Responsabilité sociale des entreprises | Page 3

Article sympathique à lire de Suren Gomtsian intitulé : « When Businesses Can Do Good: Lessons from the Coronavirus Crisis for Promoting Responsible Business Practices » (Oxford Business Law Blog).

Extrait :

Universal threats can unite opposing camps in a common effort. The new coronavirus has hit almost every country and has created a shared understanding that every effort to contribute, however small it may be, is needed to overcome the crisis. Many businesses, typically criticised for giving priority to profits and to the interests of shareholders and managers, are part of the common response to the virus.

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It is very unlikely that the virus has suddenly changed the corporate world. Clearly, the motivations of businesses for doing good may differ. While some have a genuine sense about their role in fighting the virus and helping those in need, many others view the crisis as a well-calculated opportunity to amend their battered reputations as partners and employers and gain advantage over competitors once the pandemic is over. But regardless of the motivations, the reaction of the corporate world to the pandemic offers three lessons for the promotion of responsible business practices in normal times.

First, in the absence of legislative action, change in corporate behaviour happens when there is broad consensus in society that collective action in response to a threat is an urgent priority. It is not poor ethics or morals that hold businesses back from working together with other parts of society, but disagreements about the scale and urgency of the problem. The collective response to coronavirus is the result of a broadly shared agreement on what companies are expected to do in the crisis that has emerged in almost every affected nation. Remarkably, companies are behaving differently even in the absence of legal reforms – laws on corporate purpose and directors’ duties are the same today as they were at the outset of the crisis.

Company founders and managers are a diverse group, and so are their preferences. Some may have serious concerns about global challenges facing humanity, such as inequality—whether of income, gender, race, or opportunities—or climate risks. But even these businesses may struggle in behaving responsibly because of concerns about becoming uncompetitive against less enlightened businesses. The classic collective action problem forces would-be responsible businesses to make the rational decision of ignoring inequality and environmental problems.

Where market failures like this are strong, the usual response is government intervention, for example, through the adoption of stricter employment protections or environmental standards. The reaction to the virus shows the power of a decentralized solution to the problem through collective social backlash. By increasing the costs of ignorant behaviour, broad society consensus promotes responsible business practices across markets and nations.

Second, businesses need clear guidelines as to what practical steps they are expected to take to meet the common goal. Governments have been clear about their expectations from businesses during the COVID-19 crisis by recommendations to preserve employment, cut dividends and share buybacks, and lower rents by property owners. Similarly, society in general has been sending clear signals about the expected behaviour by approving some actions taken by companies and showing discontent over undesired conduct in the form of widespread backlash.

For example, when Johnson & Johnson, a medical company, announced plans to invest US $1bn in developing a COVID-19 vaccine, the company’s shares jumped despite the not-for-profit nature of the project. By contrast, the decision by Sports Direct to keep shops open as essential or the decision by Adidas to skip rental payments on its stores led to public outcry and calls to boycott products in tabloid and social media. Similarly, the reluctance by the UK’s largest banks and German carmakers to cut dividends raised many eyebrows. Not only were some of these companies forced to apologize and reverse course, but their reputations were damaged too. Widely shared public reaction can thus send a clear message to all other businesses what to do and how not to behave.

Third, developing consensus over global challenges requires international cooperation. The exceptional scale of the current crisis coupled with the fear that governments responding to the crisis differently to others will face fierce questions explains why, even in the absence of coordination, all nations individually have acted similarly. But countries are likely to be affected differently, at least in the short run, on many other important matters. For example, the degree of underlying inequality varies across countries and some countries experience more acute climate-related risks, like forest fires or rising sea levels, than other nations. This means that atomistic development of consensus through peer pressure, unlike in the case of COVID-19, is highly unlikely. Local action, meanwhile, cannot offer meaningful solutions because markets are still global and responsible governments and businesses will not be able to compete if others do not act similarly.

To sum up, if we want businesses to act responsibly, we need to deliver a clear message by developing consensus over global challenges and communicating it clearly to businesses as one shared global voice. We also need to set out what practical steps businesses need to take to achieve the common goal – whether through government nudges or endorsements in social and news media. Where threats affect nations differently, this can be achieved only through cooperation on a global scale. Given the rise of national sovereign interests and national governments, we are facing a huge task in developing broad consensus on matters that are important. The arrival of responsible capitalism may thus take time. For now, until this consensus is formed, blame us and our elected governments, not businesses, for the failures of capitalism.

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Bonjour à toutes et à tous, on revient toujours aux B Corporation notamment la Public Benefit Corporation du Delaware ! Voici une des premières études empiriques menées sur le sujet : Michael B. Dorff, James Hicks et Steven Solomon Davidoff , « The Future or Fancy? An Empirical Study of Public Benefit Corporations » (4 février 2020).

Une belle question que se posent les auteurs : Using our novel dataset, we can discern whether for-profit investment is occurring in PBCs, and if so, whether it is different in kind from ordinary early stage investment.

