité de suivi, l’audit de contrôle etc.. Les actionnaires n’ont pas à craindre pour autant une démission de l’engagement fiduciaire, à leur détriment, car le contrat est explicite, même s’il gagnerait encore à ce que les objectifs de rendement financier soient précisés au regard des objectifs d’amélioration de la création et de la répartition de la valeur globale et de leurs ROI. Ceci afin de ne pas glisser vers « le non profit » : une attention déséquilibrée en faveur de la dimension sociétale de la mission marginaliserait le dispositif, alors que les statuts coopératif, mutualiste ou solidaire sont là pour ça.

Coincé entre le droit général et le cadre précis de « la mission », « la raison d’être » aura du mal à trouver sa place, d’autant que la loi Pacte ne dit rien sur le comment, laissant l’entreprise libre de son engagement, de son inclusion ou non dans les statuts, ce qui en fait un process au mieux pédagogique et au pire de communication ; les parties prenantes ne voient pas les conclusions qu’on en tire sur les conditions nouvelles de production et de répartition de la valeur – objectifs et indicateurs à l’appui-  pour exclure ce qui n’est pas « durable » dans l’offre et équilibrer l’allocation des résultats, voire la négocier, s’il existe un mécanisme ad hoc en amont de « l’arbitraire » des conseils. On voit bien qu’une Raison d’Etre bien posée conduit à terme au mécanisme de l’entreprise à mission et que dans le cas contraire l’entreprise ne fait que s’exposer à des critiques et frustrations qui mettent sa stratégie au défi de la cohérence et de la constance d’une gouvernance qui voudrait avancer sans oser le demander à ses actionnaires…

Cette décantation se fera inévitablement dans le temps, au détriment des entreprises « superficielles » et à l’avantage des entreprises authentiques. Le dispositif de Raison d’Etre va devenir un statut intermédiaire, de transition vers « l’entreprise à mission » ; il pousse à la construction d’un droit des sociétés qui recherche le changement profond de la gouvernance actionnariale, comme vient de le proposer la Commission Européenne dans un rapport très critique sur l’engagement insuffisant des gouvernances qui s’abritent derrière des intentions pour répondre aux pressions, rendant leur projet illisible ! Mais rien n’empêche les gouvernances d’accélérer par elles-mêmes sans attendre un règlement européen et éviter les malentendus autour d’une « raison d’être incantatoire » qui mine  la crédibilité des initiatives sociétales des entreprises ; dans un monde périlleux, les gouvernances doivent « choisir leur camp » !

À la prochaine…

Belle tribune dans Fortune de MM. Colin Mayer, Leo Strine Jr et Jaap Winter au titre clair : « 50 years later, Milton Friedman’s shareholder doctrine is dead » (13 septembre 2020).

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Fifty years ago, Milton Friedman in the New York Times magazine proclaimed that the social responsibility of business is to increase its profits. Directors have the duty to do what is in the interests of their masters, the shareholders, to make as much profit as possible. Friedman was hostile to the New Deal and European models of social democracy and urged business to use its muscle to reduce the effectiveness of unions, blunt environmental and consumer protection measures, and defang antitrust law. He sought to reduce consideration of human concerns within the corporate boardroom and legal requirements on business to treat workers, consumers, and society fairly. 

Over the last 50 years, Friedman’s views became increasingly influential in the U.S. As a result, the power of the stock market and wealthy elites soared and consideration of the interests of workers, the environment, and consumers declined. Profound economic insecurity and inequality, a slow response to climate change, and undermined public institutions resulted. Using their wealth and power in the pursuit of profits, corporations led the way in loosening the external constraints that protected workers and other stakeholders against overreaching.

Under the dominant Friedman paradigm, corporations were constantly harried by all the mechanisms that shareholders had available—shareholder resolutions, takeovers, and hedge fund activism—to keep them narrowly focused on stockholder returns. And pushed by institutional investors, executive remuneration systems were increasingly focused on total stock returns. By making corporations the playthings of the stock market, it became steadily harder for corporations to operate in an enlightened way that reflected the real interests of their human investors in sustainable growth, fair treatment of workers, and protection of the environment.

Half a century later, it is clear that this narrow, stockholder-centered view of corporations has cost society severely. Well before the COVID-19 pandemic, the single-minded focus of business on profits was criticized for causing the degradation of nature and biodiversity, contributing to global warming, stagnating wages, and exacerbating economic inequality. The result is best exemplified by the drastic shift in gain sharing away from workers toward corporate elites, with stockholders and top management eating more of the economic pie.

Corporate America understood the threat that this way of thinking was having on the social compact and reacted through the 2019 corporate purpose statement of the Business Roundtable, emphasizing responsibility to stakeholders as well as shareholders. But the failure of many of the signatories to protect their stakeholders during the coronavirus pandemic has prompted cynicism about the original intentions of those signing the document, as well as their subsequent actions.

Stockholder advocates are right when then they claim that purpose statements on their own achieve little: Calling for corporate executives who answer to only one powerful constituency—stockholders in the form of highly assertive institutional investors—and have no legal duty to other stakeholders to run their corporations in a way that is fair to all stakeholders is not only ineffectual, it is naive and intellectually incoherent.

What is required is to match commitment to broader responsibility of corporations to society with a power structure that backs it up. That is what has been missing. Corporate law in the U.S. leaves it to directors and managers subject to potent stockholder power to give weight to other stakeholders. In principle, corporations can commit to purposes beyond profit and their stakeholders, but only if their powerful investors allow them to do so. Ultimately, because the law is permissive, it is in fact highly restrictive of corporations acting fairly for all their stakeholders because it hands authority to investors and financial markets for corporate control.

Absent any effective mechanism for encouraging adherence to the Roundtable statement, the system is stacked against those who attempt to do so. There is no requirement on corporations to look after their stakeholders and for the most part they do not, because if they did, they would incur the wrath of their shareholders. That was illustrated all too clearly by the immediate knee-jerk response of the Council of Institutional Investors to the Roundtable declaration last year, which expressed its disapproval by stating that the Roundtable had failed to recognize shareholders as owners as well as providers of capital, and that “accountability to everyone means accountability to no one.” 

If the Roundtable is serious about shifting from shareholder primacy to purposeful business, two things need to happen. One is that the promise of the New Deal needs to be renewed, and protections for workers, the environment, and consumers in the U.S. need to be brought closer to the standards set in places like Germany and Scandinavia. 

But to do that first thing, a second thing is necessary. Changes within company law itself must occur, so that corporations are better positioned to support the restoration of that framework and govern themselves internally in a manner that respects their workers and society. Changing the power structure within corporate law itself—to require companies to give fair consideration to stakeholders and temper their need to put profit above all other values—will also limit the ability and incentives for companies to weaken regulations that protect workers, consumers, and society more generally.

To make this change, corporate purpose has to be enshrined in the heart of corporate law as an expression of the broader responsibility of corporations to society and the duty of directors to ensure this. Laws already on the books of many states in the U.S. do exactly that by authorizing the public benefit corporation (PBC). A PBC has an obligation to state a public purpose beyond profit, to fulfill that purpose as part of the responsibilities of its directors, and to be accountable for so doing. This model is meaningfully distinct from the constituency statutes in some states that seek to strengthen stakeholder interests, but that stakeholder advocates condemn as ineffectual. PBCs have an affirmative duty to be good corporate citizens and to treat all stakeholders with respect. Such requirements are mandatory and meaningful, while constituency statutes are mushy.

The PBC model is growing in importance and is embraced by many younger entrepreneurs committed to the idea that making money in a way that is fair to everyone is the responsible path forward. But the model’s ultimate success depends on longstanding corporations moving to adopt it. 

Even in the wake of the Roundtable’s high-minded statement, that has not yet happened, and for good reason. Although corporations can opt in to become a PBC, there is no obligation on them to do so and they need the support of their shareholders. It is relatively easy for founder-owned companies or companies with a relatively low number of stockholders to adopt PBC forms if their owners are so inclined. It is much tougher to obtain the approval of a dispersed group of institutional investors who are accountable to an even more dispersed group of individual investors. There is a serious coordination problem of achieving reform in existing corporations.

That is why the law needs to change. Instead of being an opt-in alternative to shareholder primacy, the PBC should be the universal standard for societally important corporations, which should be defined as ones with over $1 billion of revenues, as suggested by Sen. Elizabeth Warren. In the U.S., this would be done most effectively by corporations becoming PBCs under state law. The magic of the U.S. system has rested in large part on cooperation between the federal government and states, which provides society with the best blend of national standards and nimble implementation. This approach would build on that.

Corporate shareholders and directors enjoy substantial advantages and protections through U.S. law that are not extended to those who run their own businesses. In return for offering these privileges, society can reasonably expect to benefit, not suffer, from what corporations do. Making responsibility in society a duty in corporate law will reestablish the legitimacy of incorporation.

There are three pillars to this. The first is that corporations must be responsible corporate citizens, treating their workers and other stakeholders fairly, and avoiding externalities, such as carbon emissions, that cause unreasonable or disproportionate harm to others. The second is that corporations should seek to make profit by benefiting others. The third is that they should be able to demonstrate that they fulfill both criteria by measuring and reporting their performances against them.

The PBC model embraces all three elements and puts legal, and thus market, force behind them. Corporate managers, like most of us, take obligatory duties seriously. If they don’t, the PBC model allows for courts to issue orders, such as injunctions, holding corporations to their stakeholder and societal obligations. In addition, the PBC model requires fairness to all stakeholders at all stages of a corporation’s life, even when it is sold. The PBC model shifts power to socially responsible investment and index funds that focus on the long term and cannot gain from unsustainable approaches to growth that harm society. 

Our proposal to amend corporate law to ensure responsible corporate citizenship will prompt a predictable outcry from vested interests and traditional academic quarters, claiming that it will be unworkable, devastating for entrepreneurship and innovation, undermine a capitalist system that has been an engine for growth and prosperity, and threaten jobs, pensions, and investment around the world. If putting the purpose of a business at the heart of corporate law does all of that, one might well wonder why we invented the corporation in the first place. 

Of course, it will do exactly the opposite. Putting purpose into law will simplify, not complicate, the running of businesses by aligning what the law wants them to do with the reason why they are created. It will be a source of entrepreneurship, innovation, and inspiration to find solutions to problems that individuals, societies, and the natural world face. It will make markets and the capitalist system function better by rewarding positive contributions to well-being and prosperity, not wealth transfers at the expense of others. It will create meaningful, fulfilling jobs, support employees in employment and retirement, and encourage investment in activities that generate wealth for all. 

We are calling for the universal adoption of the PBC for large corporations. We do so to save our capitalist system and corporations from the devastating consequences of their current approaches, and for the sake of our children, our societies, and the natural world. 

À la prochaine…

Dans un article du Financial Times (« European companies were more keen to cut divis than executive pay », 9 septembre 2020), il est observé que les assemblées annuelles de grandes entreprises européennes montrent des disparités concernant la protection des salariés et la réduction des dividendes.

Extrait :

Businesses in Spain, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK were more likely to cut dividends than executive pay this year, despite calls from shareholders for bosses to share the financial pain caused by the pandemic.

More than half of Spanish businesses examined by Georgeson, a corporate governance consultancy, cancelled, postponed or reduced dividends in 2020. Only 29 per cent introduced a temporary reduction in executive pay. In Italy, 44 per cent of companies changed their dividend policies because of Covid-19, but just 29 per cent cut pay for bosses, according to the review of the annual meeting season in Europe.

This disparity between protection of salaries and bonuses at the top while shareholders have been hit with widespread dividend cuts is emerging as a flashpoint for investors. Asset managers such as Schroders and M&G have spoken out about the need for companies to show restraint on pay if they are cutting dividends or receiving government support. “Executive remuneration remains a key focal point for investors and was amongst the most contested resolutions in the majority of the markets,” said Georgeson’s Domenic Brancati.

But he added that despite this focus, shareholder revolts over executive pay had fallen slightly across Europe compared with 2019 — suggesting that investors were giving companies some leeway on how they dealt with the pandemic. Investors could become more vocal about this issue next year, he said.

One UK-based asset manager said it was “still having lots of conversations with companies around pay” but for this year had decided not to vote against companies on the issue. But it added the business would watch remuneration and dividends closely next year.

Companies around the world have cut or cancelled dividends in response to the crisis, hitting income streams for many investors. According to Janus Henderson, global dividends had their biggest quarterly fall in a decade during the second quarter, with more than $100bn wiped off their value. The Georgeson data shows that almost half of UK companies changed their dividend payout, while less than 45 per cent altered executive remuneration. In the Netherlands, executive pay took a hit at 29 per cent of companies, while 34 per cent adjusted dividends. In contrast, a quarter of Swiss executives were hit with a pay cut but only a fifth of companies cut or cancelled their dividend.

The Georgeson research also found that the pandemic had a significant impact on the AGM process across Europe, with many companies postponing their annual meetings or stopping shareholders from voting during the event.

À la prochaine…

Article à lire de M. Ashwell dans Corporate Secretary : « The threat of employee shareholder activism » (7 août 2020). Intéressante perspective sur l’activisme poussé de manière indirecte par la situation des salariés des entreprises.

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Facing an employee-backed or employee-led shareholder proposal generates media attention and causes embarrassment for senior management. But are these recent examples a flash in the pan, or should more companies be bracing for employee-shareholder activism?

A confluence of circumstances

Pat Tomaino is director of socially responsible investing at Zevin Asset Management and has filed shareholder proposals at Alphabet and Amazon, as well as other large technology companies, in recent years. He worked with an employee group at Alphabet, following a mass employee walkout at Google in 2018.

‘It’s a strategy that we as impact investors want to leverage more in the future, but it really depends on a confluence of circumstances,’ he says. ‘We’re not in the business of instigating employee activity inside companies – that’s not the role of investors. We have a stake in the financial outlook of the company. We’re not creating employee activism but, where we do see that it exists, we take that into account. What are employees asking for and why are they acting that way? What signal should we take for how companies are handling their long-term ESG goals?’

Tomaino says that when he has talked to employee groups at large technology companies about shareholder proposals, there’s a feeling that they have tried other avenues of feedback and activism internally. ‘These employees had tried the usual channels and were looking for levers to make change,’ he says. ‘They’d done direct action, they’d talked to the press and they’d noticed that there’s power through shareholder proposals.’

In Germany, employee-shareholder activism is much more established. Labor groups have experimented with shareholder proposals since the early 1990s, according to an academic report from Natascha van der Zwan, assistant professor of public administration at Leiden University. One particularly notable example she highlights is the Deutsche Telecom annual meeting in 2007, when around 1,000 employees entered the meeting to voice discontent about increased working hours and pay cuts as part of a corporate restructuring. Employee-shareholders reportedly signed their voting rights over to local labor unions to oppose the restructuring, as part of a broader campaign involving employee walkouts and labor union protests.

For board directors in the US, Gillian Emmett Moldowan, partner at Shearman & Sterling, says it’s never been more important to receive meaningful updates about nonexecutive employees.

‘Employee campaigns of any nature get significant press attention,’ she explains. ‘Boards have historically been more separated from non-executive employee issues, whether it’s compensation or workers’ issues, or how employees feel about the firm as a whole. I would encourage boards to get an understanding from those who report into the board of human capital management risk and enterprise risks, as well as an understanding of what the company is doing to assess and mitigate those risks.

‘If boards have not historically received information about employee satisfaction and employee sentiment about the company management, then getting hold of that information is a good first step.’

Structural issues

Instances of recent employee shareholder activism have defining traits that may not be replicated elsewhere. For instance, Tomaino explains that many Alphabet employees involved in the shareholder action feel aggrieved at how they think the company’s mission has changed. Google’s motto in its IPO documents was ‘Don’t be evil’, but it has since dropped the slogan and employees have expressed concerns about the direction the company is moving, including in its bidding for national defense contracts.

Aalap Shah, managing director at Pearl Meyer, highlights several structural issues that may make companies more at risk of employee shareholder activism in the future.

‘Part of the issue is the power some companies have given to their employees through equity,’ he explains. ‘In addition, many of these companies are recruiting from the same talent pool, where there’s a desire to work for a company that has some sort of positive purpose. There is significantly more desire [on the part of] millennials and Gen Z to be part of an organization that has purpose, and you’re going to have to compete for that top talent by giving them equity.’

Tomaino says employees with large amounts of their personal net worth tied up in company stock will view themselves as engaged investors as much as employees. But Moldowan says this shouldn’t make companies think differently about granting stock options to employees as part of their compensation packages.

‘Shareholders can bring a proposal if they qualify to do so under the proxy rules, and those shares can be bought on the market – they need not come from an equity compensation plan,’ she says. ‘Not giving equity awards won’t stop an employee acquiring equity by other means.’

An Amazon employee group recently filed a comment letter with the SEC expressing concerns and opposition to proposed changes to Rule 14a-8, on the grounds that planned shifts to share ownership and proposal resubmission thresholds would make it harder for employee groups to advocate for change.

All of the interviewees for this article agree that it’s important for boards to receive information about employee sentiment and for boards or management to be seen to respond appropriately when employee groups express significant levels of discontent. Tomaino acknowledges that it’s unlikely large passive investors would vote in favor of employees and against management – unless the proposal was on something truly egregious – but that a proposal can help cause embarrassment for management that may drive change.

As Covid-19 shines a greater light on the treatment and recognition of employees, and the Business Roundtable’s statement equally prompts stakeholders to question companies when they feel they’re not being given a fair hearing, this may not be the last we see of employee participation in shareholder proposals in the US.

À la prochaine…

Dans un article intitulé « The Pandemic and Executive Pay », Aniel Mahabier, Iris Gushi, and Thao Nguyen reviennent sur les conséquences de la COVID-19 en termes de niveaux de rémunération des CA et des hauts-dirigeants. Portant sur les entreprises du Russell 3000, cet article offre une belle synthèse et est très parlante.

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Is Reducing Base Salary Enough?

While salary reductions for Executives are greatly appreciated in this difficult time and are meant to show solidarity with employees, the fact is that base salary is only a fraction of the often enormous compensation packages granted to CEO’s and other Executives. Compensation packages predominately consist of cash bonuses and equity awards. Even though 80% of the Russell 3000 companies have disclosed 2019 compensation for Executives, we have not witnessed any companies making adjustments to these figures in light of the crisis, even for companies in hard-hit industries.

Edward Bastian, CEO of Delta Airlines, has agreed to cut 100% of his base salary for 6 months, [1] which equals USD 714,000, but still holds on to his 2019 cash and stock awards of USD 16 million, which were granted earlier in 2020. [2] Another interesting case is MGM Resorts International, where CEO Jim Murren was supposed to stay through 2021 to receive USD 32 million in compensation, including USD 12 million in severance. According to the terms of his termination agreement, he would not receive the compensation package if he left before 2021. [3] However, days after he resigned voluntarily in March, MGM announced that his resignation would be treated as a “termination without good cause”, which would qualify him to receive the full USD 32 million package. [4] In the meantime, 63,000 employees of MGM have been furloughed and will possibly be fired. [5]

Furthermore, activist investors have begun to feel unhappy about some executive pay actions amid the pandemic. CtW Investment Group, an investor of Uber, urged shareholders to reject Uber’s compensation package at the Annual General Meeting since it includes a USD 100 million equity grant to the CEO. [6]

While the ride-hailing company has suffered from a USD 2.9 billion first quarter net loss in 2020 [7] and planned to lay off 6,700 employees [8] (about 30% of its workforce), its CEO Dara Khosrowshahi only took a 100% base salary cut from May until the end of 2020, [9] which totals USD 666,000, and took home a USD 42.4 million pay package for 2019.

The same investor also urged shareholders of McDonald’s to vote against the USD 44 million+ exit package, including USD 700,000 in cash severance, for former CEO Stephen Easterbrook, who was fired last year over violation of company policies due to his relationship with an employee. [10]

The investor’s efforts failed in both instances and the CEO’s took home millions of dollars while their companies are struggling.

Since the COVID-19 outbreak, a number of public companies have gone bankrupt. Nevertheless, large sums of compensation were paid out to their Executives. Retailer J. C. Penney paid almost USD 10 million in bonuses to top executives [11] and oil company Whiting Petroleum issued USD 14.6 million in bonuses for its C-suite, [12] just days before both companies filed for bankruptcy.

Another school of thought is that the practice of issuers deferring executive salary cuts into RSUs will give rise to huge payouts in the future when the market eventually recovers and share value increases. This means that Executives who deferred their base salary have made a sacrifice that ultimately will benefit them, defeating the purpose of pay cuts.

Although the economic impacts of the pandemic on businesses are still on-going, the number of pay cuts announced has slowed since the end of May. As the effects continue to unfold over the next months, we expect companies to continue to re-evaluate their executive compensation policies. COVID-19 has changed daily lives, business operations, and the economy. Even though we will only know the full extent of impact in the second half of 2020, COVID-19 will certainly change executive pay and corporate governance practices in the future.

À la prochaine…

Corporate Board Member fait une intéressante synthèse de la politique de démission d’un administrateur qui ne recevrait pas 50 % des votes lors de son élection : « Is A Director Resignation Policy Good For Governance? » (Matthew Scott). Promeut par les grands investisseurs de ce monde, comment résumer les effets positifs d’une telle politique ? C’est ce que vous propose l’auteur !

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While historically such policies have not been strictly enforced, adopting them challenges directors to do what’s right for the organization based on moral considerations and their fiduciary responsibility. Such a policy can also act as an indicator for when board refreshment might be necessary, particularly if support for the entire board begins to fall close to or below the 50 percent threshold.

That shareholders would lobby for this type of policy suggests they are looking for a very direct way to hold board members accountable for the work they do on behalf of the company. This is a growing trend for public companies. Shareholders have reasoned that if a director who is up for re-election to the board and is running unopposed can’t manage to get more than 50 percent of shareholders to vote for their return, then a change is needed. Shareholders aren’t happy that directors who receive less than the majority of votes are allowed to keep their board seats simply because no one ran against them. For corporate boards, the question “Why aren’t shareholders supporting that director?” must be asked, answered and dealt with swiftly. If the largest shareholders aren’t supporting certain board members, it’s only a matter of time before they suggest someone to run against them. It may be better for at-risk directors to resign gracefully before being forced out by a dissident shareholder running a candidate against them.

Additionally, this policy gives affected directors a chance to ask themselves, “Is it the best decision for me to continue to serve on a board where shareholders don’t support my service?” Future career opportunities, reputational impact and board appointments might be at stake.

Having such a resignation policy could have another positive effect on governance – it may make a few more board seats open up faster. Only a limited number of board seats become available each year, so anything that can encourage board turnover in a good way is welcome. This policy could help create more open positions for boards that are looking to add diverse candidates, and at the same time, add new perspectives and innovative thought to board discussions. And most governance professionals would favor that.

À la prochaine…