normes de droit | Page 3

Dans un article publié récemment (« Majority Voting: Latest Developments in Canada »), Stephen Erlichman revient sur la situation du vote majoritaire au Canada à travers les positions :

1. du gouvernement fédéral avec le projet de loi C-25
2. de la TSX dans un document publié en mars 2017 : « TSX Releases Guidance with respect to Majority Voting Policies and Advance Notice Policies » (du cabinet McCarthy tetrault)
3. du gouvernement de l’Ontario : « Business Law Advisory Council Fall 2016 Report »

Une belle mise à jour !

A previous post on this site was written about (i) the Toronto Stock Exchange (“TSX”) adopting a majority voting listing requirement, effective June 30, 2014, which requires each director of a TSX listed issuer (other than those which are majority controlled) to be elected by a majority of the votes cast, other than at contested meetings (the “TSX Majority Voting Requirement”) and (ii) Bill C-25 which was introduced by the federal Canadian government on September 28, 2016 and proposes amendments to the Canada Business Corporations Act (“CBCA”) that include true majority voting (i.e., by requiring shareholders to cast their votes “for” or “against” each individual director’s election and prohibiting a director who has not been elected by a majority of the votes cast from serving as a director except in prescribed circumstances) (the “Bill C-25 Amendments”). This post explains the latest developments in Canada with respect to both of these initiatives, as well as a further development with respect to majority voting in the Province of Ontario.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Le Code de gouvernance allemand vient d’être réformé récemment : « Germany corp gov code to emphasise investor responsibility » (Susanna Rust, IPE, 15 février 2017). Vous trouverez dans cet article une belle synthèse de cette réforme.

Germany’s corporate governance code is being amended to emphasise that institutional investors have a responsibility to exercise their ownership rights.

The amendments follow a six-week consultation period that generated a strong response, both positive and critical, according to the government-appointed commission responsible for the code. The commission decided on changes to the code itself and the preamble, which sets out the spirit behind the code.

The preamble has been extended to argue that good corporate governance requires companies and their directors to conduct business ethically and take responsibility for their behaviour. The German word used by the commission for the latter is “Eigenverantwortung” – literally translated as “self-responsibility” or “own-responsibility”.

The guiding principle of an “honourable businessperson” (“ehrbarer Kaufmann”) was introduced to the preamble to reflect this.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Steven Cole de l’Australian Institute of Company Directors a suggér dans un article de BusinessNews 7 manièeres d’améliorer l’assemblée annuelle des actionnaires : « 7 ways to improve the AGM » (7 mars 2017). La saison des assemblées approchant, cet article tombe à point nommé pour réfléchir sur la nécessité de rendre les assemblées (a priori, lieu d’exercice de la démocratie actionnariale) plus attrayante.

The annual general meeting has come under fire for not staying relevant in the contemporary corporate  governance environment. Australian Institute of Compnay  Login Directors Fellow Steven Cole suggests ways we could improve the AGM.

(…) Criticisms of AGM effectiveness generally fall into two  Login categories, informational and procedural. On the informational side, critics argue that the meetings yield little information that is not already available to the market; the materials that are prepared for the meeting, including the directors’ report, remuneration report, corporate governance statement, auditors report and financial statements are complex and difficult to understand; and that institutional shareholders gain more frequent and better quality information than retail shareholders. When it comes to procedure, critics say that since most shareholders, by number and by percentage of holding, have already voted by proxy, the deliberations at the meeting have no material bearing on the resolution of the outcomes.

Je vous laisse lire la suite…

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Bel article du Journal de Montréal : « Le rendement à court-terme, une menace pour nos entreprises » (22 novembre 2016). Une occasion de discuter gouvernance d’entreprise en se concentrant sur la situation actuelle caractérisée par une omniprésence des investisseurs institutionnels !

Auparavant, les petits investisseurs québécois conservaient leurs actions en bourse en moyenne 10 ans. Aujourd’hui, à peine quatre mois. Quelque chose a changé dans notre rapport aux entreprises. Et pas pour le mieux, dit Gaétan Morin, président et chef de la direction du Fonds de solidarité FTQ.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

IR Magazine offre un bel article sur la situation des entreprises américaines ayant fait leur entrée en bourse en assumant un capital-actions à classe action multiple : « How common are restricted voting rights for US shareholders? » (8 mars 2017). Une excellente occasion de revenir sur la discussion qui a entouré la récente entrée en bourse de Snap Inc.

Petits extraits d’une tendance en pleine expansion :

Snap’s IPO last week will likely be the biggest and most controversial on the NYSE in 2017. The operating company in charge of Snapchat drew ire from certain parts of Wall Street for its three-tier voting structure, which offered no voting rights to any new investors that participated in the IPO.

 

(…) While it is unprecedented to offer no voting rights during an IPO, the number of companies offering restricted voting rights is on the rise.
According to data from Dealogic, 27 of the 174 IPOs in the US in 2015 used dual-class structures – roughly half of these were technology companies. In 2005, just 1 percent of all IPOs used that structure.

 

(…) Bob Lamm, senior adviser to Deloitte’s Center for Boardroom Effectiveness, says that companies can still maintain positive relationships with investors while operating with a restricted share structure.

‘Most public companies can develop good governance practices and explain why they do what they do,’ he says, speaking to IR Magazine. ‘But if they don’t convey good corporate governance practices, they run the risk of investor discontent.’

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian