Gouvernance | Page 2

« Should boards include an employee representative? » de Richard Dunnett dans Director (12 septembre 2016) propose 2 points de vue radicalement différents sur la question.

• Oui pour Stefan Stern, directeur du High Pay Centre

Something is too often lacking from the conversation at board level: an eyewitness account from the shop floor. How easy it is to forget the perspective of ordinary employees, even in the middle of discussi
ons that will have a direct impact on their lives. ‘Consultation’ is, sadly, one of the most abused management terms. It makes practical sense to listen to the views of colleagues before taking decisions that affect them. So introducing the employees’ point of view into the boardroom, through employee representatives, must make sense.

• Non pour Jim Prior, P-DG de The Partners and Lambie-Nairn

The proposal betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of how companies work in its failure to distinguish between leadership and governance. In most large companies it is the executive leadership team that makes the decisions which most affect employees, not the board. Yes, corporate leaders should listen to employees but the role of the board should be to identify and act on situations where leaders fail to listen, not to do the listening for them.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Sous la plume de Gérard Bérubé, Le Devoir offre une belle photographie du débat que soulève en Grande-Bretagne la rémunération des hauts-dirigeants : « Vers un vote britannique contraignant sur la rémunération des grands patrons ». Les choses vont-elles changer ? Rien n’est moins sûr…

La progression de la rémunération des hauts dirigeants s’est accélérée au Royaume-Uni en 2015. Le gouvernement britannique pourrait récupérer la balle au bond pour modifier le paysage du « say on pay », avec l’imposition d’un vote contraignant pouvant servir de référence dans l’univers boursier.

L’agence Reuters indiquait lundi que la rémunération moyenne des hauts dirigeants britanniques avait augmenté de plus de 10 % en 2015, à 5,5 millions de livres. Selon l’étude du High Pay Centre, elle a atteint 5,48 millions de livres (9,4 millions $CAN) en 2015, contre 4,96 millions l’année précédente, pour les patrons des entreprises composant le FTSE 100, indice de référence de la Bourse de Londres. Ces émoluments équivalent à 140 fois le salaire moyen de leurs employés, ajoute l’étude, qui parle d’un bond de 33 % de la rémunération de ces grands patrons depuis 2010.

Reuters rappelle que la nouvelle première ministre britannique, Theresa May, s’est élevée contre le phénomène pour critiquer publiquement ces écarts croissants de salaires qui s’éloignent des intérêts à long terme des entreprises. « Avant de prendre la tête du gouvernement en juillet, Theresa May a proposé de rendre contraignant le vote des actionnaires sur la rémunération des dirigeants [qui est purement consultatif et sans effet direct]. Elle a aussi prôné davantage de transparence dans la définition des objectifs qui déclenchent le versement de primes et souhaité rendre public dans chacune de ces grandes entreprises le ratio entre le salaire du patron et celui du salarié moyen », peut-on lire.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

May expressed discontent with the current model of corporate governance used by FTSE companies and in particular the effectiveness of supposedly independent non-executive directors. ‘In practice, they are often drawn from the same narrow social and professional circles as the executive team and the scrutiny they provide is often limited,’ she said. So, she suggests, workers and even consumers should be given a seat at the table.

May wrote she wants to tackle the ‘unhealthy and growing gap between what these companies pay their workers and what they pay their bosses.’ Specifically she wants to make shareholder votes on corporate pay packages binding instead of advisory and ‘simplify the way bonuses are paid so that the bosses’ incentives are better aligned with the long-term interests of the company.’

Le Financial reporting Council vient de publier un document de consultation : « UK Board Succession Planning » (ici). Voici ce qu’on peut y lire…

The FRC’s interest stems primarily from the fact that the quality of succession planning is one of the most frequent issues highlighted as a consequence of board evaluation. Stakeholders have suggested that we promote good practice to raise quality. The FRC also wishes to address the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards’ recommendations to the FRC on issues around director nomination, in which it commented that there is a ‘widespread perception that some “natural challengers” are sifted out by the nomination process. The nomination process greatly influences the behaviour of non-executive directors and their board careers.’

This paper is the result of discussions with a wide range of interested parties – individually and through group sessions – and analysis of other research. Our stakeholders have been extremely generous with their time and candid with their views, for which we are grateful. The aim of this paper is to look at the key issues, to identify suggestions for good practice and, more specifically, to examine how the nomination committee can play its role effectively. We are seeking to provoke discussion, and welcome your feedback on our approach and the issues and questions we have posed.

Issues explored in the paper include:

• how effective board succession planning is important to business strategy and culture;
• the role of the nomination committee;
• board evaluation and its contribution to board succession;
• identifying the internal and external ‘pipeline’ for executive and non-executive directors;
• ensuring diversity; and
• the role of institutional investors.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian