mission et composition du conseil d’administration | Page 9

Jacques Grisé relaie sur son blogue (ici) un intéressant article sur la pratique de la rémunération par les fonds activistes de candidats à des postes d’administrateurs : « Rémunération, par les fonds activistes, de candidats à des postes d’administrateurs | Est-ce acceptable ? ».

Un actionnaire activiste (Hedge Funds) qui veut faire élire un de ses partisans à un conseil d’administration ciblé peut-il le rémunérer afin qu’il puisse faire campagne pour son élection à un poste d’administrateur ?

Quelle est la loi à cet égard ? Quelles sont les recommandations de la firme ISS dans ces cas ?

La laisse dorée (« golden leash »), comme on appelle ce lien avec le promoteur de la campagne électorale, est-elle congruente avec le droit des actionnaires ? Ou, cette pratique est-elle sujette à d’éventuels conflits d’intérêts au détriment des actionnaires ?

Il semble bien que cette pratique soit de plus en plus répandue et qu’elle soit « légale », bien que la SEC n’ait pas dit son dernier mot à ce stade-ci. La pratique est appuyée par les grandes firmes de conseil en votation (ISS et Glass Lewis).

L’article publié par Andrew A. Schwartz, professeur à l’École de droit de l’Université du Colorado, est paru aujourd’hui sur le forum de la HBL School on Corporate Governance. On y présente différentes  problématiques, telles que la volonté des CA de bloquer l’élection d’administrateurs externes et la volonté des fonds activistes de remplacer certains administrateurs par des candidats favorables aux changements stratégiques souhaités.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

En mai 2016, l’Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators (ICSA) a publié avec Ernst & Young un rapport sur le rôle du comité de nomination : « The Nomination Committee – Coming out of the Shadows ».

While its role may be less clearly defined than that of the audit committee, and its profile lower than that of the remuneration committee, it is arguably the most important of the three. It plays a pivotal role in appointing directors to the board and, if the board lacks the right balance, knowledge, skills and attributes, the likelihood of it and its committees operating effectively is greatly reduced.

Concernant sa mission et ses membres, il est précisé les points suivants :

1. What the appropriate role of the committee should be, e.g., whether the committee should look at executive talent if it does not already do so, and whether the board would benefit from combining the committee into a nomination and governance committee.

2. Whether the following processes are clearly linked: the discussion of current board composition and future composition in light of the company’s strategy, the executive and senior talent succession planning and company strategy, the outcome of the board evaluation exercise and board succession plans, and the link between board evaluations and development and training plans.

3. The existence of a two-pronged approach to identify succession plans in both emergency and steady-state situations.

À propos de la planification de la relève et la détection de talent, le rapport mentionne relativement au comité :

1. The extent to which nomination committee looks across the market and internally to identify four or five potential successors to the CEO.

2. How deeply into the organisation the committee should be looking to identify future talent.

3. The best way to develop the skills of future executive leaders in the business.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

L’EHRC vient de publier un guide « Business and human rights – A five-step guide for company boards » bien intéressant pour les CA. Comme le précise ce document : « We recommend that boards should follow five steps to ensure that their company is fulfilling its responsibility to respect human rights in a robust and coherent manner that meets the expectations of the UN Guiding Principles and UK statutory reporting obligations. Boards should be aware of the company’s salient, or most severe, human rights risks, and ensure ».

The following are the five steps that it is recommended boards should follow to ensure that their company is fulfilling its responsibility to meet human rights in a robust and coherent manner that meets the expectations of the UN Guiding Principles and UK statutory reporting obligations:

1. the company should embed the responsibility to respect human rights into its culture, knowledge and practices;
2. the company should identify and understands its salient, or most severe, risks to human rights;
3. the company should systematically address its salient, or most severe, risks to human rights and provide for remedies when needed;
4. the company should engage with stakeholders to inform its approach to addressing human rights risks; and
5. the company should report on its salient, or most severe, human rights risks and meet regulatory reporting requirements.

Attention : encore une fois, tout cela n’est que du droit international et donc du droit « mou ». Ce guide l’exprime très bien en ces termes : « The Guiding Principles do not create any new international legal obligations on companies, but they can help boards to operate with respect for human rights and meet their legal responsibilities set out in domestic laws ».

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourain

L’Autorité prudentielle de la Banque d’Angleterre vient de publier un Supervisory Statement intitulé « Corporate governance: Board responsibilities » (SS5/16, mars 2016).

The Prudential Regulation Authority has published a policy statement and accompanying supervisory statement concerning the responsibilities of boards.

The purpose of this supervisory statement is to identify, for the boards1 of firms regulated by the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), those aspects of governance to which the PRA attaches particular importance and to which the PRA may devote particular attention in the course of its supervision. It is not intended to provide a comprehensive guide for boards of what constitutes good or effective governance. There are more general guidelines for that purpose, for example the UK Corporate Governance Code, published by the Financial Reporting Council.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Belle réflexion offerte par le Financial Times sur le rôle que le conseil d’administration devrait assumer en matière de rémunération des dirigeants : « Boards are responsible for limiting excess pay » (Financial Times, 17 avril 2016).

Boards of directors are not appointed to rubber-stamp formulas devised by consultants, no matter what the result. If there appears to be something awry, they should be able to exercise their judgment and not be limited by employment contracts that deny them authority. BP’s remuneration committee failed this simple test and so found itself exposed to scorn.

Nothing absolves a board of its responsibility to limit the quantum of pay. Chief executives perform tough, demanding, responsible jobs and their decisions heavily affect the value of companies. But it is not obvious why some need to be paid double-digit millions to do their best when single-digit millions or less were accepted as sufficient financial rewards not so long ago.

Boards sometimes need to compete for talent, signing contracts that raise expectations and constrain their freedom to cap pay. As the tenure of CEOs has reduced, bosses want to get rich faster. Some argue that they could earn more in private equity, away from the unforgiving public spotlight.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian