Structures juridiques | Page 7

Alors que le colloque du SASE va bientôt avoir lieu à Berkeley aux Etats-Unis, je reviens aujourd’hui sur ce que j’avais présenté au colloque qui s’était tenu en 2014 à Chicago : “Enterprise” and Lawyer’s view: By by Irresponsibility and Welcome in a New Area ».

Accédez au diaporama : PPT SASE 2014 version anglaise

Voici le résumé de cette intervention :

As institutions corporations and enterprises are the basis of capitalism and the subject of great interest for legal studies. Beyond regulation, the inherent nature of corporations raises sensitive legal questions, indeed, since its first appearance in the 18^th century. Inspired by economic and financial sciences, legal theories incorporate corporations to contracts (referred to as “aggregate theory”), a private government (referred to as “artificial theory”) and an autonomous entity (“entity theory” or “doctrine de l’entreprise” in Continental Europe). It is indeed argued that incorporating corporations to a simple nexus of contracts has been the subject of great attention since the 1970s, provided that none of the above theories have definitely won unanimity in law, as seen by a comparative reading of the Canadian, American and European jurisprudence. Corporate governance rules clearly demonstrate such incorporation. In its essence, however, the contractual analysis regards the corporation as a means to serving private interests whereby the liability schemes are limited to protecting the supplier of capital. The contractual analysis’s vision is indeed restricted, and it summarizes its goals, to the sought-after maximization of the corporation’s shareholders value. At the heart of the corporation’s issues lies the financial aspect. Within this framework, non-financial concerns appear far away and are dealt with as simple externality that poses management problems. Nonetheless, the corporation’s activities are bearing an economic power that is today seen as ever increasingly significant and its financial and non-financial consequences should be the basis of further thinking. Yet, Canadian law has engaged into this pathway. On the one hand, Canadian corporate law has experienced a profound re-assessment through the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions in Peoples (2004) and BCE (2008). Far from being a strict contractual reading of the corporation, these decisions have shed light on the importance of different paradigms such as corporate social responsibility and the stakeholders’ theory. Indeed, new incorporated corporate concepts have reshaped the way the corporation is perceived and its relationship with the environment. On the other hand, Canadian competition law attempts at integrating social concerns into its political sphere. In 2013, the Supreme Court of Canada has allowed the commencement of proceedings by indirect purchasers by way of a class action (see cases of Pros-sys, Sun-Rype and Infineon). Case law contemplates limiting the negative impact of anti-competition practices implemented by multinational corporations. The objective is to reinstate an economic balance as between corporations and its clients. The consumer is indeed called upon to play a protective role in the market in addition to the Canadian Competition authority’s competence. As affirmed by the Canadian Competition Tribunal in the decision of Visa/Master Card certain competition disputes between merchants are of common interest. Thus, the public should be made aware of the difficulties met by the businesses in the market. In light of the recent Canadian case law standpoint, it most certainly raises questions about the role that competition policies play within the corporation’s economic activities framework. This paper suggests showing the current legal positions of Canadian corporations and its competition law framework, in addition to putting them into perspective with  their US and European counterparts. In addition to demonstrating their convergence in favor of a more social concern, we stand for the proposition that corporations, as has been defined by the jurist, does not only form a contract. Indeed, it is an institution that carries responsibilities as against its own environment.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

En voilà une question allez-vous me répondre et pourtant… Un récent article du Harvard Business Review de Suntae Kim, Matthew Karlesky, Christopher Myers et Todd Schifeling intitulé « Why Companies Are Becoming B Corporations » aborde la question de face.

2 raisons essentielles sont identifiées :

1. First, as large established firms have ramped up their corporate social responsibility efforts, small businesses that have long been committed to social and environmental causes want to prove that they are more genuine, authentic advocates of stakeholder benefits.
2.  The qualitative evidence, gathered from firms’ B corporation application materials, revealed that certifying firms believed “the major crises of our time are a result of the way we conduct business,” and they became a B Corporation to “join the movement of creating a new economy with a new set of rules” and “redefine the way people perceive success in the business world.”

So why do certain firms (and not others) choose to identify as B Corporations? Individual leaders are partly why some organizations broaden their purpose beyond maximizing shareholder value. We might look to Sir Richard Branson, who in 2013 co-launched the “B Team,” publicly decrying corporations’ sole focus on short-term profits and calling for a reprioritization of people- and planet-focused performance. We might also consider leaders of firms like Ben & Jerry’s or Patagonia (both B Corporations) that have prioritized societal and environmental agendas.

Clearly, such leaders can be important catalysts of social change. However, the explosive growth of B Corporations seems also to be driven by broader trends and changes in the corporate landscape that cannot be explained by individuals’ actions alone.

Two of us (Suntae Kim and Todd Schifeling) conducted research to build a more robust understanding of the rise of B corporations. By qualitatively examining the internal motives of firms in the process of becoming a B corporation, and quantitatively testing key factors in these firms’ external industry environment – including the shareholder- and stakeholder-focused behaviors of their corporate competitors – we found that there are at least two major underlying reasons why firms choose to seek B Corporation certification.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Bonjour à toutes et à tous, deux des cinq firmes invitées à témoigner devant la commission parlementaire ont refusé toute responsabilité dans l’évasion fiscale (ici). Inquiétant non ?

Comme les banques avant elles, des firmes comptables sont venues dire aux élus québécois que ce n’est pas leur faute si des Canadiens ont recours aux paradis fiscaux pour payer moins d’impôt et que c’est aux gouvernements à resserrer leurs règles.

La Commission parlementaire des finances publiques à Québec a interrogé jeudi les représentants de deux firmes comptables sur leur rôle dans le recours aux paradis fiscaux à des fins d’évasion ou d’évitement fiscaux. Les représentants de KPMG et de Raymond Chabot Grant Thornton ont tour à tour affirmé que leurs firmes respectaient strictement, non seulement la lettre, mais aussi l’esprit de la loi.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

La Chaire L.R. Wilson, le CRDP de l’Université de Montréal et l’Institut de recherche en droit attractif de l’Université Paris-13 organisaient le 24 mars 2016 une journée d’étude franco-québécoise « Vers la consécration d’un devoir de vigilance : mythe ou réalité ?« .

À cette occasion, je me suis posé la question suivante : Existe-il un devoir de vigilance des institutions financières ? Quelle forme ce devoir de vigilance prend-t-il aujourd’hui ?

Alors que le devoir de vigilance est devenu un incontournable du monde juridique, apporter une réponse à cette double question est plus complexe qu’il n’y paraît de prime abord. D’une part, les banques ont une responsabilité qui s’est intensifiée depuis quelques années vis-à-vis de leurs clients et de certaines opérations. Les tribunaux se montrent parfois sévères en imposant aux banques un devoir accru de vigilance. D’autre part, les banques doivent également gérer de nouveaux risques, leur imposant de ce fait une vigilance particulière. Il en va ainsi des risques associés à leur saine gouvernance ou encore, ceux liés à la criminalité financière.

Pour accéder à la capsule-vidéo :

• http://www.chairelrwilson.ca/videos/2016/f-bicheron-et-i-tchotourian-les-banques/

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Le National Credit Union Administration est devenu la première des six Agences à dévoiler une proposition de règle d’implantation de l’article 956 de la loi américaine Dodd-Frank (« Incentive-based Compensation Arrangements », 17 CFR Part 303, Release No.; File no., RIN). Commentaire à recevoir au plus tard pour le 22 juillet 2016 !

The OCC, Board, FDIC, FHFA, NCUA, and SEC (the Agencies) are seeking comment on a joint proposed rule (the proposed rule) to revise the proposed rule the Agencies published in the Federal Register on April 14, 2011, and to implement section 956 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act). Section 956 generally requires that the Agencies jointly issue regulations or guidelines:

(1) prohibiting incentive-based payment arrangements that the Agencies determine encourage inappropriate risks by certain financial institutions by providing excessive compensation or that could lead to material financial loss; and

(2) requiring those financial institutions to disclose information concerning incentive-based compensation arrangements to the appropriate Federal regulator.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian