Publications | Page 3

autres publications Gouvernance mission et composition du conseil d'administration normes de droit

Fraude et corruption : synthèse de Deloitte

L’organisation moyenne perd chaque année 5 % de ses revenus en raison de la fraude et de la corruption, selon l’Association of Certified Fraud Examiners. Il n’est pas surprenant que les organismes de réglementation à l’échelle mondiale se concentrent de plus en plus sur la fraude et s’attendent à ce que les organisations mettent en œuvre des programmes efficaces de lutte contre la fraude. En outre, ces organismes accroissent leur coopération pour mettre en œuvre des lois anticorruption grâce auxquelles les coupables sont poursuivis pour leurs actes, y compris les dirigeants et les administrateurs qui sont responsables de l’environnement dans lequel ces crimes se produisent.

En cas de fraude ou de corruption, les administrateurs peuvent être tenus personnellement responsables s’il est démontré qu’ils n’ont pas fait preuve de la diligence voulue dans le cadre de leurs responsabilités visant la mise en œuvre des programmes et des contrôles appropriés de lutte contre la fraude et la corruption.

Votre conseil d’administration a-t-il une bonne compréhension des risques liés à la fraude et à la corruption? Quelles mesures votre organisation devrait-elle prendre pour les atténuer?

Dans son À l’ordre du jour du conseil de juillet 2016, Deloitte propose une revue des « Programmes efficaces de lutte contre la fraude et la corruption ».

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

autres publications Gouvernance Normes d'encadrement

Comparer la gouvernance d’entreprise : étude de Martin Gelter

Martin Gelter (professeur à Fordham) nous offre un très bel article « Comparative Corporate Governance: Old and New » pour le compte de l’ECGI (Law Working Paper No. 321/2016). Si vous vous intéressez à la comparaison en matière de gouvernance d’entreprise, c’est un incontournable !

 

The most fundamental comparative corporate governance debates have often focused on two issues.

The first one concerns ownership structure: Why are large corporations in some corporate governance system owned by a multitude of disempowered shareholders, thus effectively giving management free rein? Why are corporations typically governed by a controlling shareholder or a coalition of controlling shareholders in other systems?

The second issue is the role of other ‘constituencies’ of the corporation besides shareholders, of which labor is most central to the debate. Some jurisdictions explicitly give labor an influential voice in corporate affairs, whereas in others its influence is developed through factual power or unintended consequences of legislation.

This chapter explores the interactions between firm ownership and labor, focusing on the United States on the one hand and Continental Europe, particularly Germany, on the other. It distinguishes between ‘old’ and ‘new’ comparative corporate governance, the former referring to the dichotomy studied by scholars of comparative corporate law up to the early 2000s. Recent changes, heralded by intermediated, but widespread share ownership are leading us to a new equilibrium whose contours have only begun to emerge.

Over the past decades, outside investors have gained power both in the United States and in Continental Europe. However, neither in the US nor in Continental Europe has the traditional corporate governance system been completely superseded by a new one. The US remains to a large extent manager-centric. Continental Europe retains powerful large shareholders, and labor as an independent force has remained more important than in the United States. Outside institutional investors – sometimes from the US – have become a player to be reckoned with, thus adding an additional layer of complexity to the system.

 

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

autres publications Gouvernance normes de droit Nouvelles diverses

Rapport 2016 de PWC sur le crime économique

Belle étude annuelle de Pwc consacrée à la criminalité économique : « Global Economic Crime Survey 2016 – Adjusting the Lens on Economic Crime:  Preparation brings opportunity back into focus ».

 

Today more than ever before, a passive approach to detecting and preventing economic crime is a recipe for disaster. To underscore this fact, our survey uncovered a widespread lack of confidence in local law enforcement – a phenomenon that is not limited to regions or level of economic development. The message is clear: the burden of preventing, protecting and responding to economic crime rests firmly with organisations themselves. Our survey this year focuses on three key areas – Cybercrime, Ethics and compliance programmes and Anti-Money Laundering – and explores certain common themes, including managing the risks associated with the pervasion of technology; what it means to conduct business responsibly across a widening business landscape; and integrating ethical conduct into decision-making.

In addition to highlighting specific areas of economic crime worth focusing on, we emphasise the things you can do better to tackle them – implementing more sophisticated and effective measures that can not only reduce these risks, but also bring the benefits of a more threat-aware business, confident of its defences in a changing world.

 

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

autres publications Gouvernance Normes d'encadrement

Une politique ambitieuse de Vigeo

Alors que le changement climatique est sur le devant de la scène et que les entreprises et les investisseurs ne peuvent l’ignorer, l’agence de notation extra-financière Vigeo a publié le 12 janvier 2016 une politique ambitieuse intitulé « Post COP21: How well companies & investors are positioned to respond to climate change » (Policy Briefing, Climate Change & Transition to a Low Carbon Economy). Ce document rappelle haut et fort que le changement climatique est une affaire d’entreprise et d’investisseur !

 

Investors have already played a key role in bringing about COP21, and in the post COP21 landscape, investors are vital to ensure meaningful results.

No doubt initiatives such as the Montreal Pledge, the RE100 investor initiative, investor campaigns on stranded assets, and the plethora of events both before and during COP21, demonstrated to governments investor will and thought-leadership here. The growing corporate-investor-government nexus whereby some companies are calling for a credible carbon price/tax is significant.

The importance of incentives for emissions reduction activities are recognised in the Agreement preamble, including domestic policies and carbon pricing.16 These calls to action will drive forward collective performance on climate change, in addition to the ongoing pressure investors can put on companies through the investment process.

Responsible investment plays a leading role in highlighting companies’ exposure to the risks of climate change and evaluating their capacity to mitigate them. Analyses from research intermediaries such as Vigeo Eiris can help investors to understand and better manage these mounting climate change risks.

At present, only a small proportion of companies are found to have an advanced response to climate change and energy transition. To drive forward performance, companies could be encouraged to tie Board-level remuneration to climate change targets. Corporate reporting could be improved, particularly through use of quantitative assessments, and companies should be encouraged to report on the impact of the whole product lifecycle on emissions. There is also room for much greater corporate acknowledgement of the policy context.

 

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

autres publications Gouvernance Nouvelles diverses

Strong managers, strong owners : un ouvrage pour cet été ?

Harry Korine et Pierre-Yves Gomez ont publié un ouvrage qui vient de rejoindre ma bibliothèque : « Strong Managers, Strong Owners: Corporate Governance and Strategy » (Cambridge University Press, décembre 2013).

 

The family firm preparing generational change, the partnership that welcomes new partners, and the shareholders of a firm that chooses to go public are making decisions that will have an impact on strategy and management. Conversely, a change in strategy such as a move to diversify or a decision to take on more risk in a business can make the firm more attractive to some shareholders and less attractive to others and is therefore not ownership neutral. Opening the black box of agency theory, Korine and Gomez show how management and ownership interact to shape the strategy of the firm. In their view, the critical question to ask is not what is the best strategy, but rather, who is the strategy for? With numerous detailed examples, Strong Managers, Strong Owners is an invaluable resource for company owners, board members and executives, as well as their advisors in strategy and governance.

 

Voici la table des matières :

 

Part I. Changes in the Identity of Ownership and Management:
1. Change in ownership
2. Change in management
Concluding remarks
Part II. Changes in the Form of Ownership and Organization:
3. Change of legal structure
4. Change of organizational structure
Concluding remarks
Part III. Changes in Strategy:
5. Corporate and business strategies
6. Despite failure, NO change in ownership, management, or strategy
7. Because of success, reinforcement of ownership, management, and strategy
Concluding remarks
Part IV. Implications for Corporate Governance:
8. The board of directors
Conclusion – strategy for whom?

 

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

autres publications Gouvernance objectifs de l'entreprise Valeur actionnariale vs. sociétale

Reclaiming the idea of shareholder value

Michael J. Mauboussin et Alfred Rappaport ont publié il y a quelques jours un article dans la Harvard Business Review qui revient sur la valeur actionnariale : « Reclaiming the Idea of Shareholder Value ». Les auteurs insistent sur l’importance de définir et de communiquer clairement l’objectif des entreprises.

 

 

Corporate governance issues are constantly in the headlines. Activist investors challenge management strategies. Investors and others ask why companies binge on buybacks while skimping on value-creating investment opportunities. But discussions of corporate governance invariably miss the real problem: most public companies have extensive governance procedures but no governing objective. As a result, there is no sound basis for stakeholders, including shareholders, to assess the performance of the company and its executives.

Corporate governance is a system of checks and balances that a company designs to ensure that it faithfully serves its governing objective. The governing objective is the cornerstone upon which the organization builds its culture, communications, and choices about how it allocates capital. Think of it as a clear statement of what a company is fundamentally trying to achieve.

Today there are two camps that aim to define the idea of governing objective, but neither is effective. The first believes the company’s goal is to maximize shareholder value. Countries that operate under common law, including the United States and the United Kingdom, lean in this direction.

The second advocates that the company balance the interests of all stakeholders. Countries that operate under civil law, including France, Germany, and Japan, tend to be in this camp.

 

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

autres publications Gouvernance Normes d'encadrement normes de droit normes de marché

Governance goes green : à lire !

Beau rapport du cabinet Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP qui montre que la RSE ne peut plus être ignoré par les entreprises : « Governance Goes Green ».

 

It’s not just us tree-huggers. Increasingly, institutional investors, pension plans and regulators are calling for (and in some cases requiring) companies to assess and report on the sustainability of their business operations and investments. Climate change and other environmental concerns are at the forefront of these calls. Institutional investors are focusing on sustainable business practices – a broad category in which environmental and social risks, costs and opportunities of doing business are analyzed alongside conventional economic considerations – as a key factor in long-term financial performance. Sustainability proponents are looking to boards of directors and management to integrate these considerations into their companies’ long-term business strategies.

Éléments essentiels à retenir :

  • Institutional investors increasingly regard environmental and other sustainability issues as strategic matters for companies.
  • Shareholders continue to submit environmental and other sustainability proposals, successfully garnering attention and prompting companies to make changes, despite their failure to win majority votes.
  • Independent organizations are developing standards for sustainability and environmental reporting to provide investors with consistent metrics for assessing and comparing the sustainability of companies’ practices.
  • Sustainability and environmental reporting remains in the SEC’s sights as it evaluates the effectiveness of current disclosure requirements and considers changes for the future.

 

 

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian