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Proposal for a Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD)

Le 21 avril 2021, l’Union européenne a publié une série de mesures touchant la taxonomie, le reporting extra-financier et les devoirs des investisseurs institutionnels.

Éléments essentiels :

The Commission adopted a proposal for a Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD), which would amend the existing reporting requirements of the NFRD. The proposal

  • extends the scope to all large companies and all companies listed on regulated markets (except listed micro-enterprises)
  • requires the audit (assurance) of reported information
  • introduces more detailed reporting requirements, and a requirement to report according to mandatory EU sustainability reporting standards
  • requires companies to digitally ‘tag’ the reported information, so it is machine readable and feeds into the European single access point envisaged in the capital markets union action plan

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Les adieux au reporting extra-financier… vraiment ?

Blogging for sustainability offre un beau billet sur la construction européenne du reporting extra-financier : « Goodbye, non-financial reporting! A first look at the EU proposal for corporate sustainability reporting » (David Monciardini et Jukka Mähönen, 26 April 2021). Les auteurs soulignent la dernière position de l’Union européenne (celle du 21 avril 2021 qui modifie le cadre réglementaire du reporting extra-financier) et explique pourquoi celle-ci est pertinente. Du mieux certes, mais encore des critiques !

Extrait :

A breakthrough in the long struggle for corporate accountability?

Compared to the NFRD, the new proposal contains several positive developments.

First, the concept of ‘non-financial reporting’, a misnomer that was widely criticised as obscure, meaningless or even misleading, has been abandoned. Finally we can talk about mandatory sustainability reporting, as it should be.

Second, the Commission is introducing sustainability reporting standards, as a common European framework to ensure comparable information. This is a major breakthrough compared to the NFRD that took a generic and principle-based approach. The proposal requires to develop both generic and sector specific mandatory sustainability reporting standards. However, the devil is in the details. The Commission foresees that the development of the new corporate sustainability standards will be undertaken by the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG), a private organisation dominated by the large accounting firms and industry associations. As we discuss below, the most important issue is to prevent the risks of regulatory capture and privatization of EU norms. What is a step forward, though, is the companies’ duty to report on plans to ensure the compatibility of their business models and strategies with the transition towards a zero-emissions economy in line with the Paris Agreement.

Third, the scope of the proposed CSRD is extended to include ‘all large companies’, not only ‘public interest entities’ (listed companies, banks, and insurance companies). According to the Commission, companies covered by the rules would more than triple from 11,000 to around 49,000. However, only listed small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are included in the proposal. This is a major flaw in the proposal as the negative social and environmental impacts of some SMEs’ activities can be very substantial. Large subsidiaries are thereby excluded from the scope, which also is a major weakness. Besides, instead of scaling the general standards to the complexity and size of all undertakings, the Commission proposes a two-tier regime, running the risk of creating a ‘double standard’ that is less stringent for SMEs.

Fourth, of the most welcomed proposals, however, is strengthening a double materiality’ principle for standards (making it ‘enshrined’, according to the Commission), to cover not only just the risks of unsustainability to companies themselves but also the impacts of companies on society and the environment. Similarly, it is positive that the Commission maintains a multi-stakeholder approach, whereas some of the international initiatives in place privilege the information needs of capital providers over other stakeholders (e.g. IIRCCDP; and more recently the IFRS).

Fifth, a step forward is the compulsory digitalisation of corporate disclosure whereby information is ‘tagged’ according to a categorisation system that will facilitate a wider access to data.

Finally, the proposal introduces for the first time a general EU-wide audit requirement for reported sustainability information, to ensure it is accurate and reliable. However, the proposal is watered down by the introduction of a ‘limited’ assurance requirement instead of a ‘reasonable’ assurance requirement set to full audit. According to the Commission, full audit would require specific sustainability assurance standards they have not yet planned for. The Commission proposes also that the Member States allow firms other than auditors of financial information to assure sustainability information, without standardised assurance processes. Instead, the Commission could have follow on the successful experience of environmental audit schemes, such as EMAS, that employ specifically trained verifiers.

No time for another corporate reporting façade

As others have pointed out, the proposal is a long-overdue step in the right direction. Yet, the draft also has shortcomings, which will need to be remedied if genuine progress is to be made.

In terms of standard-setting governance, the draft directive specifies that standards should be developed through a multi-stakeholder process. However, we believe that such a process  requires more than symbolic trade union and civil society involvement. EFRAG shall have its own dedicated budget and staff so to ensure adequate capacity to conduct independent research. Similarly, given the differences between sustainability and financial reporting standards, EFRAG shall permanently incorporate a balanced representation of trade unions, investors, civil society and companies and their organisations, in line with a multi-stakeholder approach.

The proposal is ambiguous in relation to the role of private market-driven initiatives and interest groups. It is crucial that the standards are aligned to the sustainability principles that are written in the EU Treaties and informed by a comprehensive science-based understanding of sustainability. The announcement in January 2020 of the development of EU sustainability reporting standards has been followed by the sudden move by international accounting body the IFRS Foundation to create a global standard setting structure, focusing only on financially material climate-related disclosures.  In the months to come, we can expect enormous pressure on EU policy-makers to adopt this privatised and narrower approach, widely criticised by the academic community.

Furthermore, the proposal still represents silo thinking, separating sustainability disclosure from the need to review and reform financial accounting rules (that remain untouched). It still emphasises transparency over governance. Albeit it includes a requirement for companies to report on sustainability due diligence and actual and potential adverse impacts connected with the company’s value chain, it lacks policy coherence. The proposal’s link with DG Justice upcoming legislation on the boards’ sustainability due diligence duties later this year is still tenuous.

After decades of struggles for mandatory high-quality corporate sustainability disclosure, we cannot afford another corporate reporting façade. It is time for real progress towards corporate accountability.

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Entreprise sociale : Chypre adopte une loi

Nouvelle qui intéressera nos lectrices et lecteurs du blogue : « Cyprus passes Social Enterprise Law » (par Alexandra Fougala-Metaxa, Pioneer Post, 30 mars 2021).

Extrait :

Social enterprises in Cyprus now have their own legal framework. In December 2020, the House of Representatives of Cyprus passed, for the first time, a Social Enterprise Law. The bill was initially introduced in 2013 and it has taken seven years for it to be approved, reportedly due to many modifications, debates and delays. 

Prior to this, Cyprus had no legal framework for social enterprises. According to a social enterprise mapping report for Cyprus, carried out by the European Commission, there were only seven organisations that could be described as ‘social enterprises’ in Cyprus in 2014. A recent survey by CyprusInno of entrepreneurs in the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities found that 11% of the 359 entrepreneurs surveyed said they ran social enterprises.

Maria Nomikou, the youth, skills and inclusive communities sector lead for Europe at the British Council, says: “A law on social enterprises can have a very positive impact as it fosters visibility, growth and the development of this type of business.”

Visibility surrounding social enterprises is key to encouraging the growth of the sector in Cyprus. For years, the lack of a legal definition of the term social enterprise meant that social enterprises in Cyprus operated as either limited liability companies or charities. The problem with this, as identified by Andrea Solomonides, the lead of Cyprus operations at enterprise support organisation Cypriot Enterprise Link, was it created an image problem – many people did not think that working full time for social enterprises was financially sustainable, and thus the sector struggled to attract staff. 

A law defining social enterprises as separate, unique entities, distinct from other types of businesses or non-profits, helps increase awareness. The law also means that social enterprises will have access to EU grants available only to the social enterprise sector, and receive various tax benefits, which, Maria Nomikou hopes, will motivate people to set up their own social enterprises.

(…) The definition of social enterprises under the new law is as enterprises with a social cause that reinvest a proportion of their profits back into their work, or enterprises that hire a certain proportion of their staff from vulnerable groups.

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Conditions de travail des ouvriers chinois : pas de poursuite en France !

L’entreprise sud-coréenne Samsung, spécialisée dans l’électronique, a été contrainte de se défendre, jeudi 11 janvier, après que deux ONG avaient apporté de nouveaux éléments à leurs accusations de violations des droits de l’homme dans les usines chinoises du constructeur (ici). Le Monde nous apprend que les poursuites judiciaires n’auront pas lieu : « Conditions de travail des ouvriers chinois : les poursuites contre Samsung France annulées » (26 avril 2021).

Extrait :

La filiale du leader mondial des smartphones avait en effet été mise en examen en avril 2019 pour « pratiques commerciales trompeuses », du fait de la présence sur son site Internet de son opposition au travail forcé et au travail des enfants.

(…) Selon une source judiciaire, cette plainte a été jugée irrecevable le 30 mars par la chambre de l’instruction de la cour d’appel de Paris, au motif que les ONG ne disposaient pas de l’agrément pour agir en justice contre des « pratiques commerciales trompeuses ».

Cette décision entraîne de fait la nullité de la procédure qu’elles avaient lancée, et a donc pour conséquence d’annuler la mise en examen de Samsung France. La maison mère, Samsung Electronics, a dit « prendre acte » de ces décisions, sans plus de commentaires.

(…)

Afin de justifier une procédure pénale en France, les ONG estimaient suffisant que le message incriminé soit accessible aux consommateurs français pour que les juridictions du pays soient compétentes. S’appuyant sur divers rapports d’ONG qui ont pu se rendre dans les usines du groupe en Chine, en Corée du Sud et au Vietnam, Sherpa et Actionaid dénonçaient l’« emploi d’enfants de moins de seize ans », des « horaires de travail abusifs », des « conditions de travail et d’hébergement incompatibles avec la dignité humaine » et une « mise en danger des travailleurs ».

Une autre association, UFC-Que choisir, a déposé elle aussi en février à Paris une plainte avec constitution de partie civile pour pratiques commerciales trompeuses visant le groupe, et attend désormais que la justice se prononce.

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Fausse publicité en matière de RSE : New York tente sa chance

On le sait depuis longtemps : la publicité mensongère peut être un fondement de durcissement de la RSE Voilà qu’une actualité du Journal de Québec vient le confirmer (« New York accuse ExxonMobil, BP et Shell de « tromperie » sur les énergies propres », 22 avril 2021)… même si on ne sait pas l’issue de la procédure enclenchée.

Extrait :

La plainte de 97 pages leur reproche aussi « d’amplifier les bienfaits pour le climat » des produits liés au gaz naturel, aux biocarburants ou à l’hydrogène.

Elle accuse par ailleurs les entreprises, ainsi que la puissante fédération professionnelle du secteur API, de « présenter de façon erronée » les impacts climatiques des énergies fossiles.

Lutter contre le changement climatique signifie aussi « s’attaquer à certaines des plus grandes entreprises polluantes pour publicité mensongère et greenwashing », a justifié le maire de la ville, Bill de Blasio, dans un communiqué.

La plainte a été déposée le jour de l’ouverture du sommet virtuel sur le climat organisé par le président américain Joe Biden.

« Lorsque des compagnies pétrolières présentent leurs produits avec des mots comme « plus écologiques » ou « plus propres », tout en omettant de divulguer les effets réels de ces produits, cela nuit à la capacité des consommateurs à prendre des décisions éclairées », a estimé Lorelei Salas, du département de protection des consommateurs et des travailleurs de la ville.

Ce n’est pas la première fois que New York part à l’assaut des géants du secteur pétrolier.

La mairie avait porté plainte en janvier 2018 contre BP, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil et Shell pour leurs responsabilités dans le changement climatique, une plainte rejetée en appel début avril.

La ville de New York a aussi perdu fin 2019 un procès contre ExxonMobil, qu’elle accusait d’avoir trompé les investisseurs en prétendant à tort intégrer pleinement les risques de durcissement des législations sur les émissions de gaz à effet de serre dans ses projections à long terme.

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Divulgation ESG en finance : le point sur l’Europe

McCarthytetrault fait le point sur les dernières évolutions de l’Union européennes en matière de divulgation extrafinancière : « L’UE va de l’avant avec la divulgation ESG obligatoire pour les gestionnaires d’actifs et les conseillers financiers » (23 mars 2021). Une belle mise à jour et une perspective canadienne vraiment intéressante. À lire !

Extrait :

Ce que signifient les nouvelles règles ESG de l’UE pour les entreprises canadiennes 

A. Incidences directes et indirectes du régime de l’UE 

L’impact du Règlement ne sera pas limité aux entreprises de l’UE. Les entreprises canadiennes sont susceptibles de ressentir des répercussions directes et indirectes. Comme nous l’avons mentionné plus haut, le Règlement s’appliquera aux gestionnaires de fonds résidant hors de l’UE, dont les Canadiens, qui offrent leurs fonds à des investisseurs résidant en UE en vertu du RNPP, qui devront donc s’assurer que les produits financiers ainsi offerts sont conformes au Règlement.

Les entreprises canadiennes peuvent aussi être indirectement sujettes au Règlement par leurs relations avec leurs homologues de l’UE qui doivent se conformer au Règlement : par exemple, lorsqu’un gestionnaire d’actifs de l’UE a besoin de données provenant de tiers, tels que les gestionnaires de fonds offerts, il pourrait demander à un sous-conseiller canadien de fournir des renseignements qui seraient intégrés dans les déclarations de l’entreprise de l’UE. Il est également possible que les entreprises demandent, par prudence, différentes informations aux entreprises canadiennes jusqu’à ce que le marché s’uniformise.

L’introduction des NTR en 2022 permettra de clarifier davantage les circonstances dans lesquelles le Règlement exigera effectivement une certaine forme de divulgation de la part des entreprises établies hors de l’UE. 

B. Le régime de l’UE comme indicateur des futures obligations canadiennes en matière de divulgation 

Avec le Règlement, l’UE se positionne en pionnière dans la réglementation des divulgations ESG pour les intermédiaires du marché. Au même moment, des pays influents comme le Royaume-Uni et les États-Unis se tournent aussi vers l’introduction de régimes réglementaires similaires. Un virage mondial vers les divulgations ESG semble donc bel et bien amorcé et le Canada ne fera probablement pas exception. 

Au niveau canadien, dès juin 2019, le Groupe d’experts sur la finance durable (« Groupe d’experts ») a remis au gouvernement fédéral son rapport final intitulé Mobiliser la finance pour une croissance durable. Le rapport contient 15 recommandations, dont plusieurs sont substantiellement comparables aux obligations imposées par le Règlement. Par exemple, la recommandation 5.1 du rapport appuie l’introduction d’une approche « se conformer ou expliquer » dans le cadre d’une éventuelle adoption d’un ensemble de normes, dont la popularité est croissante, du Groupe de travail sur l’information financière relative aux changements climatiques (« GIFCC »).

Le rapport du Groupe d’experts indique que l’introduction d’un régime canadien d’information sur les critères ESG n’est probablement pas une question de « si », mais plutôt de « quand ». À mesure que le Règlement et des régimes de divulgation comparables dans d’autres pays et régions entrent en vigueur, les entreprises canadiennes seraient avisées d’adopter ou d’accélérer leurs pratiques de divulgation ESG existantes, soit pour l’ensemble de l’entreprise, soit pour toute offre de produits comportant une composante durable.

Le résultat 

Fidèle à elle-même, avec le Règlement, l’UE est en avance sur les autres dans la mise en œuvre de la divulgation obligatoire relative aux critères ESG. Ce régime sera peaufiné avec l’introduction des NTR en 2022. 

Il est probable que le Règlement aura des répercussions directes et indirectes sur les entreprises canadiennes. Elles doivent non seulement être attentives à quand la conformité est requise, mais aussi s’attendre à ce que leurs collègues de l’UE demandent des informations qui seront incluses dans leurs divulgations. 

Les recommandations de politiques dans plusieurs juridictions, y compris au Canada, indiquent que les exigences en matière de divulgation relative aux critères ESG (au niveau des entreprises et des produits) comparables à celles imposées par le Règlement deviendront des normes mondiales. Les entreprises canadiennes et leurs conseillers devraient surveiller la réaction du marché au Règlement afin de se préparer à l’adoption d’obligations comparables au Canada. Par conséquent, les entreprises devraient se demander si le moment est venu d’améliorer volontairement leurs pratiques de divulgation ESG. 

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La SEC consulte sur le changement climatique

La SEC a publié récemment une nouvelle sur son site indiquant qu’elle chercher l’avis du public sur sa réglementation dans le domaine du changement climatique : « Public Input Welcomed on Climate Change Disclosures » (15 mars 2021). C’est le moment de vous exprimer !

La SEC bouge en ce domaine comme cet extrait du message de la SEC le résume bien : Since 2010, investor demand for, and company disclosure of information about, climate change risks, impacts, and opportunities has grown dramatically. Consequently, questions arise about whether climate change disclosures adequately inform investors about known material risks, uncertainties, impacts, and opportunities, and whether greater consistency could be achieved. In May 2020, the SEC Investor Advisory Committee approved recommendations urging the Commission to begin an effort to update reporting requirements for issuers to include material, decision-useful environmental, social, and governance, or ESG factors. In December 2020, the ESG Subcommittee of the SEC Asset Management Advisory Committee issued a preliminary recommendation that the Commission require the adoption of standards by which corporate issuers disclose material ESG risks.

Extrait :

Questions for Consideration

  1. How can the Commission best regulate, monitor, review, and guide climate change disclosures in order to provide more consistent, comparable, and reliable information for investors while also providing greater clarity to registrants as to what is expected of them? Where and how should such disclosures be provided? Should any such disclosures be included in annual reports, other periodic filings, or otherwise be furnished?
  2. What information related to climate risks can be quantified and measured?  How are markets currently using quantified information? Are there specific metrics on which all registrants should report (such as, for example, scopes 1, 2, and 3 greenhouse gas emissions, and greenhouse gas reduction goals)? What quantified and measured information or metrics should be disclosed because it may be material to an investment or voting decision?  Should disclosures be tiered or scaled based on the size and/or type of registrant)? If so, how? Should disclosures be phased in over time? If so, how? How are markets evaluating and pricing externalities of contributions to climate change? Do climate change related impacts affect the cost of capital, and if so, how and in what ways? How have registrants or investors analyzed risks and costs associated with climate change? What are registrants doing internally to evaluate or project climate scenarios, and what information from or about such internal evaluations should be disclosed to investors to inform investment and voting decisions? How does the absence or presence of robust carbon markets impact firms’ analysis of the risks and costs associated with climate change?
  3. What are the advantages and disadvantages of permitting investors, registrants, and other industry participants to develop disclosure standards mutually agreed by them? Should those standards satisfy minimum disclosure requirements established by the Commission? How should such a system work? What minimum disclosure requirements should the Commission establish if it were to allow industry-led disclosure standards? What level of granularity should be used to define industries (e.g., two-digit SIC, four-digit SIC, etc.)?
  4. What are the advantages and disadvantages of establishing different climate change reporting standards for different industries, such as the financial sector, oil and gas, transportation, etc.? How should any such industry-focused standards be developed and implemented?
  5. What are the advantages and disadvantages of rules that incorporate or draw on existing frameworks, such as, for example, those developed by the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB), and the Climate Disclosure Standards Board (CDSB)?[7] Are there any specific frameworks that the Commission should consider? If so, which frameworks and why?
  6. How should any disclosure requirements be updated, improved, augmented, or otherwise changed over time? Should the Commission itself carry out these tasks, or should it adopt or identify criteria for identifying other organization(s) to do so? If the latter, what organization(s) should be responsible for doing so, and what role should the Commission play in governance or funding? Should the Commission designate a climate or ESG disclosure standard setter? If so, what should the characteristics of such a standard setter be? Is there an existing climate disclosure standard setter that the Commission should consider?
  7. What is the best approach for requiring climate-related disclosures? For example, should any such disclosures be incorporated into existing rules such as Regulation S-K or Regulation S-X, or should a new regulation devoted entirely to climate risks, opportunities, and impacts be promulgated? Should any such disclosures be filed with or furnished to the Commission?   
  8. How, if at all, should registrants disclose their internal governance and oversight of climate-related issues? For example, what are the advantages and disadvantages of requiring disclosure concerning the connection between executive or employee compensation and climate change risks and impacts?
  9. What are the advantages and disadvantages of developing a single set of global standards applicable to companies around the world, including registrants under the Commission’s rules, versus multiple standard setters and standards? If there were to be a single standard setter and set of standards, which one should it be? What are the advantages and disadvantages of establishing a minimum global set of standards as a baseline that individual jurisdictions could build on versus a comprehensive set of standards? If there are multiple standard setters, how can standards be aligned to enhance comparability and reliability? What should be the interaction between any global standard and Commission requirements? If the Commission were to endorse or incorporate a global standard, what are the advantages and disadvantages of having mandatory compliance?
  10. How should disclosures under any such standards be enforced or assessed?  For example, what are the advantages and disadvantages of making disclosures subject to audit or another form of assurance? If there is an audit or assurance process or requirement, what organization(s) should perform such tasks? What relationship should the Commission or other existing bodies have to such tasks? What assurance framework should the Commission consider requiring or permitting?
  11. Should the Commission consider other measures to ensure the reliability of climate-related disclosures? Should the Commission, for example, consider whether management’s annual report on internal control over financial reporting and related requirements should be updated to ensure sufficient analysis of controls around climate reporting? Should the Commission consider requiring a certification by the CEO, CFO, or other corporate officer relating to climate disclosures?
  12. What are the advantages and disadvantages of a “comply or explain” framework for climate change that would permit registrants to either comply with, or if they do not comply, explain why they have not complied with the disclosure rules? How should this work? Should “comply or explain” apply to all climate change disclosures or just select ones, and why?
  13. How should the Commission craft rules that elicit meaningful discussion of the registrant’s views on its climate-related risks and opportunities? What are the advantages and disadvantages of requiring disclosed metrics to be accompanied with a sustainability disclosure and analysis section similar to the current Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations?
  14. What climate-related information is available with respect to private companies, and how should the Commission’s rules address private companies’ climate disclosures, such as through exempt offerings, or its oversight of certain investment advisers and funds?
  15. In addition to climate-related disclosure, the staff is evaluating a range of disclosure issues under the heading of environmental, social, and governance, or ESG, matters. Should climate-related requirements be one component of a broader ESG disclosure framework? How should the Commission craft climate-related disclosure requirements that would complement a broader ESG disclosure standard? How do climate-related disclosure issues relate to the broader spectrum of ESG disclosure issues?

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