Gouvernance | Page 36

Le séminaire DRT-7022 donné à l’automne 2016 apportera aux étudiants une réflexion originale sur les liens entre la sphère économico-juridique, la gouvernance des entreprises et les enjeux sociétaux actuels. Le séminaire s’interrogera sur le contenu des normes de gouvernance et leur pertinence dans un contexte de profonds questionnements des modèles économique et financier.

En partenariat avec les éditions Yvon Blais, un prix (en dotation de livres) sera remis aux meilleurs travaux de recherche.

Pour faciliter la diffusion des travaux réalisés par les étudiants, le séminaire DRT-7022 fera appel à deux moyens. D’une part, le séminaire comprendra un colloque-étudiant. Les étudiants participeront comme conférenciers à un colloque organisé par le CÉDÉ. Cette tribune publique leur permettra de présenter le résultat de leurs recherches effectuées durant la session d’hiver. D’autre part, le séminaire bénéficiera du soutien de trois blogues : le blogue Droit de l’entreprise : gouvernance comparée et responsabilité sociétale (ici), le blogue de Jacques Grisé – Gouvernance (ici) et le blogue Gouvernance & services financiers du Centre d’Études en Droit Économique (CÉDÉ) (ici). Ces blogues seront des partenaires privilégiés en proposant aux étudiants de diffuser certains de leurs travaux afin de leur donner une audience provinciale et nationale, et ce, au travers d’un format original.

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Ivan Tchotourian

Un groupe de travail du Financial Reporting Council (FRC) a publié fin avril 2016 un bilan de la 1e phase de son travail : « Phase 1 Report of the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) ». Qu’en retenir ?

Objectifs

We support the objectives of the TCFD and welcome that it is focussing on financial risks and in particular those that could have a potential impact on future cash flows. We believe that this is important in identifying the boundary of information that would be relevant to investors’ decision-making. As with any project with multiple objectives there will be instances where a trade-off is necessary. Consistent principles are important, but absolute uniformity in disclosures detracts from careful consideration and communication of information that is relevant for its users. Whilst climate related risks will be important to many companies any recommendations must be proportionate and balanced, to avoid excessive focus on one set of risks to the detriment of disclosures of the other principal risks and uncertainties a company faces. Boards must retain responsibility for determining what disclosures, if any, on climate related risks are relevant and material. This requires an understanding of the potential impacts of climate change and legislative responses, and the application of judgement. Identification of factors to be considered by management when making such an assessment will be helpful.

Portée

The recommendation should provide preparers and their boards an understanding of the factors to consider when assessing, mitigating and, where necessary, reporting the climate change risks they might face. Factors to consider might include the sensitivity of its business model to climate related legislation (for example, the existence of low carbon substitute products or processes); the energy use and carbon emissions of the company, its products and suppliers; the company’s investment planning periods; and the geographical location of operations and its distribution channels. High risk sectors could then be used to illuminate those factors.

Utilisateurs

We note from the Phase 1 Report that the intended users for the information goes beyond those making direct investments in companies to those further back in the capital supply chain. We welcome this to ensure more informed capital allocation decisions. However the disclosure recommendations will need to take into consideration the needs of the intended audience and be dependent on the type of preparer as different considerations will apply for climate related risks arising from companies reporting on their own operational activities in their annual report and those investing in a portfolio of assets or advising on investment activities. We also encourage the TCFD to consider the placement of information outside the annual report when recommending disclosures that might go beyond the needs of the annual report’s intended audience. We encourage reporting of more detailed voluntary information for investors or other users outside the annual report so that it does not detract from the key messages.

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Ivan Tchotourian

Excellent texte auquel je viens d’accéder rédigé par Yvon Allaire et François Dauphin daté du 11 août 2016 et intitulé : “Making Say-on-Pay Vote Binding: a Good Idea?” (IGOPP).

Petit extrait :

The challenge of reading and understanding the particulars of executive compensation has become far more daunting. Indeed, for the 50 largest (by market cap) companies on the TSX in 2015 that were also listed back in 2000, the median number of pages to describe their compensation went from 6 in 2000 to 34 pages in 2015, ranging all the way up to 66 pages. Investors with holdings in dozens or hundreds of stocks face a formidable task. The simplest way out is either to vote per the stock’s performance or, more likely, rely on the recommendation of proxy advisory firms (which also base their “advice” on relative stock market performance. (…)

Boards of directors, compensation committees and their consultants have come to realize that it is wiser and safer to toe the line and put forth pay packages that will pass muster with proxy advisory firms. The result has been a remarkable standardization of compensation, a sort of “copy and paste” across publicly listed companies. Thus, most CEO pay packages are linked to the same metrics, whether they operate in manufacturing, retailing, banking, mining, energy, pharmaceuticals or services. For the companies on the S&P/TSX 60 index, the so-called long term compensation for their CEO in 2015 was based on total shareholder return (TSR) or the earnings per share growth (EPS) in 85% of cases. The proxy advisory firm ISS has been promoting these measures as the best way to connect compensation to performance. (…)

At a more fundamental level, the setting of pay policies should be the preserve of the board, as Canadian corporate law clearly states. When egregious pay packages are given to executives, a say-on-pay vote, compulsory or not, binding or not, will always be much less effective than a majority of votes against the election of members of the compensation committee. But that calls upon large investment funds to show fortitude and cohesiveness in the few instances of unwarranted compensation which occur every year.

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Ivan Tchotourian

Sous la plume de Gérard Bérubé, Le Devoir offre une belle photographie du débat que soulève en Grande-Bretagne la rémunération des hauts-dirigeants : « Vers un vote britannique contraignant sur la rémunération des grands patrons ». Les choses vont-elles changer ? Rien n’est moins sûr…

La progression de la rémunération des hauts dirigeants s’est accélérée au Royaume-Uni en 2015. Le gouvernement britannique pourrait récupérer la balle au bond pour modifier le paysage du « say on pay », avec l’imposition d’un vote contraignant pouvant servir de référence dans l’univers boursier.

L’agence Reuters indiquait lundi que la rémunération moyenne des hauts dirigeants britanniques avait augmenté de plus de 10 % en 2015, à 5,5 millions de livres. Selon l’étude du High Pay Centre, elle a atteint 5,48 millions de livres (9,4 millions $CAN) en 2015, contre 4,96 millions l’année précédente, pour les patrons des entreprises composant le FTSE 100, indice de référence de la Bourse de Londres. Ces émoluments équivalent à 140 fois le salaire moyen de leurs employés, ajoute l’étude, qui parle d’un bond de 33 % de la rémunération de ces grands patrons depuis 2010.

Reuters rappelle que la nouvelle première ministre britannique, Theresa May, s’est élevée contre le phénomène pour critiquer publiquement ces écarts croissants de salaires qui s’éloignent des intérêts à long terme des entreprises. « Avant de prendre la tête du gouvernement en juillet, Theresa May a proposé de rendre contraignant le vote des actionnaires sur la rémunération des dirigeants [qui est purement consultatif et sans effet direct]. Elle a aussi prôné davantage de transparence dans la définition des objectifs qui déclenchent le versement de primes et souhaité rendre public dans chacune de ces grandes entreprises le ratio entre le salaire du patron et celui du salarié moyen », peut-on lire.

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Ivan Tchotourian

Alors que le changement climatique est sur le devant de la scène et que les entreprises et les investisseurs ne peuvent l’ignorer, l’agence de notation extra-financière Vigeo a publié le 12 janvier 2016 une politique ambitieuse intitulé « Post COP21: How well companies & investors are positioned to respond to climate change » (Policy Briefing, Climate Change & Transition to a Low Carbon Economy). Ce document rappelle haut et fort que le changement climatique est une affaire d’entreprise et d’investisseur !

Investors have already played a key role in bringing about COP21, and in the post COP21 landscape, investors are vital to ensure meaningful results.

No doubt initiatives such as the Montreal Pledge, the RE100 investor initiative, investor campaigns on stranded assets, and the plethora of events both before and during COP21, demonstrated to governments investor will and thought-leadership here. The growing corporate-investor-government nexus whereby some companies are calling for a credible carbon price/tax is significant.

The importance of incentives for emissions reduction activities are recognised in the Agreement preamble, including domestic policies and carbon pricing.16 These calls to action will drive forward collective performance on climate change, in addition to the ongoing pressure investors can put on companies through the investment process.

Responsible investment plays a leading role in highlighting companies’ exposure to the risks of climate change and evaluating their capacity to mitigate them. Analyses from research intermediaries such as Vigeo Eiris can help investors to understand and better manage these mounting climate change risks.

At present, only a small proportion of companies are found to have an advanced response to climate change and energy transition. To drive forward performance, companies could be encouraged to tie Board-level remuneration to climate change targets. Corporate reporting could be improved, particularly through use of quantitative assessments, and companies should be encouraged to report on the impact of the whole product lifecycle on emissions. There is also room for much greater corporate acknowledgement of the policy context.

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Ivan Tchotourian

Alors que Theresa May a fait part de son intérêt d’importer en Grande-Bretagne le système allemand, MM. Horst Eidenmüller,  Mathias Habersack, Caspar Behme et Lars Klöhn  reviennent sur la pertinence de cette proposition en jetant un regard prudent (de chercheurs !) sur ce système : « Corporate Co-Determination German-Style as a Model for the UK? » (18 juillet 2016).

On 13 July 2016, Theresa May took up office as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. Only shortly before, she had made headlines when she proposed to adopt European-style worker representation on the boards of leading companies.

Corporate co-determination hence seems to gain a certain degree of popularity with the British government – which is highly astonishing, considering that it was the UK which most fiercely fought against co-determination on a European level. It was mainly the diverging views of the UK and Germany on co-determination which have thwarted projects like the Draft Fifth Company Law Directive or the establishment of a European Private Company (Societas Privata Europaea, SPE). It is downright ironic that while the UK now shows an interest in co-determination, the concept is being questioned in Germany after decades of lying dormant. The reason for the new German discussion of co-determination are doubts regarding the compatibility of its specific form of co-determination with higher-ranking Union law. This post provides a brief overview of the most recent developments in German co-determination law that were the focus of a joint Oxford/Munich conference at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität (LMU) in Munich in March 2016.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian