Normes d’encadrement | Page 6

Minerva Analytics apporte une belle mise à jour à la problématique de la diversité en m’apprenant que la Grèce vient de renforcer son dispositif juridique en matière de féminisation : « Greek companies will soon be mandated to meet a 25% female quota on their boards following a landmark decision for gender diversity ».

Extrait :

The quota requirement has been included as an amendment to the bill transposing the EU Shareholder Rights Directive II (SRD II) into Greek law, and is the result of a consultation led by a group of academics specialising in corporate governance.

(…)

Overall, the directive is designed to encourage companies away from short-termism, focusing on areas such as director remuneration. However, the Greek amendment marks the first time it has been used to tackle the EU’s poor record on gender diversity at a board level.

According to the European Commission’s 2019 report on equality between men and women, since 2015, progress on corporate gender inclusivity has stalled. As of October 2018, the proportion of women on the boards of the EU’s biggest companies was only 26.7%.

Within this, France was the only EU member state with at least 40% female representation at board-level, while women account for less than a third of board-level positions in Italy, Sweden, Finland and Germany.

According to the same data, women made up less than 10% of board members in Greece.

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David Larcker, Bradford Lynch, Brian Tayan et Daniel Taylor publient un texte qui revient sur la transparence des ghrandes entreprises américaines en matière de COVID-19 « The Spread of Covid-19 Disclosure » (29 juin 2020). Un document plein de statistiques et de tendances sur la transparence… vraiment intéressant sachant que l’enjeu de la question n’est pas à négliger.

Extrait :

The COVID-19 pandemic presents an interesting scenario whereby an unexpected shock to the economic system led to a rapid deterioration in the economic landscape, causing sharp changes in performance relative to expectations just a few months prior. For most companies, the pandemic has been detrimental. For a few, it brought unexpected demand. In many cases, supply chains have been strained, causing ripple effects that extend well beyond any one company.

How do companies respond to such a situation? What choices do they make, and how much transparency do they offer? How does disclosure vary in a setting where the potential impact is so widely uncertain? The COVID-19 pandemic provides a unique setting to examine disclosure choices in a situation of extreme uncertainty that extends across all companies in the public market. This devastating outlier event provides a rare glimpse into disclosure behavior by managers and boards.

Why This Matters

1. The COVID-19 pandemic provides a unique opportunity to examine disclosure practices of companies relative to peers in real time about a somewhat unprecedented shock that impacted practically every publicly listed company in the U.S. We see that decisions varied considerably about whether to make disclosure and, if so, what and how much to say about the pandemic’s impact on operations, finances, and future. What motivates some companies to be forthcoming about what they are experiencing, while others remain silent? Does this reflect different degrees of certitude about how the virus would impact their businesses, or differences in managements’ perception of their “obligations” to be transparent with the public? What does this say about a company’s view of its relation and duty to shareholders?
2. In one example, we saw a consumer beverage company make zero references to COVID-19 in its SEC filings and website, despite the virus plausibly having at least some impact on its business. In another example, we saw a company claim no material changes to its previously reported risk factors when managers almost certainly had relevant information about the virus and the likely impact on sales and operations. What discussion among the senior managers, board members, external auditor, and general counsel leads to a decision to make no disclosures? What should shareholders glean from this decision, particularly in light of peer disclosure?
3. The COVID-19 pandemic represents a so-called “black swan” event that inflicted severe and unexpected damage to wide swaths of the economy. What strategic insights will companies learn from this event? Can boards use these insights to prepare for other possible outlier events, such as climate events, terrorism, cyber-attacks, pandemics, and other emergencies? Should these insights be disclosed to shareholders?

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Intéressant article du Financial Times du 1er juillet 2020 qui revient sur le modèle allemand « German corporations — and regulation — are in the dock ».

Extrait :

Now the consensual German model of business has suffered multiple mechanical failures. Wirecard, the payments group that bolstered German tech credentials, has imploded in fraud. Bayer is taking up to $11bn in charges mostly triggered by a disastrous US takeover. Once-proud conglomerates Siemens and Thyssenkrupp are shrinking. Volkswagen’s service life shortens each time Tesla’s outlook improves.

(…) Germany, can we talk? “Sure. I’m driving but I’m German so that’s second nature,” jokes an economist via his hands-free, “I don’t think there is any common thread between Wirecard and these other examples.” According to him, the worst accidents occur when German business adopts US ways. Wirecard had a two-tier board structure, like most German businesses. But its supervisory board was seemingly full of corporate yespersons, not vigilant workers as governance rules dictate. And the group was led by a bossy entrepreneur. Kenneth Amaeshi, a professor of business at Edinburgh university, disagrees with such exceptionalism. He believes the Wirecard scandal puts German stakeholder capitalism “in the dock”. It points to a structural weakness of regulation, he says. He is right.

(…) Corporate governance must be overhauled this time.

Supervisory boards must shrink, meet more often and include more independent directors. Regulators must adopt the adversarial approach of US peers. Industrial giants should unbundle further to create a new tier of focused medium-sized businesses. Siemens’ 2018 flotation of Healthineers, a healthcare equipment unit, shows what can be done. Germany’s biggest challenge is spurring investment in disruptive technology. Business has depended on debt finance from risk-averse investors. But there is no lack of equity, as Guntram Wolff of Bruegel, a think-tank, points out. It features as retained corporate earnings rather than footloose investment capital. This is reflected in total equity of some €1.2tn on the balance sheets of Germany’s top 100 quoted companies, according to S&P Global data. Tax breaks are needed to chivvy more of this capital into start-ups and electric vehicle development. It would be a shame to waste two good crises — the meltdown of the German model plus coronavirus. Moreover, support is growing worldwide for stakeholder capitalism, in which social and environmental goals rank alongside profits. Germany just needs to reduce its emphasis on safe jobs for workers and well-networked managers. A little less consensus can make the German model roadworthy again.

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Dans le dossier Droit du travail et droit des sociétés : questions d’actualité réalisé sous la coordination scientifique de Jérôme Chacornac et Grégoire Duchange, je signale deux articles intéressants touchant les thématiques du blogue :

• L’obligation de prendre en considération les enjeux sociaux : quel impact pour les salariés d’une société ? Par Matthieu Buchberger
• Les administrateurs représentant les salariés : un renforcement de principe mais des difficultés pratiques ignorées… Par Valentino Armillei

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Le Code civil chinois a été adopté le 28 mai 2020. Il ne rentrera en vigueur qu’au 1er janvier 2021. Deux articles ont attirés mon attention dans une perspective de responsabilité sociétale, articles qui concerne le régime des For-Profit Legal Person (section 2). En substances, voici ce que précisent lesdits articles :

Les actionnaires ne doivent pas intenter à l’intérêt de la personne morale ou à celui des créanciers.

Les entreprises assument une responsabilité sociale.

Order of the President of the People’s Republic of China (No. 45)
The Civil Code of the People’s Republic of China, as adopted at the 3rd Session of the Thirteenth National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on May 28, 2020, is hereby issued, and shall come into force on January 1, 2021.
President of the People’s Republic of China: Xi Jinping
May 28, 2020
Civil Code of the People’s Republic of China
(Adopted at the 3rd Session of the Thirteenth National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on May 28, 2020)

Extrait :

• Article 83

An investor of a for-profit legal person shall not damage the interests of the legal person or any other investor by abusing the rights of an investor. If the investor abuses the rights of an investor, causing any loss to the legal person or any other investor, the investor shall assume civil liability in accordance with the law.
An investor of a for-profit legal person shall not damage the interests of a creditor of the legal person by abusing the independent status of the legal person and the limited liability of the investor. If the investor abuses the legal person’s independent status or the investor’s limited liability to evade debts, causing serious damage to the interests of a creditor of the legal person, the investor shall be jointly and severally liable for the legal person’s debts.

• Article 86

In business activities, a for-profit legal person shall comply with business ethics, maintain the safety of transactions, receive government supervision and public scrutiny, and assume social responsibilities.

Merci à mon collègue, le professeur Bjarne Melkevik, de cette information.

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Pour M. Ben Aamar et Mme Martinez, il faut que les entreprises doivent dépasser le « greenwashing » pour informer les investisseurs sur la résilience de leur modèle économique aux chocs environnementaux. Je vous invite à lire leur tribune : « Améliorer l’information environnementale des investisseurs doit devenir une priorité «  (Le Monde, 5 juin 2020).

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La pandémie actuelle peut aboutir à une prise de conscience collective et à un renforcement de la lutte contre les causes du dérèglement climatique, ou bien, au contraire, à une mise entre parenthèses des initiatives en ce sens, car l’attention ainsi que toutes les ressources financières seront consacrées à des mesures de relance économique. La cause climatique passerait alors au second plan face à l’urgence, avec, à terme, des conséquences désastreuses.

Le rôle des gouvernants est majeur. Mais pour orienter correctement les flux financiers, publics comme privés, améliorer l’information environnementale des investisseurs doit également devenir une priorité. Le sujet est peu connu du grand public car d’apparence technique. Pourtant, les enjeux sont considérables.

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