normes de droit Nouvelles diverses objectifs de l'entreprise Valeur actionnariale vs. sociétale
Primauté actionnariale et Benefit corporation
Ivan Tchotourian 9 janvier 2017
Le Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation propose un bel article sous la plume de Frederick Alexander : « Moving Beyond Shareholder Primacy: Can Mammoth Corporations Like ExxonMobil Benefit Everyone? ». Une belle occasion de revenir sur le thème de la Benefit Corporation et de la remise en cause de la primauté actionnariale dont elle peut être la cause…
The New York Times recently took issue with Rex Tillerson, the President-elect’s nominee for Secretary of State, and the current CEO of ExxonMobil. Why? “Tillerson Put Company’s Needs Over U.S. Interests,” accused the front page headline. The article details how the company puts shareholders’ interests before the interests of the United States and of impoverished citizens of countries around the world.
In response, a company spokesman insisted that all laws were followed, and that “‘[a]bsent a law prohibiting something, we evaluate it on a business case basis.’” As one oil business journalist puts it in the article: “‘They are really all about business and doing what is best for shareholders.’” Thus, as long as a decision improves return to shareholders, its effect on citizens, workers, communities or the environment just doesn’t rank.
Unfortunately, this idea—evaluate the “business” case, without regard to collateral damage, permeates the global capital system. Corporations are fueled by financial capital, which ultimately comes from our bank accounts, pension plans, insurance premiums and mutual funds, and from foundations and endowments created for public benefit—in other words, our money. And yet when that capital is invested in companies that ignore societal and environmental costs, we all suffer: Corporations use our savings to drive climate change, increase political instability, and risk our future in myriad ways.
The good news is that structures like “benefit corporations” can help us repair our broken system of capital allocation—but the clock is ticking.
À la prochaine…
Ivan Tchotourian
Gouvernance Nouvelles diverses Valeur actionnariale vs. sociétale
Court-termisme : les propositions de The Aspen Institute
Ivan Tchotourian 2 janvier 2017
The Aspen Institute (par l’intermédiaire de The American Prosperity Project Working Group) vient de publier un rapport proposant de contrer le court-termisme qui gangrène les entreprises américaines. Dans « The American Prosperity Project: Policy Framework », le groupe de travail propose 3 pistes de solutions qui sont les suivantes :
- Focus government investment on recognized drivers of long-term productivity growth and global competitiveness—namely, infrastructure, basic science research, private R&D, and skills training—in order to close the decades-long investment shortfall in America’s future. Building this foundation will support good jobs and new business formation, support workers affected by globalization and technology, and better position America to address the national debt through long-term economic growth.
- Unlock business investment by modernizing our corporate tax system to achieve one that is simpler, fair to businesses across the spectrum of size and industry, and supportive of both productivity growth and job creation. Changes to the corporate tax system could reduce the federal corporate statutory tax rate (at 35%, the highest in the world), broaden the base of corporate tax payers, bring off-shore capital back to the US, and reward long-term investment, and help provide revenues to assure that America’s long-term goals can be met.
- Align public policy and corporate governance protocols to facilitate companies’ and investors’ focus on long-term investment. Complex layers of market pressures, governance regulations, and business norms encourage short-term thinking in business and finance. The goal is a better environment for long-term investing by business leaders and investors, and to provide better outcomes for society.
Pour une synthèse de ce rapport de travail, vous pourrez lire cet excellent article d’Alana Semuels dans The Atlantic « How to Stop Short-Term Thinking at America’s Companies » (30 décembre 2016).
There was a time, half a century ago, when what was good for many American corporations tended to also be good for America. Companies invested in their workers and new technologies, and as a result, they prospered and their employees did too.
Now, a growing group of business leaders is worried that companies are too concerned with short-term profits, focused only on making money for shareholders. As a result, they’re not investing in their workers, in research, or in technology—short-term costs that would reduce profits temporarily. And this, the business leaders say, may be creating long-term problems for the nation.
“Too many CEOs play the quarterly game and manage their businesses accordingly,” Paul Polman, the CEO of the British-Dutch conglomerate Unilever, told me. “But many of the world’s challenges can not be addressed with a quarterly mindset.”
Polman is one of a group of CEOs and business leaders that have signed onto the American Prosperity Project, an initiative spearheaded by the Aspen Institute, to encourage companies and the nation to engage in more long-term thinking. The group, which includes CEOs such as Chip Bergh of Levi Strauss and Ian Read of Pfizer, board directors such as Janet Hill of Wendy’s and Stanley Bergman of Henry Schein, Inc., and labor leaders such as Damon Silvers of the AFL-CIO, have issued a report encouraging the government to make it easier for companies to think in the long-term by investing in infrastructure and changing both the tax code and corporate governance laws.
À la prochaine…
Ivan Tchotourian
Gouvernance Nouvelles diverses objectifs de l'entreprise
Plus de dividendes et moins d’investissement
Ivan Tchotourian 10 décembre 2016
Article inquiétant d’Olivier Pinaud ans L’Agefi.fr intitulé « Les dividendes prennent le dessus sur les investissements ». Il semblerait que face au ralentissement économique mondial, les entreprises aient décidé de conserver un versement de dividendes toujours aussi importants… et cela au détriment de l’investissement, nécessaire pourtant à la croissance économique et à la survie des entreprises elles-mêmes !
Malgré des perspectives de résultats en baisse, les groupes cotés versent des dividendes dans des proportions toujours plus grandes.
À la prochaine…
Ivan Tchotourian
Gouvernance normes de droit Nouvelles diverses Valeur actionnariale vs. sociétale
Enron : 15 ans déjà
Ivan Tchotourian 8 décembre 2016
Dans « Why Enron Remains Relevant » (Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, 2 décembre 2016), Michael W. Peregrine aborde les leçons de l’affaire Enron, 15 ans après. Un bel article !
The fifteenth anniversary of the Enron bankruptcy (December 2, 2001) provides an excellent opportunity for the general counsel to review with a new generation of corporate officers and directors the problematic board conduct that proved to have seismic and lasting implications for corporate governance. The self-identified failures of Enron director oversight not only led to what was at the time the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history, but also served as a leading prompt for the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and the corporate responsibility movement that followed. For those reasons, the Enron bankruptcy remains one of the most consequential governance developments in corporate history.
Enron evolved from a natural gas company to what was by 2001 a highly diversified energy trading enterprise that pursued various forms of particularly complex transactions. Among these were the soon-to-be notorious related party transactions in which Enron financial management executives held lucrative economic interests. (These were the so-called “Star Wars” joint ventures, with names such as “Jedi”, “Raptor” and “Chewco”). Not only was Enron’s management team experienced, both its board and its audit committee were composed of individuals with broad and diverse business, accounting and regulatory backgrounds.
In the late 1990s the company experienced rapid growth, such that by March 2001 its stock was trading at 55 times earnings. However, that rapid growth attracted substantial scrutiny, including reports in the financial press that seriously questioned whether such high value could be sustained. These reports focused in part on the complexity and opaqueness of the company’s financial statements, that made it difficult to accurately track its source of income.
By mid-summer 2001 its share price began to drop; CEO Jeff Skilling unexpectedly resigned in August; the now-famous Sherron Watkins whistleblower letter was sent (anonymously) to Board Chair Ken Lay on August 15. On October 16, the company announced its intention to restate its financial statements from 1997 to 2007. On October 21 the SEC announced that it had commenced an investigation of the related party transactions. Chief Financial Officer Andrew Fastow was fired on October 25 after disclosing to the board that he had earned $30 million from those transactions. On October 29, Enron’s credit rating was lowered. A possible purchaser of Enron terminated negotiations on November 28, and the company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on December 2.
The rest became history: the collapse of the company; the individual criminal prosecutions and convictions; the obstruction of justice verdict against company and, for Arthur Andersen (subsequently but belatedly overturned); the loss of scores of jobs and the collateral damage to the city of Houston; Mr. Lay’s sudden death; and, ultimately the 2002 enactment of the Sarbanes Oxley Act, which was intended to prevent future accounting, financial and governance failings as had occurred in Enron and other similar corporate scandals. But a 2016 Enron board briefing would be much more than a financial history lesson. For the continuing relevance of Enron is at least two-fold
À la prochaine…
Ivan Tchotourian
devoirs des administrateurs Gouvernance Nouvelles diverses objectifs de l'entreprise Valeur actionnariale vs. sociétale
Retour sur le devoir fiduciaire : une excuse pour maximiser le retour des actionnaires ?
Ivan Tchotourian 24 octobre 2016
Intéressant ce que relaie le Time. Il y a un des candidats à l’élection présidentielle américaine a invoqué le devoir fiduciaire pour justifier les politiques d’évitement fiscales qu’il a mises en œuvre pendant de nombreuses années : « Donald Trump’s ‘Fiduciary Duty’ Excuse on Taxes Is Just Plain Wrong ». Qu’en penser ? Pour la journaliste Rana Foroohar, la réponse est claire : « The Donald and his surrogates say he has a legal responsibility to minimize tax payments for his shareholders. It’s not a good excuse ».
It’s hard to know what to say to the New York Times’ revelation that Donald Trump lost so much money running various casino and hotel businesses into the ground in the mid-1990s ($916 million to be exact) that he could have avoided paying taxes for a full 18 years as a result (which may account for why he hasn’t voluntarily released his returns—they would make him look like a failure).
But predictably, Trump did have a response – fiduciary duty made me do it. So, how does the excuse stack up? Does Donald Trump, or any taxpayer, have a “fiduciary duty,” or legal responsibility, to maximize his income or minimize his payments on his personal taxes? In a word, no. “His argument is legal nonsense,” says Cornell University corporate and business law professor Lynn Stout,
À la prochaine…
Ivan Tchotourian
Nouvelles diverses Structures juridiques Valeur actionnariale vs. sociétale
L’entreprise a-t-elle une âme ?
Ivan Tchotourian 24 octobre 2016
Bonjour à toutes et à tous, c’est avec cette question que Michael Dorff (« Can a Corporation Have a Soul? ») ouvre un beau débat dans The Atlantic ? Merci à Mme Louise Champoux-Paillé d’avoir diffusé l’information sur cet article sur LinkedIn…
In light of recent corporate scandals such as Wells Fargo’s, one can be excused for wondering whether corporations seek anything beyond profits for their shareholders by any means necessary. In these days of activist hedge funds pressing companies for ever more share buybacks, is there room for a company that cares about its workers, the environment, or the communities in which it does business? In other words, can a company have a soul?
Mark Fields, the CEO of Ford Motor Company, believes so. In an interview with Fortune, he called Ford “a company with a soul,” pointing to a long-held policy of donating money and employees’ volunteer hours to the communities in which the company operates and to the company’s high rankings for good corporate behavior by an organization called the Ethisphere Institute. Fields quoted the company’s founder, Henry Ford, as saying, “A business that earns nothing but money is a poor business.”
Et la conclusion :
In the absence of any radical new regulations, for American-style capitalism to work again for the middle class as well as for the wealthy, more CEOs like Fields are going to have to adopt ambitious plans for implementing Henry Ford’s advice, plans that stretch far beyond making some charitable donations and implementing sustainability initiatives. They are going to have to give their companies true souls.
À la prochaine…
Ivan Tchotourian
Gouvernance Nouvelles diverses Valeur actionnariale vs. sociétale
Contradiction des acteurs de la gouvernance et préférence des actionnaires : l’exemple de Chanel
Ivan Tchotourian 21 septembre 2016
Au moins les propriétaires de Chanel, les frères Alain et Gérard Wertheimer, n’auront pas été affectés par la crise que traverse tout le secteur du luxe. Les actionnaires de cet empire non coté ont touché à eux deux 1,64 milliard de dollars (1,47 milliard d’euros) de dividendes en 2015. Une somme infiniment plus coquette que les 69 millions de dollars qu’ils avaient perçus au cours de l’exercice précédent.
C’est l’une des révélations des 92 pages du rapport annuel 2015 de Chanel International BV – l’entité néerlandaise qui chapeaute le groupe et ses filiales – que le magazine suisse Bilan et Le Monde se sont procuré. Ce document ratifié par le cabinet d’audit Deloitte a été déposé à la chambre de commerce d’Amsterdam.
Comme l’avait déjà révélé l’agence Reuters fin août, Chanel n’a pas été épargné par le retournement du marché. Ce groupe, qui met un point d’honneur à ne jamais diffuser le moindre chiffre, a vu ses ventes plonger de 17 % par rapport à 2014, à 6,24 milliards de dollars. Son résultat net a également reculé de 6,8 %, à 1,34 milliard de dollars. La rentabilité du groupe s’en est seulement un petit peu ressentie puisqu’elle est restée à un niveau extrêmement enviable de 25,7 % (contre 27,6 % un an plus tôt).
À la prochaine…
Ivan Tchotourian