Extrait :

The PBC has stirred much debate and speculation about the future of
the corporation. Some have called it the future while others decried the
form as mere public relations or purpose washing. In this article we
have attempted to add data to the debate. Using a hand-collected
sample of all Delaware-registered PBCs that received investment
between 2013 and 2018 we examine whether PBCs are the future or
mere fancy.
We find that neither hypothesis holds. Instead, we find that there are
295 PBCs which have received investment from VC funds amounting
to over $2.5 billion in the aggregate. This investment is significant
because it shows that the PBC form is not a failure and that it is
capable of attracting for-profit investment, a marker of success. This
investment is coming not just from pro-social VCs but from top-tier
firms.
Nonetheless, we also find that PBCs are being funded over a wide
range of mostly consumer-focused industries (banking, food,
education, technology, and more), implying that the form is a
secondary consideration to the for-profit motive. In other words, the
PBC form is most likely to receive VC funding when the PBC’s
business strategy suggests the form will benefit a for-profit mission.
Our evidence also suggests that PBC round sizes are smaller than their
purely profit-seeking peers, implying that VCs are taking less risk with
these forms than with traditional corporations.
Ultimately, we theorize that, based on our findings, the future course
of the PBC is uncertain.

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Belle tribune offerte par Les Échos.fr par M. Arnaud Marion : « Distribuer des dividendes en 2020 est contraire à l’intérêt social des entreprises, des Etats et des salariés » (25 mars 2020).

Extrait :

Le monde économique a toujours été animé par les paradoxes. Le début d’année 2020 restera marqué par la prise de conscience dans le monde occidental d’une crise planétaire au moment où les sociétés cotées terminaient leurs publications annuelles en affichant des records de croissance et de résultats, avant d’aller faire approuver quelques semaines après leurs comptes annuels, leurs rémunérations (en vertu du « say on pay ») et leurs dividendes devant leurs assemblées générales d’actionnaires. Les entreprises vont devoir résister à un mouvement tectonique économique mondial, inimaginable dans ses conséquences de court et moyen terme, à tel point que les entreprises ont annulé leurs rendez-vous investisseurs, et ne savent plus se prononcer sur leur « guidance » et leurs prévisions de résultats.

Plusieurs questions se posent pour les grandes entreprises et les entreprises cotées, qui vont faire face à une chute d’activité, mettre des salariés en chômage partiel, et peut-être par la suite à en licencier avant de retrouver sur le moyen terme un niveau d’activité normatif.closevolume_off

Comment la continuité d’exploitation va-t-elle être appréciée par les dirigeants et leurs commissaires aux comptes dans un contexte où aucune prévision ne peut être sérieusement faite sans une visibilité sur la fin de la pandémie, avec de surcroît une valeur des cash-flows qui s’est effondrée, et une prime de risque qui a bondi du fait d’une forte volatilité ?

Comment la démocratie actionnariale va-t-elle pouvoir s’exercer, sans occulter légalement les débats annuels nécessaires qui rendent responsables les mandataires sociaux de leurs actes de gestion devant leurs actionnaires une fois par an ? Ce virus ne peut pas être un prétexte pour museler la légitimité et le rôle des actionnaires, ni donner une immunité aux mandataires sociaux révocables ad nutum.

Comment les entreprises, qui sont dans l’incapacité de faire des prévisions, vont-elles pouvoir maintenir raisonnablement à leur ordre du jour la distribution de dividendes fondés sur des résultats passés ?

Point crucial. Ce dernier point est sans aucun doute le point le plus crucial alors que certaines grandes entreprises ont décidé de ne pas verser de dividendes. Il a une double résonance au nom de l’intérêt social. Comment effectivement des dirigeants et actionnaires peuvent-ils soutenir qu’il est dans « l’intérêt social de l’entreprise » de distribuer des dividendes et donc de la trésorerie alors qu’on ne sait pas de quoi est fait le lendemain avec une activité qui est aujourd’hui à l’arrêt à hauteur de 75 % sur le territoire ?

Comment pourrait-on concilier cette équation contre nature de rémunérer les actionnaires alors que dans les mêmes temps on ferait rémunérer une partie de ses salariés par le chômage partiel, voire financer son activité par la puissance publique redevenue État providence ? Ce serait revenir à une économie de la rente.

Comment enfin, l’intérêt social des salariés, salariés des fournisseurs et sous-traitants, serait garanti avec une rémunération pour les actionnaires aujourd’hui, sans savoir si demain elles pourront rémunérer tous leurs salariés, sous-traitants et fournisseurs ? La responsabilité sociale et environnementale doit être au cœur de ce débat, compte tenu du choc d’offre auquel les entreprises sont actuellement confrontées et du choc de demande qui s’ensuivra sans aucun doute.

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Bel article proposé par la professeure Tsuk Mitchell, Dalia : « From Dodge to eBay: The Elusive Corporate Purpose » (Virginia Law & Business Review, 2019, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 155-211) ! Cet article revient sur la fameuse mission des entreprises en confrontant les visions économiques et socio-politiques qui expliquent une lecture différentes de son contenu.

Résumé :

This article examines the history of the law of corporate purpose. I argue that the seemingly conflicting visions of corporate social responsibility and shareholder wealth maximization, which characterize contemporary debates about the subject, are grounded in two different paradigms for corporate law — a socio-political paradigm and an economic-financial one. Advocates of the socio-political paradigm have historically focused on the power that corporations could exercise in society, while those embracing the economic-financial paradigm expressed concerns about the power that the control group could exercise over the corporation’s shareholders. Over the course of the twentieth century, scholars have debated the merits of each of these paradigms and the concerns associated with them, while judges drew upon the academic and, more importantly, the managerial sentiments and concerns of the era to attach a purpose to corporate law’s doctrine, that is, the ultra vires doctrine in the early twentieth century, the enabling business judgment rule by mid-century, and the laws applicable to evaluating managerial responses to hostile takeovers at the century’s end. Ultimately, the cases seemingly addressing corporate purpose did not endorse wealth maximization or social responsibility as objectives. Rather, they empowered corporate managers to set corporate goals without interference from shareholders or the courts.

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